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ANA LUIZA VEDOVATO RODRIGUES

OS EFEITOS DA GUERRA NA FORMAÇÃO DE ORDENS REGIONAIS:
PROBLEMAS ANALÍTICOS E EVIDÊNCIAS DESDE A AMÉRICA LATINA

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Dissertação submetida ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais.

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RESUMO

Esta dissertação discute a relação entre guerra, mudança e formação de ordens regionais a partir das evidências do caso latino-americano. O trabalho divide-se em três partes. A primeira parte apresenta uma contextualização do tema como objeto de estudo no campo interdisciplinar das Relações Internacionais e Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais e apresenta a origem das preposições teóricas da pesquisa na literatura das Teorias da Transição de Poder e Estabilidade Hegemônica, da Sociologia Histórica e do Regionalismo. A segunda parte consiste em um artigo científico focado na relação entre guerras e ordens regionais e o caso da América Latina. No intuito de avaliar como guerras definem ordens regionais, analisa-se o efeito da guerra na (I) definição das unidades relevantes na região, (II) na definição da hierarquia regional; e (III) na definição do grau de autonomia regional. Orientando-se pelo referencial teórico-metodológico da Sociologia Histórica e pela revisão crítica das Teorias da Transição de Poder e Estabilidade Hegemônica sobre o papel da guerra na mudança sistêmica e na formação de ordens, o trabalho resgata o caráter contingente das interações conflitivas por meio da reinterpretação de eventos históricos para demonstrar como as sequências, conjunturas críticas e resultados de algumas guerras foram decisivos para a configuração da ordem regional na América Latina desde a Independência. Por fim, na terceira parte do trabalho apresenta-se a agenda de pesquisa na qual o trabalho está inserido e os problemas de pesquisa que se pretende desenvolver em trabalhos futuros. Justifica-se a pertinência da agenda e destaca-se a relevância de estudos sobre guerra e mudança sistêmica para a compreensão das características de ordens e estruturas e para avaliação de continuidades e mudanças em sistemas regionais e internacional.

Palavras-chave: Guerra. Ordem regional. América Latina. Teoria. Relações Internacionais.

ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the relationship between war, change, and regional order formation based on the evidence from the Latin American case. This study is divided into three parts. The first one presents a contextualization of the theme as an object of study in the interdisciplinary field of International Relations and International Strategic Studies, as well as the theoretical propositions found in the literature of Power Transition and Hegemonic Stability Theories, Historical Sociology and Regionalism. The second part focuses on the relationship between wars and regional orders and the analysis of the case of Latin America regional order. In order to assess how war defines regional orders, we analyze the effect of war on the definition of (I) the relevant units in the region, (II) the regional hierarchy; and (III) the degree of regional autonomy. Guided by the theoretical-methodological framework of Historical Sociology and the critical review of Power Transition and Hegemonic Stability Theories on the role of war in systemic change and order configuration, this study rescues the contingent character of conflicting interactions through the reinterpretation of historical events to demonstrate how the sequences, critical junctures, and results of some wars have been decisive for the configuration of the regional order in Latin America since Independence. Finally, the third part of this work presents the research agenda in which this study is inserted and the research problems that are intended to be developed in future studies. The importance of the agenda is justified and the relevance of studies on war and systemic change is highlighted for its centrality to the understanding of the characteristics of orders and structures and for the evaluation of continuities and changes in regional and international systems.

Keywords: War. Regional order. Latin America. Theory. International Relations.

LISTA DE ABREVIATURAS E SIGLAS

CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CINC	Composite Indicator of National Capability
COW	Correlates of War
HS	Historical Sociology
IR	International Relations
ITRA	Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
MID	Military Interstate Dataset
MIDs	Militarized Interstate Disputes
OAS	Organization of American States
PPT	Power Transition Theory
PRIO	Peace Research Institute de Oslo
RI	Relações Internacionais
SH	Sociologia Histórica
TTP	Teoria da Transição de Poder
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America

SUMÁRIO

1 CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO[1]

Este trabalho busca explicar como guerras definem ordens regionais. Para tanto, nesta parte inicial a pesquisa será contextualizada no âmbito dos Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais. O argumento central do trabalho é que a quantidade, intensidade, extensão, forma de emprego dos meios militares e resultados das guerras impactam as três fases de estruturação de uma região:

a) na primeira fase, as guerras são um fator importante na própria definição de quais serão as unidades políticas existentes;

b) na segunda fase, as guerras constituem um dos principais fatores na definição da hierarquia regional, ou seja, de como o poder se distribui entre as unidades políticas de uma região;

c) na terceira fase, que corresponde ao sistema internacional contemporâneo, as guerras entre as grandes potências extrarregionais tendem a definir o grau de autonomia que cada região tem no sistema.

Essas três fases correspondem a mecanismos importantes que dizem respeito a definição de características que compõe a ordem regional, sejam elas:

a) as unidades;

b) a distribuição de poder;

c) o grau de autonomia regional.

Valendo-se de evidências do caso latino-americano, discute-se como as guerras envolvendo a região influíram de modo distinto nas três fases, definindo a ordem regional. Mesmo com especificidades, mecanismos e resultados distintos observados na América Latina, em comparação com a Europa ou Ásia, argumenta-se que também aqui a guerra foi um fator importante na formação dos Estados e da ordem política regional.

Para contextualizar a proposição central do trabalho no campo interdisciplinar das Relações Internacionais e Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais[2], vale destacar que o trabalho

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[1]Este trabalho foi estruturado em três partes e em dois idiomas de acordo com as Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. São as partes: a Introdução ao tema: Contextualização (Primeira Parte) e as Considerações Finais: Agenda de Pesquisa (Terceira Parte), redigidas em português; e o Artigo Científico (Segunda Parte) redigido em inglês.

[2] Cabe mencionar que esta contextualização, correspondente a Primeira Parte da dissertação, tem como base o Trabalho de Conclusão de Curso da autora em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), sobre mudanças na ordem regional sul-americana (2017), bem como artigos com o orientador da graduação nesta mesma agenda de pesquisa, um publicado na revista Debates (2019) e outros em processo de publicação. Também orientam essa contextualização o projeto de dissertação apresentado na disciplina de Seminários de Relações Internacionais. Dado o objeto desta Parte e a afinidade temática entre os temas da agenda

pertence a estes campos na medida em que analisa processos, relações e características do sistema internacional, em particular suas dimensões políticas e estratégicas, inclusive o problema do uso da força, suas finalidades e consequências[3]. Ainda que se privilegie o debate teórico sobre sistemas e estruturas no âmbito das teorias de Relações Internacionais, ao enfatizar o papel da guerra é preciso reconhecer a centralidade das ações, intenções e da incerteza quanto aos resultados dos engajamentos armados na política internacional (PROENÇA JÚNIOR; DUARTE, 2007, p. 37). Assim, entende-se que o problema analisado aqui está inserido nos Estudos Estratégicos na medida em que corrobora a definição do campo como "o ramo dos estudos políticos preocupados com as implicações políticas da capacidade de fazer a guerra" (HALLE, 1984, p. 4, tradução nossa)[4].

Cabe situar, ainda, o alinhamento temático do trabalho nas linhas de pesquisa do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais. A discussão temática deste trabalho afina-se ao objetivo principal do programa, que enfatiza a "[...] dimensão estratégica das relações internacionais e a política internacional das regiões emergentes como seu foco principal (África, Ásia e América Latina), bem como seu papel nas mudanças em curso na ordem internacional." (UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DO RIO GRANDE DO SUL – UFRGS, 2020). O trabalho privilegia observações que vão ao encontro dos objetivos principais da linha de Segurança Internacional e Defesa do Programa ao estudar problemas relacionados ao "fenômeno da Guerra e dos Conflitos Armados a partir, prioritariamente, da perspectiva das Relações Internacionais e das Ciências Militares", por meio de uma abordagem que "leva em conta a agenda e a distribuição de capacidades entre os Estados mais poderosos e a sua relação com o Brasil no nível global de análise (Grandes Potências)" (UFRGS, 2020), conforme descrição de objetivos da linha de pesquisa.

Nesse sentido, o trabalho justifica-se no campo de Relações Internacionais e Estudos Estratégicos, e em específico na área de Segurança Internacional, pelas contribuições que estudos sobre guerra e mudança sistêmica possuem para a avaliação de continuidades e mudanças em sistemas regionais e globais. Ao debruçar-se sobre o caso latino-americano, buscaremos resgatar evidências históricas que corroborem (ou não) o papel decisivo da guerra para a configuração regional, permitindo compreender as condições e contextos que

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de pesquisa, a autora aproveitou discussões dos trabalhos anteriores, buscando conectá-los à proposta deste trabalho nesta contextualização.

[3] Para uma discussão mais aprofundada sobre a relação entre os campos, ver Barry Buzan (1987), Richard K. Betts (1997), Domício Proença Júnior e Érico E. Duarte (2007), Eugenio Diniz (2010) e Érico E. Duarte e Flávio P. Mendes (2015).

[4] No original: "*[...] the branch of political studies concerned with the political implications of the war-making capacity*".

determinaram a formação e as mudanças na ordem regional, as condições nas quais se dão as relações da região com o sistema internacional, e as implicações da conexão entre ordens regionais e internacionais para o entendimento da política internacional e das mudanças em curso no sistema internacional. Ademais, o estudo enfatiza a importância do nível regional de análise, compreendendo sua conexão e especificidades diante de dinâmicas locais, nacionais e globais.

Para além da pertinência do tema, é importante referir o contexto propriamente teórico em que o debate se insere. Três abordagens da literatura são diretamente mais relevantes para este trabalho. A saber, as Abordagens Sistêmicas (Teorias da Transição de Poder e Estabilidade Hegemônica), a Sociologia Histórica e o Regionalismo. O ponto de partida dessa discussão é o problema da mudança sistêmica. Dentre distintas interpretações sobre o conceito de ordem internacional, contrastam visões que tratam a ordem como um padrão de comportamento, criado como subproduto da competição estatal sob o dilema de segurança, reproduzida pelo mecanismo contínuo da balança de poder (WALTZ, 1979; MEARSHEIMER, 2001) e aquelas que compreendem a ordem, prioritariamente, como um conjunto de instituições, regras compartilhadas e elementos de normatividade, articulados como consequência de uma convergência de interesses dos atores do sistema (BULL, 1977; KEOHANE; NYE, 1977; KRASNER, 1982; IKENBERRY, 2001). Para as Teorias da Transição de Poder e Estabilidade Hegemônica, as quais nos referimos aqui como Abordagens Sistêmicas, a ordem é definida como elemento de poder e governança do sistema, derivada de transições de poder (ORGANSKI, 1958; KUGLER; ORGANSKI, 1989) ou da formação de sistemas hegemônicos (GILPIN, 1981), a partir da articulação de arranjos institucionais que refletem interesses dos Estados dominantes (ORGANSKI, 1958; GILPIN, 1981; ARRIGHI, 1994; COX, 1996). Assim, as abordagens sistêmicas reconhecem tanto o caráter estrutural da ordem quanto sua relação com as unidades do sistema e, adicionalmente, a possibilidade de mudança nos sistemas internacionais. Segundo esta abordagem, a guerra figura como elemento importante na compreensão da mudança sistêmica e formação e transformação de ordens.

O trabalho de A. F. K. Organski (1958) em *World Politics* foi pioneiro em centrar-se nessa problemática, apresentando a Teoria da Transição de Poder (TTP), em rejeição ao argumento da Teoria do Balanço de Poder, segundo a qual maior estabilidade sistêmica se daria em condição de paridade de poder. A explicação alternativa, reforçada posteriormente por A. F. K. Organski e Jacek Kugler (1980), Jacek Kugler e A. F. K. Organski (1989) e Jacek Kugle e Douglas Lemke (1996, 2000), argumentava que a estabilidade era mais factível em situações de desequilíbrio de capacidades, mediante a existência de uma potência dominante. Assim, o

foco da teoria na distribuição de poder indicava a importância de observar as capacidades dos Estados e mudanças em sua distribuição a fim de identificar transições sistêmicas. Além do fator distributivo, a transição violenta aconteceria mediante a existência de insatisfação com o *status quo* sistêmico. Nesse aspecto, a TTP oferece uma explicação para o problema de quando a guerra ocorreria: a interação entre as duas variáveis, poder relativo e grau de satisfação com o *status quo*, determinaria a ocorrência de guerra (instabilidade) ou paz (estabilidade). Segundo esse argumento, guerras não aconteceriam sem transições prévias, qualificando a transição de poder uma condição necessária, ainda que insuficiente, para a ocorrência da guerra (ORGANSKI; KUGLER, 1980, p. 50-52; KUGLER; ORGANSKI, 1989, p. 179).

No entanto, para além da explicação sobre suas causas, a TTP destaca-se pelo pioneirismo e potencial em explicar também seus efeitos, aspecto o qual é mais relevante para este trabalho. A teoria argumenta que a guerra levaria a uma nova distribuição de poder e estabelecimento de uma nova potência dominante que, ao final da transição, seria responsável por reformular a ordem com base nos seus interesses, criando um novo padrão de relações estáveis entre os Estados, a partir do estabelecendo de novas regras de comportamento (ORGANSKI, 1958, p. 465). O processo de mudança, mediante a formação de uma nova estrutura de poder, com intuito de preservar interesses das potências dominantes e garantir a estabilidade do sistema (LEMKE; KUGLER, 1996, p. 21; DICICCO; LEVY, 1999, p. 684-685), caracterizaria a formação de uma ordem "[...] definida tanto pela distribuição de poder quanto pelo conjunto de regras e práticas comuns impostas por um Estado dominante." (DICICCO; LEVY, 1999, p. 684-685, tradução nossa)[5].

Embora a variável dependente da TTP seja a estabilidade sistêmica, definida pela ocorrência ou não de guerras, ela fornece amplo potencial explicativo para compreensão de mudanças sistêmicas e formação e transformação da ordem internacional, aspecto que influenciou outras abordagens na disciplina. Seguindo o ciclo de abordagens sobre o problema da mudança sistêmica, foi Robert Gilpin (1981) quem abordou mais diretamente o problema da guerra e sua relação com a mudança *dos* e *nos* sistemas internacionais. Em *War and Change in World Politics,* o objetivo central do trabalho é explicar a natureza da mudança da política internacional (GILPIN, 1981, p. 3). Gilpin (1981) argumenta que a guerra hegemônica[6] seria o principal mecanismo de mudança ao longo da história, devido ao seu efeito de reordenamento

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[5] No original, "[…] *defined both by the distribution of power and the set of rules and common practices imposed by a dominante state.".*

[6] Para Gilpin, a guerra hegemônica é definida como "[...] *a war that determines which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system."* (GILPIN, 1981, p. 15) e pela qual a potência dominante garante seus objetivos e transforma instituições para promover seus interesses.

sistêmico, mediante a criação de um "[...] novo *status quo* e desequilíbrio refletindo a redistribuição de poder no sistema e os outros componentes do sistema" (GILPIN, 1981, p. 15, tradução nossa)[7]. Em semelhança à Organski (1958), o resultado dessa mudança sistêmica teria como componentes a preponderância de poder da nova potência dominante e afirmação de seus interesses no conteúdo da nova ordem (GILPIN, 1981, p. 9).

Sendo a mudança sistêmica a variável dependente na obra de Gilpin (1981), seu trabalho propõe uma classificação de três diferentes tipos de mudanças internacionais:

   a) mudanças de sistema (*systems change*), quando há uma mudança na natureza ou tipo de unidades do sistema (Impérios, Estados-nação etc.);

   b) mudança sistêmica (*systemic change*), mudanças em relação a organização e governança do sistema, quando há mudanças na distribuição de poder e no *status quo* (ordem) do sistema;

   c) mudanças interacionais (*interaction change*), quando há mudanças nas interações, relações interestatais e condições políticas e contextuais sobre as quais as unidades e o sistema estão submetidos.

O trabalho enfatiza a relação da guerra com as mudanças sistêmicas, isto é, mudanças na ordem do sistema. Assim, para os autores das abordagens sistêmicas, tanto na literatura derivada de Organski (1958) quanto de Gilpin (1981), a guerra é uma conjuntura crítica, visto que é a partir dos efeitos desse processo que geralmente se desencadeiam as mudanças *dos* e *nos* sistemas internacionais[8].

Quadro 1 – Tipos de mudança em sistemas internacionais segundo Gilpin (1981)

Mudança	Descrição	Natureza da mudança
Mudança do sistema	Natureza/tipo dos atores ou unidades (Impérios, Estados-nação etc.)	Estrutural
Mudança no sistema (mudança sistêmica)	Governança do sistema (distribuição de poder e ordem)	Estrutural
Mudança interacional	Relações interestatais e condições políticas e contextuais	Interacional

Fonte: elaborado pela autora, com base em Gilpin (1981, p. 40).

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[7] No original, "[…] *new status quo and equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power in the system and the other components of the system*.".

[8] Cabe esclarecer que apesar de abordarem a guerra como condicionante das mudanças sistêmicas, esses autores também consideram a possibilidade de mudança pacífica no sistema. A natureza da mudança (pacífica ou violenta) relaciona-se com a existência de insatisfação ou não com a ordem vigente (status-quo), dando destaque a ordem como conceito-chave na compreensão da mudança sistêmica.

Ao compreender o sistema global como sistema integrado por sistemas regionais, a extensão do debate da TTP para as regiões considera que cada sistema possui uma ordem própria (LEMKE; WERNER, 1996; LEMKE, 2002). A ordem, entendida por essa literatura como o *status quo* é definida como "um conjunto de regras que afeta o comportamento dos membros do sistema" (LEMKE; WERNER, 1996, p. 237, tradução nossa)[9]. No entanto, não há um debate claro a respeito de sua dimensão analítica, visto que os autores consideram que o "status quo pode referir-se a estruturas regionais *ou* relacionamentos" (LEMKE; WERNER, 1996, p. 245, ênfase nossa, tradução nossa)[10]. Ademais, a extensão do debate da ordem para as regiões acabou voltando-se mais sobre aspectos securitários e o problema cooperação-conflito, isto é, o predomínio de guerra ou paz nas regiões (LEMKE; WERNER, 1996; LAKE; MORGAN, 1997; LEMKE, 2002; BUZAN; WEAVER, 2003; STEWART-INGERSOLL; FRAZIER, 2012) do que a um debate estrutural-sistêmico sobre ordens regionais, no qual busca-se avançar nessa dissertação. Isto é, *estrutural* no sentido de preocupar-se com as características e formas de organização dos elementos dos sistemas, e *sistêmico* no sentido de considerar a relação entre unidades, interações e estruturas para compreender as dinâmicas das relações internacionais em sua complexidade.

A relação entre guerra e mudança também é problema central de outras abordagens interdisciplinares às Relações Internacionais, tendo grande ênfase no campo da Sociologia Histórica (SH). Especialmente na obra de Charles Tilly, o papel de processos violentos e do crime organizado na formação dos Estados europeus tornou-se referencial para discutir a relação entre guerra e construção do Estado (TILLY, 1975; 1985; 1990). Na obra de Tilly e na tese bélico-extrativa em geral, a construção do Estado (*state-making*) é tido como aspecto processual associado a atividade da guerra (*war-making*). Assim, a guerra é trabalhada desde uma perspectiva relacional entre as unidades políticas, e não como conjunto de eventos recorrentes ou sequências pré-definidas (TILLY, 1975, p. 50). Portanto, a principal atividade de formação do Estado estaria vinculada a preparação para a guerra (processo) e não apenas à guerra em si (evento), de tal maneira que o efeito da guerra sobre o Estado e o sistema regional em formação teria sido contínuo, tendo "moldado e remoldado o sistema de Estados europeus" (TILLY, 1975, p. 75, tradução nossa)[11] de forma heterogênea e contingente em cada contexto, mas com implicações para a formação de uma ordem regional característica.

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[9] No original, "a set of rules which affect the behavior of the system's members".

[10] No original, "Status quo may refer to regional structures or relationships".

[11] No original, "shaped and reshaped the European state system". Uma vez formado esse sistema, as oportunidades de construção de novos Estados a partir do conflito e preparação para a guerra também foram constrangidas, mas

No livro seminal de 1990, "*Coercion, Capital, and European States Ad 990-1990*", Tilly realiza um exercício interpretativo sobre um longo período histórico (mil anos), buscando justamente identificar as principais variações na trajetória de construção do Estado e sociedades na Europa (TILLY, 1990). Mais do que reiterar a tese de que a guerra foi um fator central na acumulação e concentração de poder que permitiu a predominância dos Estados nacionais como forma predominante de organização política moderna, Tilly procurou identificar nas redes de cidades um elemento diferenciador entre as trajetórias de construção do estado mais coercitivas, mais capitalizadas e aquelas que se revelaram mais bem-sucedidas, de coerção capitalizada (TILLY, 1990, p. 47). O autor também analisa de maneira realista a conexão entre guerra, construção do Estado e os problemas de ação coletiva, barganhas entre súditos e governantes e, eventualmente, revoluções que engendraram, ao longo de séculos, as bases da cidadania (TILLY, 1990, p. 100).

Na Ciência Política e nas Relações Internacionais, a obra de Tilly foi amplamente aclamada, mas também criticada, principalmente devido a ênfase dada ao papel da guerra na formação do sistema de Estados europeu[12]. Alguns estudos chegaram a conclusões que corroboram Tilly (HUI, 2005; THIES, 2004, 2005), enquanto outros destacaram os limites dos mecanismos causais identificados e variações e/ou inconsistências em determinados casos e contextos históricos (MIGDAL, 1988; SPRUYT, 1994; HERBST, 2000; CENTENO, 2002; KURTZ, 2009; TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008). Uma parte dos críticos de Tilly denunciam o "belicismo"[13] da teoria, o seu suposto caráter "eurocêntrico" (HERBST, 2000, p. 22-23; CENTENO, 2002, p. 275) e "darwinista", segundo suas concepções[14] (KASPERSEN, 2002, p. 103; CENTENO, 2002, p. 106; SPRUYT, 2017, p. 88).

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não eliminadas, mantendo seu efeito sobre as unidades políticas e o sobre o próprio sistema, visto que "war became the normal condition of the international system of states and the normal means of defending or enhancing a position within the system" (TILLY, 1985, p. 184).

[12] Para uma revisão da literatura em torno da tese de Tilly, ver Thomas Ertman (2005), Brian D. Taylor e Roxana Botea (2008), Tuong Vu (2010) e Hendrik Spruyt (2017). Para outras contribuições ao debate sobre guerra e formação do Estado, ver Spruyt (2002), Lars Bo Kaspersen (2002) e Ertman (2017). Para discussões sobre Tilly e teoria das RI, ver Hobden (1998).

[13] Em oposição, a literatura que diz concordar com Tilly tem adotado o termo "belocêntrico" (NEXON, 2009; HUI, 2017; KASPERSEN *et al.,* 2017). Estamos de acordo com Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2017, p. 271), para quem o termo é inadequado pois ignora as outras duas variáveis centrais da tese de Tilly, capital e coerção, bem como por remeter a uma tese que seria "*war-like*" e não "*war-centered*".

[14] Segundo esta interpretação, a tese bélico-extrativa seria "darwinista" por causa de sua ênfase no mecanismo de eliminação dos Estados derrotados, exagerando assim os efeitos de seleção. Hendrik Spruyt, por exemplo, argumenta que nem todas as unidades "fracas" foram eliminadas pelos processos violentos (guerra), e afirma que os Estados nacionais era uma de várias alternativas políticas (Ligas de Cidades, Impérios, etc) que acabaram predominando em determinados contextos por razões diferentes, não necessariamente decorrentes de disputas militarizadas (SPRUYT, 2017, p. 88). Entretanto, a existências de competidores, a contingência dos processos e a persistência de "soluções" alternativas ao Estado nacional é explicitamente reconhecida por Tilly (1990, p. 190).

Nas Teorias das RI, tais críticas foram parcialmente adotadas pela literatura que propôs o desenvolvimento de uma "Sociologia Histórica das Relações Internacionais" (HOBDEN, 1998; HOBDEN; HOBSON, 2002), em oposição a Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990) e Theda Skocpol (1979), os quais teriam uma visão "[...] reducionista e neorrealista do Estado e das relações internacionais", para os proponentes dessa visão peculiar de Sociologia Histórica das RI (HOBSON, 2002, p. 20, tradução nossa)[15]. Hobson (2002) buscou desenvolver uma abordagem neo-weberiana da Sociologia Histórica para as Relações Internacionais por meio da proposição de uma "teoria estruturacionista" (HOBSON, 2002). Segundo os críticos, Tilly e Skocpol reproduziriam uma visão "cronofetichista" e "tempocentrista" da disciplina, incoerente com a preocupação central da Sociologia Histórica (HOBSON, 2002, p. 21) e associada ao neorrealismo das Relações Internacionais (BUZAN, 1996, p. 60; HOBDEN, 1998; HOBDEN; HOBSON, 2002; KASPERSEN, 2002, p. 122).

Há pelo menos duas inconsistências teóricas graves nessas críticas. Primeiro, no sentido original atribuído por Waltz (1979) ao neorrealismo, abordagens sistêmicas seriam justamente aquelas que se oporiam ao "reducionismo" de se tentar explicar resultados agregados de política internacional por meio da análise das características da política externa e dos processos de formação de cada estado e de seus regimes políticos (WALTZ, 1979, p. 18). Nesse sentido, se (ênfase no condicional) Charles Tilly estivesse tentando explicar a política internacional, sua teoria poderia ser chamada de reducionista, mas definitivamente não poderia ser chamada de neorrealista estrutural. Como Tilly (1995) afirma que seu objeto não é o sistema ou a política internacional, a crítica sobre o suposto reducionismo de sua abordagem sobre a formação dos Estados fica ambígua e precariamente especificada. Aliás, a aproximação da SH do neorrealismo estrutural ignora diferenças consideráveis, inclusive distintas concepções do Estado e de seus processos de formação e interação (SMITH, 2002, p. 230; HUI, 2017, p. 271). Mesmo que, em termos epistemológicos, ambas tenham ênfase explicativa e voltadas à análise causal (SMITH, 2002, p. 232; HOBDEN 1998, p. 74-175) a associação segue sendo equivocada no sentido de que ambas as teorias (tanto a de Tilly quanto a de Waltz) podem estar corretas ao mesmo tempo em seus respectivos domínios de validade, posto que seus objetos são distintos.

A segunda inconsistência tem a ver com a caracterização da abordagem como "cronofetichista" e "tempocentrista", sendo que seu propósito justamente se caracteriza por romper com a visão etapista, elitista e homogeneizante das teorias funcionalistas sobre o desenvolvimento político (TILLY; STINCHCOMBE, 1997). De tal forma que se torna

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[15] No original, "[…] *neorealist and reductionist theory of the state and international relations*".

incoerente acusar Tilly por levar em conta, em sua teoria, a passagem do tempo e a contingência do futuro em relação às interações presentes. Como reconhece o próprio Stephen Hobden, as críticas a Tilly "[...] não consideram um ponto central sobre a disciplina da SH: a centralidade da noção de tempo e mudança." (HOBDEN, 1998, p. 177, tradução nossa)[16]. Problemático seria se a abordagem de Tilly pretendesse uma explicação unilinear e resultados atemporais, o que certamente não é o caso.

Nos estudos sobre regiões do Terceiro Mundo, a incorporação dessas críticas a abordagem da Sociologia Histórica levou a conclusões precipitadas e ou enviesadas de que a guerra teria menos relevância para a compreensão da formação dos Estados e dos sistemas regionais (SORENSEN, 2001; TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008; DELATOLLA, 2016). Em relação ao caso africano, Jeffrey Herbst (2000) destaca diferenças nos fatores demográficos e geográficos em relação ao caso europeu, argumentando que a ausência de condições semelhantes teria produzido estados fracos no continente africano, impedindo a formação do Estado nos moldes identificados por Tilly para o caso da Europa moderna. Em estudos sobre o Oriente Médio, Ian Lustick (1997) e Dietrich Jung (2006) também consideram que a guerra teria papel menos central na formação dos Estados da região devido a interferência das potências globais. Na América Latina, Centeno (2002) considera que o processo de formação do Estado não teria sido bem-sucedido porque as guerras latino-americanas foram predominantemente limitadas em termos de mobilização e custeadas por meio de endividamento externo (CENTENO, 2002, p. 269). Ou seja, segundo Centeno um efeito "positivo" da guerra sobre as capacidades estatais só seria verificável mediante a ocorrência de guerras totais. De maneira semelhante, Robert Holden aponta que as teses de Tilly "[...] deveriam ser descartadas, para a América Latina em geral e para a região centro-americana em particular." (HOLDEN, 2017, p. 254)[17].

Ainda que esses argumentos encontrem validade no sentido de demonstrarem que as dinâmicas de formação do Estado nas regiões do Terceiro Mundo foram distintas e particulares quando em comparação ao caso Europeu, ao minimizarem a importância da guerra em outros contextos fora da Europa moderna, os críticos de Tilly esquecem que ele ressaltou justamente o caso europeu em sua multiplicidade de trajetórias e irrepetibilidade histórica[18]. O próprio

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[16] No original, "*[...] miss a central point about the discipline of HS: the centrality of the notion of time and change*".

[17] No original, "*[...] should be discarded, for Latin America at large and the Central American region in particular*".

[18] Em *Reflections on the History of European State-Making*, Tilly chega a sinalizar "[…] *the possibility that the Western experience was [...] an aberration, a dead end, or simply one among many paths.*" (TILLY, 1975, p. 4).

autor afirmou ser crítico à ideia de que "existiu um único processo padrão de formação do estado" (TILLY, 1990, p. 193-194, tradução nossa)[19]. Sobre a aplicação da abordagem para diferentes Estados e outras regiões, a tese original de Tilly previa "*enviromental mechanisms*" (TILLY, 2001, p. 24, grifo nosso), isto é, condições e variáveis específicas aos casos analisados, tendo destacado a necessidade de considerar "[...] a experiência de áreas específicas dentro do grande processo internacional" (TILLY, 1975, p. 627, tradução nossa)[20].

No caso dos países do Terceiro Mundo, originados nos processos de descolonização, Tilly destacou que provavelmente tais casos "[...] não se assemelham muito à Europa do século XVI ou XVII" (TILLY, 1985, p. 169, tradução nossa)[21]. Ainda, Taylor e Botea (2008) observaram que, na aplicação da tese a casos contemporâneos, é preciso considerar que nos casos contemporâneos "[...] a guerra ocorre em um sistema de Estados já criado, em vez de agir para criar esse sistema." (TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008, p. 29, tradução nossa)[22]. Isto é, que as condições estruturais e contextuais são completamente diferentes, de acordo com os casos e períodos históricos analisados, mas que apesar dessas especificidades alterarem a proposição original e a relação entre as variáveis, não se descarta a relevância da guerra para a compreensão desses processos, inclusive devido a seus efeitos diversos. Enfim, embora a conclusão geral de que cada região, local e período de construção do Estado teve diferenças entre si seja evidente para quem trabalha na perspectiva da Sociologia Histórica, os resultados empíricos de diferentes investigações de fato contribuem significativamente para o desenvolvimento do debate teórico, permitindo sua (re)discussão em distintas abordagens e objetos de análise, como é o caso do problema deste trabalho.

Trata-se, aqui, de saber se (e como) as guerras têm relevância para a formação de **ordens regionais**. Portanto, para contextualizar tal problema é relevante problematizar também a literatura identificada como Regionalismo (FAWCETT; HURRELL, 1995; BUZAN; WEAVER, 2003; VÄYRYNEN, 2003; HETTNE, 2005; HURRELL, 2007; KATZENSTEIN, 2005; ACHARYA, 2007; FAWN, 2009; NOLTE, 2010). Depois da Guerra Fria, o cenário global de integração e globalização resgatou o papel de processos políticos de cooperação e integração nas e entre as regiões, fortalecendo a importância do nível regional para a compreensão das relações políticas, econômicas, sociais e securitárias internacionais. Tais processos, caracterizados como regionalismo, deram início a uma agenda de pesquisa ampla,

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[19] No original, *"[...] a single standard process of state formation existed"*.
[20] No original, *"[...] the experience of specific areas squarely within the large international process"*.
[21] No original, *"[...] not greatly resemble Europe of the sixteenth or seventeenth century"*.
[22] No original, *"[...] war now takes place in a state system that has already been created rather than acting to create that system"*.

motivando o desenvolvimento de trabalhos e formulações teóricas próprias desse nível de análise, intermediário entre as unidades e as configurações globais do sistema internacional[23]. Estudos a respeito das particularidades dos sistemas regionais do Terceiro Mundo passaram a considerar e sublinhar a importância de analisar-se os níveis de autonomia de uma dada região em um dado período histórico em relação a outras estruturas (KELLY, 2007; CASTELLANO, 2017), aspectos onde o problema da formação e características de ordens regionais passaram a ganhar relevância.

No caso da América Latina, a tese de que a guerra não teria centralidade na construção dos Estados (CENTENO, 2002; KURTZ, 2009, 2013; HOLDEN, 2017) coincide, com variações, com a caracterização da América Latina como uma "zona de não-guerra" (HOLSTI, 1996, p. 154), ou como uma "zona de paz" no mundo contemporâneo (KACOWICZ, 1998; MARTÍN, 2006; BATTAGLINO, 2012). Esses dois tópicos, apesar de aparentemente distintos e muitas vezes não relacionados na literatura sobre a região, convergem para o problema da configuração e características da ordem regional. Mesmo um autor como David Mares (2001), que discorda da tese de que a América Latina seja uma zona de paz, recorre a evidências sobre a prevalência de Disputas Interestatais Militarizadas (MIDs) na região para corroborar a tese a existência de uma "paz violenta" na região. O número e a recorrência de MIDs, além das altas taxas de homicídio observadas na América Latina, certamente desautorizam caracterizar a região como sendo "pacífica". Ainda assim, o problema de se avaliar o papel específico das guerras permanece.

Apesar de aparentemente distintos e muitas vezes não relacionados na literatura sobre a região, esses dois tópicos convergem para o problema da formação e características da ordem regional. Considero que o conceito de ordem se refere a como a região está organizada em termos de unidades constituintes, distribuição de poder e grau de autonomia em relação ao sistema internacional como um todo. Portanto, para caracterizar uma ordem regional é preciso considerar os padrões de cooperação e conflito na região e a forma como os Estados e regiões comportam-se e relacionam-se diante do sistema internacional. Uma ordem regional qualquer não surge *ex nihilo*. Ela se constitui a longo prazo, ao longo de um determinado período histórico. Por isso, tão importante quanto entender esses padrões e relacionamentos no presente, é compreendermos como as guerras ocorridas desde os processos de independência definiram a ordem regional ao longo de um período que, se não é milenar como no caso europeu estudado por Tilly, abarca já mais de duzentos anos. Até porque muito da literatura regionalista na

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[23] Ver, por exemplo, Robert Kelly (2007, p. 199) e Igor Castellano (2017, p. 32).

América Latina caracteriza-se por um forte "*present-bias*" (RIVAROLA PUNTIGLIANO; BRICEÑO-RUIZ, 2013, p. 4; PETERSEN; SCHULZ, 2018, p. 107). Ao adotarmos uma perspectiva histórica mais ampla, que nos permite capturar o processo de passagem de uma ordem regional quase totalmente heterônoma e ditada pelo colonialismo para uma ordem regional formada por estados independentes e desiguais, o estudo sobre a região possibilita um diálogo mais qualificado entre o fazer teórico universalizante e a atenção às especificidades históricas (CENTENO; LÓPEZ-ALVES, 2001, p. 3).

Em resumo, por meio do estudo de um fator crítico (a guerra) e um recorte macro-histórico (desde as independências até o começo do século XXI), espera-se explicar uma "*big structure*" (ordem) e um "*large process*" (formação da ordem), para usar um par de expressões consagradas por Tilly (1984) a respeito da análise comparativa histórico-sociológica. Por meio de uma comparação intra-caso, que busca analisar os distintos efeitos da guerra sobre aspectos da ordem regional em distintos períodos históricos, o recorte temporal proposto assume que a transição de uma ordem regional heterônoma (no período colonial) para uma outra ordem regional, potencialmente mais autônoma (desde o período pós-independências) é longa, contingente e foi de fato influenciada de modo decisivo pelo papel que a guerra cumpriu em diferentes conjunturas críticas e períodos formativos. Ao encerrarmos a análise nos anos 2000, não queremos dizer que o processo se conclua ali. A delimitação em fases é um recurso para sistematizar o predomínio de determinados efeitos da guerra sobre a região em determinados períodos, identificando certos padrões no processo histórico e permitindo a comparação intra-caso.

Esta contextualização inicial apresentou uma descrição geral dos objetivos do trabalho, discutindo seu enquadramento na área de Relações Internacionais e Estudos Estratégicos, sua justificativa social e acadêmica, a delimitação do tema na literatura e o marco teórico e temporal adotados no artigo apresentado a seguir. Na segunda parte desta dissertação, o artigo científico analisa como guerras definem ordens regionais, considerando o caso latino-americano. Por fim, na terceira parte do trabalho, expõe-se a agenda de pesquisa da autora e os problemas e desafios em aberto diante dos interesses da pesquisa.

2 BUILDING ORDER FROM CHAOS: the effects of war on the formation of the Latin-American regional order

ABSTRACT

This paper presents an analysis of how war defines regional orders. The main argument is that war defines (I) the relevant units in the regions, (II) the distribution of power among them, and, collectively, (III) the degree of autonomy that regions have in relation to the international system, thus characterizing the regional order. In the case of Latin America, war was instrumental in defining the contemporary regional order following a historical path consistent with our argument. Wars between 1800 and 1859 forged the main political units of the region. The distribution of power among the units were also defined through wars that occurred between 1860 and 1939. Finally, the global conflicts between 1940 and 2000 (World War and Cold War events) reiterated the limits of regional autonomy in Latin America. In response to arguments opposing the centrality of war, based on the alleged inadequacy of Charles Tilly's thesis to the case of Latin America, we intend to rescue the contingent character of conflictive interactions and the integration of levels of analysis to demonstrate that war outcomes matter to understand the region, particularly the regional order formation. While Historical Sociology emphasizes the formation of the units, Power Transition and Hegemonic Stability theories discuss the effects of war in the governance of the international system. Based on the critical analysis of the three theoretical approaches and the reinterpretation of historical events, this study demonstrates how the sequences, critical junctures, and outcomes of some wars were decisive for the configuration of the regional order in Latin America since the independence period.

Keywords: War. Regional Order. Latin America. Theory. International Relations.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The debate on the role of war in state formation is controversial when referring to peripheral regions and, especially, to the Latin American case. According to one of the most influent studies on the topic, "war did not make states in Latin America" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 163), in contrast to Charles Tilly's aphorism (1975, p. 42) that "war made the state" in Europe's modern history. Miguel Centeno's (2002) thesis presents that the wars in Latin America in the last two hundred years were more limited than the ones in Europe, which mobilized a smaller proportion of the total population and were financed through external debt. As a result, states have become weaker (not stronger), and bargaining for rights has not occurred in the same way as in Europe, limiting the scope of citizenship in the region. By pointing out that war had less centrality in the political structuring processes, previous studies have reinforced that state

formation in Latin America should be explained by variables other than war[1]. Unfortunately, such assumptions could lead one to wrongly underestimate the role of war on the regional formation. Therefore, the main goal of this article is to correct such biased interpretation by analyzing the distinct roles war historically played in the formation process of the Latin America's regional order.

Two preliminary considerations are required. First, other causal factors and social mechanisms are certainly important to be recognized in order to understand the state formation in Latin America. Although the fact that the war was different and had a "weakening" role for states and citizenship, this does not mean that such a role was irrelevant. Instead, the findings of Centeno (2002) and the qualifications of other studies indicate that the implications of this aspect of war in terms of low extractive capacity, tax injustice, capacity to defend national sovereignty, respect for popular sovereignty, military autonomy in relation to the civil power, and repressive profile (anti-insurgent) of the armed forces in the region were significant and lasting[2]. Indeed, the war did not "make" states in Latin America in the same way as in Europe. However, it does not follow that war is not relevant to explain states' formation and other important structural characteristics in the region. Further than being "strong" or "weak", the common feature of states in Latin America is their authoritarian origin and their anti-popular bias, at the service of economic elites, which is object of contention and recurring conflict until today. Latin American wars have reiterated both this specific social character and its lasting influence in the states of the region since independence[3].

Second, the level of analysis at which the phenomenon is observed in this study is different from the current literature that debates the role of war in the region. Our concern here is regarding the role of war in the historical formation of the contemporary regional order in Latin America. Thus, in our study, Tilly's legacy is more relevant when he demonstrates that history is a critical component for analyzing mechanisms and processes of change (TILLY,

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[1] Examples are the works of Barbara Geddes (1996), Marcus J. Kurtz (2009, 2013), Miguel A. Centeno; Agustin E. Ferraro (2013), Ryan Saylor (2014), Hillel David Soifer (2015) e Robert H. Holden (2017). Among the variables addressed by these works, aspects of social relations, the role of elites in the processes of decolonization and independence (GEDDES, 1996; KURTZ, 2009, 2013; SOIFER, 2015; HOLDEN, 2017) and the international economy and economic cycles (SAYLOR, 2014) stand out.

[2] The relevance of the correlation between war and state formation in Latin America is addressed by Fernando López-Alves (2000); Cameron Thies (2005), Sabine Kurtenbach (2011) and Luis L. Schenoni (2020), considering different systemic conditions. Thies (2005), for example, sought to overcome the limitation of the initial framework by adjusting the explanatory variable, focusing on interstate rivalries instead of interstate wars (THIES, 2005, p. 451). From a macro-historical approach, other important studies were the ones presented by K. J. Holsti (1996), Jared Diamond (1997) and Douglass North et. al (2009).

[3] For a more detailed discussion of these dimensions in Latin America state-building processes, see Pedro Borba (2014, 2019).

2001). In fact, our aim is to answer a question from Centeno, who correctly stated that "Latin American cases forces us to ask once again how war actually produces order from chaos" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 27). With some profligacy, we consider the independence period as the "chaos", the critical juncture from which the current configuration of the existing regional order in Latin America has been shaped over two centuries, questioning the role that other wars also had in that process.

Our hypothesis is that wars had a decisive impact on different aspects of the regional order over time. From 1800 to 1859, wars of independence, civil wars, and wars of dissolution and/or conquest defined how many and which political units would exist in Latin America. New political units emerged after that (Cuba in 1902 and Panama in 1904, for example). However, most of the political units currently existing in the region were defined as the result of wars that occurred in the first half of the 19th century. In a second period, from 1860 to 1934, interstate wars and revolutions, either of greater or lesser success, defined the hierarchy between regional and local powers in Latin America. Winners became more powerful (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, for example), and losers lost their ability to dictate the rules and opportunities to accumulate wealth and military power in the region (Bolivia and Paraguay, for example). Finally, in the period from 1935 to 2000, global conflicts between great powers (World War II and Cold War), or asymmetric conflicts involving extra-regional powers (Cuba and Malvinas/Falklands War) defined the limits of autonomy that the region (and its regional powers) could aspire in the international system. In a more abstract and potentially comparative terms, the argument is that war defines regional order in three different features and in different structuring periods of a regional order:

a) war defines the relevant units in the regions;

b) war defines the distribution of power among the units and, collectively;

c) war defines the degree of autonomy of the regions vis-à-vis the international system.

It is worth clarifying the general meaning attributed to the concepts of "war", "order", and "regional" in this study. By war, we mean the armed conflicts occurred between collectivities or, considering a strict Clausewitzian definition, the acts or threats of violence against enemies in order to guarantee political objectives (CLAUSEWITZ, 1976, p. 75)[4]. In this regard, war assumes distinct characteristics and variations throughout history. In addition

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[4] In the classical definition of Clausewitz (1976, p. 75), "War is thus an act of violence to force an opponent to fulfill our will" and "nothing but a personal combat on a larger scale". Furthermore, "War is the mere continuation of political intercourse by other means" (CLAUSEWITZ, 1976, p. 87).

to material metrics (logistics, weapons, organizations, and people)[5], war involves symbolic and subjective elements. The processes of capital mobilization and coercion interact with bargains and conflicts between social classes (TILLY, 1975, p. 42). The cumulative effects of conflicts are also manifested in economic, cultural, and social revolutions; therefore, an understanding of war capable of going beyond the armed interstate conflicts definition is required here.

As for the concept of order, we follow the understanding of Robert Gilpin (1981), who characterizes order as the form of organization in terms of power distribution and institutional configuration of an international system, in a given historical period (GILPIN, 1981, p. 15). The component of the international system structure plays a fundamental role in the organization and governance of the system in question. The order is characterized by a specific distribution of power, by its predominant institutional configuration, and by the socioeconomic constraints that need to be considered by actors when strategically acting (CEPIK, 2013, p. 308).

Finally, our concept of region considers territorial contiguity and insertion in the international system as a whole (VOLGY et al., 2017). We follow the definition of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever: "Regions, almost however defined, must be composed of geographically clustered sets of such units, and these clusters must be embedded in a larger system, which has a structure of its own" (BUZAN; WAEVER, 2003, p. 27). Therefore, in the regions, order constitutes the connecting element between the region and the international order. Moreover, its definition contemplates the degree of regional autonomy, i.e., the relative position of the region in the international system and the capacity of its existing states to articulate interests and make decisions in the face of the constraints imposed by the international structure[6].

Despite the existence of several contributions relating the international order formation to violent processes of change, mainly derived from power transitions and disputes over the governance of the system (e.g., ORGANSKI, 1958; KUGLER; ORGANSKI, 1989; GILPIN, 1981), such a debate is still incipient at the regional level of analysis[7]. When considering regions as geopolitical spaces defined by the contiguity and interactions among units (VOLGY et al., 2017, p. 458), with a degree of connection in relation to the international structure and specific

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[5] For example, taxonomies that follow quantitative criteria, such as those of the Correlates of War Project (COW), Military Interstate Dataset (MID), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Oslo Peace Research Institute (PRIO). One of the shared criteria interprets war as a conflict between two or more members of the interstate system that produces at least 1000 deaths per year (SINGER; SMALL, 1972; SARKEES; WAYMAN, 2010, p. 75).

[6] For a more in-depth discussion of the concept of autonomy, see Russell; Tokatlian (2008).

[7] Exceptions are studies like ones of Lemke; Werner (1996) and Lemke (2002). Another exception is the study of Igor Castellano (2017), who analyzes the relationship between war, state-building, and regional order in the formation and execution of the southern African states' foreign policies.

dimensions of analysis[8], it becomes possible to recover the importance of the role of wars for the regional configuration and transposing the debate from the global to the regional level of analysis. We also follow Gilpin (1981) in our understanding of system and systemic change[9], considering these changes essential to comprehend the process of order formation on the regional level of analysis.

In order to evaluate our hypothesis, the discussion was articulated in two main sections in this paper. In the first section, we approach the problem of the relationship between war and regional order from a critical review of the war-making/state-making thesis in Historical Sociology (TILLY, 1975, 1985, 1990), the Power Transition Theory (ORGANSKI, 1958) and the Hegemonic Stability Theory (GILPIN, 1981). Although focused on different levels of analysis, these approaches complement each other to explain the effect of war on the regional order formation considering its different historical trajectories. The integration of the levels of analysis allows the construction of a theoretical model to analyze, in the second section, the effects of war on the formation of Latin America's regional order between the 1800s and 2000s. On this basis, we conclude by presenting the main results of the research and discussing advances and theoretical challenges for the study of the relationship between war, change, and regional orders, highlighting the importance of the effects of war to understand the characteristics of the Latin American regional order and its effects on state behavior and regional autonomy in the face of the constraints of the international system.

2.2 BETWEEN SYSTEMIC APPROACHES AND HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

The finding that state-building trajectories followed different patterns from those identified by Tilly (1990, p. 30) in the case of Europe has inhibited the analysis on the effects of wars in Latin America and other Third World regions (SORENSEN, 2001; HERBST, 2000; CENTENO, 2002; TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008; DELATOLLA, 2016). Even recognizing the negative effects of warfare (e.g., low social mobilization and external indebtedness) on the extractive capacities and provision of public policies in Latin American states, as observed by Centeno (2002), for this same reason it is also necessary to ask ourselves about other cumulative effects that war could have had on the formation of the states and the region. For instance, when

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[8] Thus, it is admitted that regions have particular structures and interactions, configuring regional orders with limited degrees of autonomy in relation to the international order.

[9] That is, changes in the nature/type of the units of the system (system change) and concerning the organization of the system (systemic change), like changes in the distribution of power and the *status quo* (order).

analyzing how the region is structurally organized nowadays, it is crucial to comprehend its historical formation and the possible effects of war in this process, whereas the order formation, due to its structural character, is a long-term process.

Therefore, in order to discuss the relationship between war and regional order, which is the primary purpose of this study, it is necessary to review the literature that somehow discussed this relationship. The broader notion of Historical Sociology (HS) about the role of war in the configuration of international political structures stands out (HINTZE, 1975; WEBER, 1978; TILLY, 1975, 1985, 1990; ELIAS, 1982). However, the literature on war and state-building in Historical Sociology (TILLY, 1975; 1985; 1990) focuses mainly on the level of units. On the other hand, theorizations on the problem of war and the international order, for instance, the Theory of Power Transition (ORGANSKI, 1958) and the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (GILPIN, 1981), are restricted to the global level, are restricted to the global level and barely discuss the effects of war in the regions. Likewise, the literature associated with Regionalism tends to focus on institutional aspects and regional levels of economic interdependence and/or integration[10], and does not discuss the role of war in any of these processes. Otherwise, Regionalism tended to associate the problem of war/peace more as a result of a given order[11] than as a catalyst of order formation, as proposed here. Therefore, when the three perspectives are isolated, none of them allows an adequate assessment of the problem of how wars define regional orders. Even though, we believe that when together, they provide an adequate framework for assessing the issue of how regional orders are formed and how they change, as well as the role of war in this process.

2.2.1 The problem of order and the Systemic Approaches

Order is one of the main and most recurring concepts addressed in the International Relations literature. Such centrality contrasts with the lack of consensus on its definition and operationalization (VEDOVATO, 2017). Different interpretations of the concept of order also

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[10] The uses of the concept of order in the literature of Regionalism still tend to associate the order with the degree of regional cooperation and/or integration (SOLINGEN, 1998; AYOOB, 1999; ACHARYA, 2007, 2011; PAUL, 2012; GARZÓN PEREIRA, 2014).

[11] For instance, David Lake and Patrick Morgan (1997, p. 9) define regional order as "the mode of conflict management within the regional security complex" (LAKE; MORGAN, 1997, p. 11). Barry Buzan; Ole Weaver (2003) follow a similar definition, associating the concept of order with patterns of relationship between states that are part of a region or a given Regional Security Complex. Robert Stewart-Ingersoll; Derrick Frazier also restrict their definition to the security field, defining regional order as the "governing arrangements among the units of a regional system, including their rules, principles and institutions" (STEWART-INGERSOLL; FRAZIER, 2012, p. 20).

imply different possibilities for evaluating processes of formation and transformation in international orders. After all, how are international orders formed? Moreover, how do they maintain or change in the system? In this study, regional order is conceptualized as the structural element that characterizes the way a region is structurally organized in a given historical context, in terms of the units that are part of this system, the distribution of power in it, the predominant institutional configuration and its degree of regional autonomy.

In the literature, while some views treat the order as a pattern of behavior in the absence of world government and as a trend reproduced by the balance of power mechanism (WALTZ, 1979; MEARSHEIMER, 2001), others consider the material-institutional dimension and, therefore, admit its potential for change even in the absence of a fully developed global government (BULL, 1977; KEOHANE; NYE, 1977; KRASNER, 1982; IKENBERRY, 2001; ORGANSKI, 1958; KUGLER; ORGANSKI, 1989; GILPIN, 1981; COX, 1996). In the 1960s, the balance of power theory predominated over the way of thinking about the behavior of states and international conflicts. Scholars started to question the need to understand the meaning of these transformations for the configuration of the international system[12]. More recently, even a classic realist author like Henry Kissinger recognized that,

> […] all of the major centers of power practice elements of Westphalian order to some degree, but none considers itself the natural defender of the system. All are undergoing significant internal shifts. Can regions with such divergent cultures, histories, and traditional theories of order vindicate the legitimacy of any common system? (KISSINGER, 2014).

Among the different approaches on the concept of order, the contributions of Power Transition and Hegemonic Stability Theories, which we refer here as Systemic Approaches[13] (ORGANSKI, 1958; KUGLER; ORGANSKI, 1989; GILPIN, 1981) directly debated these issues. By offering a robust theoretical framework to think about system and systemic changes, these approaches gave centrality to war as an active element in the formation and transformation of international orders. Originated in Organski's Power Transition Theory (PTT), this approach characterizes order according to the distribution of power and the establishment of rules of governance and behavior that guarantees the stability of the system (ORGANSKI, 1958, p. 465; DICICCO; LEVY, 1999, p. 684-685). Due to this concept, PTT considers that order is at the

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[12] About the limited explanatory potential of the traditional approaches of the discipline about mechanisms and processes of change, check Ole Holsti et al. (1980), Barry Buzan and RJ Barry Jones (1981), John Gerard Ruggie (1983, 1989) and James Rosenau (1990).

[13] Systemic because they consider both the units and the structural elements as interdependent features of international systems.

center of power transitions, which would be predominantly violent and would happen due to the dissatisfaction of states with the systemic status quo (order). Thus, war would trigger changes considering its direct effect on the distribution of power, leading to the definition of new dominant powers. After a war, this new configuration would give rise to a new order. This illustrates the opposition of PTT to realism and the balance of power approaches, which have a view of international order as a continuous and recurrent pattern of behavior.

The relationship between war and change was deepened by Gilpin (1981) in the Hegemonic Stability Theory with the intention to understand more broadly the nature of change in international politics (GILPIN, 1981, p. 3). Gilpin's understanding of order reinforces a view of order as the configuration of the system at a given historical moment, reflecting the "redistribution of power in the system and the other components of the system" (GILPIN 1981, p. 15). The configuration of the system and, therefore, of the order, would occur after the systemic changes resulting from hegemonic wars[14]. Although the relationship established by Gilpin focuses on a specific type of war, ignoring the role of violent conflict more broadly, he advances in relation to PPT by building a detailed framework regarding types of international change, which recognizes both centrality to systemic changes[15] and the possibility of change of international systems[16]. Gilpin (1981) deepens the notion of war as a critical juncture by observing its effect on "[...] the nature and governance of the system itself and/or, more rarely, the character of the international actors themselves" (GILPIN, 1981, p. 46). Hence, these approaches consider the effects of war, at least, on the change of I. the nature of the units, II. the distribution of power; and III. the system governance (order).

Thus, in contrast to realist approaches, which emphasize the structural anarchical character of the international order, Systemic Approaches offer a framework to analyze the formation, transformation, and rupture of hierarchical orders. Although initially focused on the analysis of the international order, the systemic character of these approaches signals the possibility of reproducing similar mechanisms at the regional level of analysis (LEMKE;

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[14] In his definition, hegemonic war is a type of war that determines the order formation, since its objective would be to define "which state or states will be dominant and will govern the system" (GILPIN, 1981, p. 15). This definition derives from Aron (1964, p. 359), who defines hegemonic war by its extension and by the mobilization of dominant powers (ARON, 1964, p. 359). The concept is further explored in Gilpin (1988).

[15] According to Gilpin (1981, p. 40), systemic changes are changes in relation to the governance of the system (order), characterized by revisions in the distribution of power and in the systemic status quo.

[16] System changes occur when there is a change in the nature or type of system units (Empire, nation-states, etc.), according to Gilpin (1981, p. 40).

WERNER, 1996; LEMKE, 2002)[17]. Therefore, this framework can help the task of analyzing the origins and conditions of order formation from violent processes that enhance both structural and unit-level changes. Considering these perspectives, we could overcome the understanding of order as a simple result of institutional processes, as usually reproduced by the literature of Regionalism, as well as the irrelevance of war to regional formation.

The demarcation of the analysis at the global level leave important gaps regarding the regional level. In order to further assess the "system change", which is directly related to the nature and type of the units, according to the classification of Gilpin (1981, p. 40), one cannot ignore the problem of state formation, which is the focus of Historical Sociology discussion. We review the contributions of the literature on war and state formation, referring to these gaps and, therefore, advancing our argument and our analysis model design.

2.2.2 War and change in Historical Sociology

The link between war and change is also a central concern of studies derived from Historical Sociology[18], albeit at a level of analysis focused on the units. The emphasis on macro-processes of social change gained expression with the so-called "New Historical Sociology" theorists (ELIAS, 1982; GIDDENS, 1985; MANN, 1986, 1988; SKOCPOL, 1979; TILLY, 1975, 1985, 1990), giving rise to a research agenda focused on the analysis of war as one of the central factors that trigger these processes (HINTZE, 1975; WEBER, 1978; TILLY, 1975, 1985, 1990; ELIAS, 1982). The war-making/state-making thesis by Charles Tilly (1975, 1985, 1990) stood out for its extension and emphasis on the role of violent processes, especially war, in European state-building. From a relational perspective, which valued processes, context, and temporal-spatial specificities (TILLY, 1975, p. 50), Tilly's historical-comparative method advanced in relation to the modernization theories on state formation[19], giving rise to other studies from his referential.

As a result, Tilly's work has been extensively revisited in different cases. While some studies corroborated and advanced the research agenda of the war-making/state-making thesis

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[17] Despite extending the PPT literature to the regional level of analysis, these authors focused more to the cooperation-conflict problem – namely, the predominance of war or peace in the regions – than to the original PPT debate about power transitions and systemic changes in the regions (LEMKE; WERNER, 1996; LEMKE, 2002).

[18] For more elaboration on the field of Historical Sociology, check Charles Tilly (1980), Theda Skocpol (1984, 2008) and James Mahoney (2004).

[19] On this point, see Lars Bo Kaspersen *et al.* (2017, p. 12-14) and Benno Teschke (2017, p. 31-34). On a discussion about method in Tilly's Historical Sociology, see Tilly (1981, 1984, 2001).

(THIES, 2004, 2005; LEANDER, 2004; HUI, 2005), others concluded that the approach was limited in some cases and historical contexts (MIGDAL, 1988; SPRUYT, 1994; HERBST, 2000; CENTENO, 2002; KURTZ, 2009; TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008). Especially in the Third World, scholars have suggested that war would have less relevance for understanding the formation of states and regions (SORENSEN, 2001; TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008; DELATOLLA, 2016). In studies about regions as Africa (HERBST, 2000), Middle East (LUSTICK, 1997, JUNG, 2006), and Latin America (CENTENO, 2002), the literature started to observe that the limited character of war would have produced less capable states. Concerning the Latin American case, for example, the work of Centeno (2002) gave rise to a consensus that the Latin American wars would have had a predominantly negative effect on the process of state formation due to their limited character, reinforcing violent patterns and indebtedness instead of the strengthening of the state (CENTENO, 2002, p. 269). If, on the one hand, these studies corroborated Tilly's study by presenting a counterfactual for the claim that war produced more capable states in Europe, on the other hand, they argued that the war-oriented approach did not explain the cases in the Third World[20] and, therefore, needed to be overcome in favor of alternative explanations[21].

From these new theoretical and empirical studies, much criticism arose against Tilly's approach, which came to be called "bellicist", "Eurocentric" and "Darwinist" (SPRUYT, 2017, p. 86), rejecting the argument that the intensity and the regularity of war in Europe would have enabled the construction of more capable states[22]. According to some critics, Tilly's approach tends to be seen normatively, as if total or recurrent war was desirable for the processes of social change and state-building[23]. In fact, it is necessary to recognize the explanatory potential of other variables, observing the local context and particularities, without rejecting the role of war in these processes or taking it as a desirable normative prescription[24]. In the processes of construction and development of peripheral states and regions, wars produced different effects from those observed in Europe. Nevertheless, they were also relevant to the configuration of the states and the regional order.

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[20] On Latin America, for example, Robert Holden points out that Tilly's thesis "should be discarded, for Latin America at large and the Central American region in particular" (HOLDEN, 2017, p. 254).

[21] See, for example, Sorensen (2001), Herbst (2000), Taylor; Botea (2008), and Delatolla (2016).

[22] For a literature review on the contemporary debates about Tilly's thesis, see Thomas Ertman (2005), Brian D. Taylor; Roxana Botea (2008), Tuong Vu (2010) and Hendrik Spruyt (2017). For other contributions to the debate on war and state formation, see Spruyt (2002), Kaspersen (2002) and Ertman (2017). For discussions of the connection between Tilly and IR theory, see Hobden (1998).

[23] Check Herbst (2000, p. 22-23), Kaspersen (2002, p. 103), Centeno (2002, p. 106), Spruyt (2017, p. 88).

[24] For a detailed answer to Tilly's critics, see Victoria Tin-bor Hui (2017, p. 269-273).

2.2.3 Approaching levels of analysis: war, timing and regional orders

In order to overcome these gaps and assess inconsistencies and challenges of the existing contributions on the problem of war, change, and order formation, it is necessary to first, recover the importance of war to understand macro-processes of change, in general, and secondly, to admit different temporal dimensions and different roles of war against different elements, in particular. To begin with, if we differentiate the role of war on unit formation from its effect on the development of state capacity and material or institutional attributes of states[25], the contributions of Systemic Approaches and Historical Sociology can be incorporated into an analysis model to assess how wars define regional orders. As explored by the literature, the effect of war on the capabilities seems to occur in a different timing, due to the interaction of war with other conditions and variables, which are sensitive to specific contexts and mechanisms of the cases under analysis. The idea that "less war, or less intense war, leads to weaker states" (TAYLOR; BOTEA, 2008, p. 30), reinforced by Tilly's critics, is restricted to thinking about the effects of war on material attributes from the states when compared to more "successful" cases, as the European one. Furthermore, a second problem is that these perspectives ignore the need to observe the context of the wars and how these wars were fought and the effects, negative or not, that they triggered. Different types of war lead to different effects, so the relationship between war and attributes of state power is neither linear nor conclusive, producing cumulative effects to state and regional formation.

Another aspect concerns the incorporation of this framework into the International Relations literature. According to Stephen Hobden (1998, p. 178-179), HS would be useful to International Relations only by providing it with a theory of the state, due to an "inconsistent approach to theorizing the international system". However, we argue that it is necessary to point out and recover its potential of observing the structuring and changing processes that are broader, thus enabling the possibility to extend the debate to the regional level of analysis. As Douglas Lemke pointed out (2019:1006), these traditions provide us with lessons of the importance of observing crosstemporal connections and how "past events and outcomes influence subsequent events and outcomes" (Lemke 2019:1006).

Considering that the Historical Sociology literature provides not only the object and variables of analysis but also a theoretical-methodological framework that values and assists the observation of macro-processes of change and temporal-spatial specificities, we understand

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[25] As Spruyt (2017, p. 85) observes, it is necessary to "distinguishing the state as a juridical entity from its governing capacity".

that it is possible to question the other effects of war in processes of system's formation beyond the definition of units. Authors who made the connection between Historical Sociology and International Relations theories highlighted their relationship with neorealist and neo-institutionalist approaches (HOBDEN, 1998, p. 177; HOBDEN; HOBSON, 2002, p. 274). Although, as they substantially ignored their affinity with other contributions, such as the Systemic Approaches (e.g., the Power Transition Theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory)[26], which are much closer to the HS in terms of its focus on understanding systemic processes and changes as well as the emphasis given to war as a central variable.[27].

From the approximation of these perspectives, the state formation process can be framed as equivalent to the fundamental principle of system formation and/or change considering the definition of the units of the system, as investigated by Tilly. According to Gilpin's model, changes in the nature of the actors or entities (GILPIN, 1981, p. 39–40) are characterized as system changes. Thus, the definition of the structural foundation of the systems is related to the processes of definition of units[28]. However, in addition to these changes, the Systemic Approaches emphasize the role of war in the processes of systemic change, i.e., the internal changes to the system regarding the distribution of power and its characteristics and rules of structuration and governance (order). Hence, there is support in the literature to affirm that war is a crucial variable for analyzing system and systemic changes and, therefore, the formation and transformation of structures in different contexts and levels of analysis, including the regional one. Nonetheless, such effects vary in time, space and context, mainly through three mechanisms, as shown in Figure 1.

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[26] About Historical Sociology affinity with systems theory in IR, check Spruyt (1998).

[27] Kaspersen (2002), for example, argues that "only 'the realists' within international relations […] remained in business with some explanatory power" (KASPERSEN, 2002, p. 101) about the importance of war for understanding social and policy changes. In addition to ignoring the limitations of realism in understanding international change, the author ignores contributions from other approaches that relate war and change, such as the Power Transition and the Hegemonic Theories.

[28] Such a mechanism is also approached by Buzan et al. (1993). The authors consider the structural foundation as the "deep structure" of the systems, defined by its organizational principle (hierarchical or anarchic) and the functional differentiation of the units (the type of units). The flexibility of its model admits the possibility of change in deep structures, in contrast to structural neorealism (e.g. WALTZ, 1979, p. 96).

Figure 1 – Theoretical model: levels and impacts of war on regional order

Source: author's elaboration.

We build our theoretical model (Figure 1) based on the critical review of these different approaches, considering the contingent character of war outcomes on macro-historical processes (HANAGAN; TILLY, 2010, p. 247). Through the study of a critical factor (war) and a macro-historical approach (from independence until the beginning of the 21st century), we explain a "big structure" (order) and a "large process" (the formation process of the order), to use a pair of expressions enshrined by Tilly (1984) regarding the historical-sociological comparative analysis. Through an intra-case comparison, which seeks to analyze the different effects of war on aspects of the regional order in different historical periods, the proposed time frame assumes that the transition from a heteronomous regional order (in the colonial period) to another regional order, potentially more autonomous (since the post-independence period) is long, contingent and was decisively influenced by the role that the war played in different critical situations and formative periods.

Therefore, the effect of war on the definition of regional orders would be cumulatively produced through three predominant mechanisms that correspond to different time and contextual phases "inherently contingent, discontinuous, and open-ended" (SEWELL, 2005, p. 110). Initially, by its effects on the definition of the units of a given region (state formation processes). Secondly, the outcomes of wars would change the distribution of power, thus defining the regional hierarchy. Finally, the degree of regional autonomy would be determined both by the cumulative effects of the other phases and the role of war (global conflicts).

Therefore, wars are manifested both as events[29] and as processes[30], which are characterized as critical junctions with contingency properties and cumulative effects, identifying a path-dependent process of change (MAHONEY, 2000).

2.3 REGIONAL ORDER FORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Focusing on the three predominant mechanisms of the definition of regional orders (unit selection, hierarchization and autonomy), we analyze the Latin American case to trace back the effects of independence wars and post-independence conflicts on the definition of the main political units in the region (1800-1859). Then, we analyze the relation of the main interstate conflicts of the region with the definition of power distribution between the units (1860-1939). Finally, we discuss the implications of global conflicts (such as World Wars and Cold War) regarding the regional autonomy (1940-2000). It is not necessarily a matter of discussing which wars had or did not have effects on the order setting, but of analyzing how the interaction between war and order formation takes place, using the Latin American case as empirical evidence of this process. Because of that, for our examination, the role of war over these three dimensions is more important than the identification of the types of war or their classification considering intensity or scope[31].

2.3.1 War defines the units (1800-1859)

Decolonization and independence processes that led to the formation of political units in Latin America erupted in the region at the beginning of the 19th century. Between the 1810s and 1830s, the formation of political units took place predominantly through conflictive dynamics: through wars of dissolution and reconfiguration of the previous political units. In Spanish America, the conflict led to the fragmentation of political units, while in Portuguese America, to the confluence into a single unit (CARVALHO, 2003, p. 13)[32].

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[29] Namely, "[...] temporally concentrated sequences of actions that transform structures" (SEWELL, 2005, p. 273).
[30] In Tilly's definition, the "combination or sequences of mechanisms", being the mechanisms a "delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements" (TILLY, 2001, p. 25-26).
[31] For a discussion about the taxonomy of Latin America wars, check Tássio Franchi et al. (2017).
[32] An exception to this initial phase of independence is the Haitian Revolution (1791-1803), which led to the independence of Haiti, the first occurred in the region. Subsequently, conflicts of independence in Santo Domingo, which became the Dominican Republic (1820-1844), and Cuba (1868-1898) also produced new states in the region.

Of the five existing units during the colonial period – four Spanish vice-kingdoms and colonial Brazil, – 17 independent states were formed by the end of the 1830s. On that context, events in Europe (French Revolution, the reforms, and the Napoleonic Wars) and in the United States (American Revolution) served as "catalysts for Independence" (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 19), accelerating and influencing ongoing processes that led to colonial separations (BUSHNELL, 1985, p. 95)[33]. Thus, the construction of the political orders of the units in the region cannot be reduced to the processes of independence, originated in the cumulative effects of the colonial period and the ongoing global transformations. What differs in this period (1800-1859) is the effects of war on the definition of units, i.e., on the establishment of the geopolitical limits of states.

In Spanish America, the process of disintegration of the Viceroyalty was engendered by the crisis of legitimacy of Spanish domination in the Americas, after the reforms of Carlos III in Spain and the Napoleonic occupation[34], erupting questions regarding the power structure and the political order in the colonies. In the 1810s, the establishment of colonial *juntas* claiming autonomy from the Viceroyalty led to major independence conflicts across the region. The disintegration process of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1810-1823), which began in 1796 with Francisco de Miranda, was intensified by the establishment of the Caracas *Junta* in 1810, leading to the declaration of Venezuela's independence in 1811. Then, the declaration of independence of the United Provinces of New Granada took place in the same year. The independence was achieved between 1819 and 1822, when Spanish forces were expelled from New Granada, culminating in the formation of Great Colombia (1819-1831). The subsequent dissolution of Great Colombia in 1831, after the result of the armed conflict with Peru over disputed territories (1828-1829)[35], gave rise to Ecuador, Venezuela, and the Republic of New Granada (present-day Colombia).

In the Viceroyalty of the River Plate (1810-1824), the Buenos Aires council, which was established in 1810, preceded a series of independence conflicts that extended from 1810 to 1818. These conflicts led to Paraguay's independence in 1811 and gave rise to the United

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[33] This contrasts with the approaches in which independence resulted exclusively from external processes, as for Centeno (2002), independence wars "did not result from internal changes in the colonial societies. The independence wars disrupted the old order, but they did not establish an alternative system of domination" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 157).

[34] On the origins and historical context of Spanish American independence, see John Lynch (1973); Jay Kinsbruner (1994) and Jaime Rodríguez O. (1998).

[35] Declarations at the Panama Congress in 1826 about Great Colombia's intention to incorporate regions of Peru and Bolivia into their territory led to a conflict with the union between 1828 and 1829. As a result, Peru and Bolivia secured their governments under the command of Gamarra and Santa Cruz, while Great Colombia was dissolved in Nova Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 122). The conflict also started a series of territorial disputes between Peru and Ecuador, which lasted in the region until the end of the 20th century.

Provinces of the River Plate in 1816[36]. However, the establishment of independence did not lead to the immediate union of the territory. Instead, it erupted a new series of conflicts between Buenos Aires and the provinces from 1820 to 1861. The Cisplatine War, a conflict against the Brazilian Empire in the territory of Banda Oriental, led to the independence of Uruguay in 1825, which was recognized in 1828. Conflicts with the provinces resulted in Bolivia's independence in 1825. Only after a series of civil conflicts and disputes involving the disjunctive federalism and union between the remaining provinces (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 70), the Argentine Republic was established in 1861.

The Viceroyalty of Peru (1810-1831), the center of Spanish colonial power in South America remained, during the independence period, as the center of the Spanish reaction to autonomy movements. Lima remained loyal to the crown. However, the general captaincy of Chile, following the independence movements in New Granada and the River Plate, claimed its status as an autonomous republic in 1810 (BUSHNELL, 1985, p. 106). In 1818, the Chilean declaration of independence took place in the context of a war of independence, which lasted until 1826, when Spain stopped efforts to recover the territories. Peru became independent only in 1821, after Argentine and Chilean involvement in the armed conflict. From 1822 to 1824, Lima was assured under the command of José de San Martín with the dispute over the rest of the territory.

In the Viceroyalty of New Spain (1810-1829), the *Grito de Dolores* led by Miguel Hidalgo in 1810 initiated an eleven-year war of independence, which ensured the independence of the Mexican Empire in 1821. Unlike South American processes, the Mexican case had a revolutionary origin. Instead of being centered on the urban Creole elites, it stemmed from a predominantly *mestizo* and indigenous protests (HALPERIN DONGHI, 2005, p. 126). In that process, independent Mexico inherited a politically fragmented nation, struggling to secure its territory (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 98). In 1823, Central America dissociated itself from the empire, forming the United Provinces of Central America, which, in turn, went through a series of internal conflicts between 1826 and 1840. These conflicts led to the end of the union and gave rise to Nicaragua (1838), Honduras (1838), Costa Rica (1838), and El Salvador (1841), with the rest of the territory forming Guatemala (1841). The remaining territories of the former Viceroyalty were divided between the Philippines and Cuba and Puerto Rico. Both islands in the Caribbean were ceded to the United States after the Spanish defeat in the Spanish-American War in 1898.

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[36] Until 1831, and after that, the Argentine Confederation (1831-1861).

Although reflecting in the European changes during the early 19th century, the Brazilian independence, proclaimed by the Portuguese Emperor Dom Pedro I in 1822, was another exception in the context of Latin American independence[37]. With British support and early international recognition, Brazil ensured a less violent and more conservative transition towards independency (BETHELL, 1985, p. 196). Nonetheless, even Brazil was noticeable for a series of rebellions: internal and external conflicts that conditioned its formation, even though it did not trigger a formal war of independence. Brazilian involvement in military activities before independence, such as the occupation in French Guiana (1808-17) and Banda Oriental (1821), and the incorporation of the province of Cisplatine, outlined the path towards union in post-independence after expeditions in the North and Northeastern Brazil against forces loyal to Portugal (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 99)[38]. In 1825, after winning over the Confederation of Ecuador, Brazil ensured its post-independence unit (CARVALHO, 2003, p. 13)[39].

In the post-independence period, conflicts involving territorial disputes and internal rebellions, which sought to shape and remodel the units, continued to mark the state-building process and regional order formation. For instance, in Brazil, even after guaranteeing its unit after colonial liberation, a series of separatist revolts between 1831 and 1849 continued to challenge the boundaries of the independent state. In the Platine region, conflicts involving geostrategic issues linked to River Plate Basin, such as the Cisplatin War (1825-1828), *Guerra Grande* (1836-1852), and the *Platine* War (1851-1852) characterized Argentine expansionism and competition with Brazil (LÓPEZ-ALVES, 2000, p. 81). These conflicts led to an intense and lasting rivalry with significant implications for state formation in the countries of the Southern Cone.

In 1836, another reconfiguration in the political map of the region came with the articulation of the Peru-Bolivia Confederation. This union, which posed a threat to Chile due

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[37] The Napoleonic occupation in Portugal and the transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Brazil in 1808, with the subsequent formation of the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarve, in 1815, are factors identified by the literature as conditions of the process of independence in Brazil. However, these movements are also seen as a strategy to contain the trends of independence underway in Spanish America and the various Brazilian territories, since it guaranteed the approximation of the Portuguese crown to the Brazilian oligarchy. According to Bethell, "It was the Portuguese revolutions of 1820, the return of the Portuguese court to Lisbon in 1821 and Portugal's determination to reverse the political and economic gains since 1808 which forced the Brazilian dominant class (which included many Portuguese-born) along the road to independence" (BETHELL, 1985, p. 195).

[38] Driven by attempts to promote political order, social stability and guarantee territorial unity in post-independence, the brief Brazilian "war of independence" was characterized by conflicts with troops in the North and Northeast, in the territory that remained loyal to Portugal (BETHELL, 1985, p. 196). One of the most expressive revolts in 1824 led to the temporary formation of the Confederation of Ecuador, in Northeastern Brazil, as an independent republic.

[39] In the same year, the Cisplatine province was lost due to Uruguayan independence, in the context of the conflict with Argentina during the Cisplatine War (1825-1828).

to the combination of wealth and geographical extension, resulted in the war that became, as called by Robert Burr (1965, p. 38), a "campaign to achieve the second independence of Chile", which lasted until 1841. The dispute involved the Chilean conflict with Bolivia over the Atacama region and the competition between Valparaíso and Callao as the main ports and commercial areas on the South American West coast. In 1837, Argentina also declared war on the Confederation, using the conflict as a unifying element in the face of ongoing regional and internal disputes, fighting for the province of Tarija with Bolivia and seeking to guarantee influence in the nearby provinces (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 143). In 1839, the Chilean victory in the Battle of Yungay forced the dissolution of the Confederation. The victory and the economic and political prosperity achieved between 1830 and 1850 made Chile a symbol of stability and national cohesion in the region (SAFFORD, 1985, p. 415). This meant, for Chile, the re-establishment of the balance of power in South America (BURR, 1965, p. 57)[40].

From 1835 to 1848, Mexico faced the most critical disputes in its territorial definition in conflicts with Texas and the United States[41]. The defeat, fixed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (1848), resulted in the annexation of Texas by the United States in 1845 and the loss of a great area to the United States, almost equivalent to the current size of the Mexican territory. Regardless of the degree of social mobilization and the way the wars were financed, the importance of the outcome of these wars is emphasized by Scheina (2003a, p. 196), who says that while the war allowed the United States the necessary resources to develop the country into a great power, for Mexico, the result defined its lower position in the hierarchy of power. The Mexican case clearly illustrates the effects of the war outcomes on the definition of units (and their hierarchy) in the region.

Based on these processes, the conditions and legacies under which these states integrate the international system and constitute the region determine how these systems will be organized[42]. Therefore, besides the debate over how much and how such wars would explain the nature of independent states (CENTENO, 2002, p. 130), it is important to consider the effect of the outcomes of the wars and conflicts of independence. The influence of the international context on the processes of independence and the direct engagement in conflicts – as in wars in the colonies – and indirectly – as in interventions in regional conflicts – illustrates that Latin

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[40] As noted by Robert Burr (1965), "dramatic victory at Yungay consecrated in the minds of Chilean leaders the idea that their nation's security was dependent upon maintenance of a balance of power" (BURR, 1965, p. 57).

[41] The period comprises the Independence of Texas (1835-36), the wars between Mexico and Texas (1836-44) and the Mexican American War (1846-48).

[42] Although focused on a different problem, i.e., how the origins of States influence their subsequent war experiences, the term "birth legacies" used by Lemke; Carter (2016) can be useful to describe the mechanism pointed here (LEMKE; CARTER, 2016, p 497).

America was no longer isolated or fully subordinated to the international system at the beginning of the 19th century, as recognized by Centeno (2002, p. 269)[43].

War, in its different forms and scales, played a fundamental role in the formation of the political units that made up the political region later called Latin America. Although the effects are multiple and could be further explored, the aspect that we emphasize when analyzing the problem of the order and the regional system is precisely the political formation of the units in number, as a result of the fragmentation disputes, and in dimension, due to the territorial delimitations that followed these conflicts. This initial phase corresponds to the formation of the regional system itself and, in terms of Gilpin (1981), to a system change, due to changes in the nature and type of the units. Therefore, independence and state-building conflicts mark the transition from a colonial order to a post-colonial, independent order formation in the region. An important feature of this order, fundamental to the current definition of the regional order, is defined by which and how many units will exist in this system. Moreover, taking into account the contingent and non-linear process characteristic of the state formation in Latin America (KNÖBL, 2011, p. 15) and the continuous character of its influence on the attributes of the units, changes in their capabilities begin to be delineated as a result of the definition of borders and demographic aspects, with significant losses and gains in territory and population. The definition of capabilities, which characterizes systemic change, is expressed in the following period, with the main regional interstate conflicts that occurred in the region.

2.3.2 War defines regional hierarchy (1860-1939)

With the definition of the main political units at the end of the 1850s, after the cycle of post-independence conflicts involving the political delimitations and the state formation in the region, the period from 1860 to 1939 allowed these states to start acting in the guarantee or expansion of their material achievements of the previous period. In Mexico, the Mexican Revolution (1910-1914) had important effects on state capacity, political organization, and

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[43] According to the author, war "does not have built states because they were too isolated in time and space to have the necessarily cumulative effect" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 269). In Latin America, "while war may have played a significant role in the development of some European states, its explanatory power wanes on crossing the Atlantic" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 20). In addition to the important temporal and contextual differences of the region in relation to the process of state formation in European countries, even in the face of contextually similar processes, there are important factors that illustrate the specificities of the formation of the regional order. The independence of Latin American countries, in contrast to the American case, takes place in a context of declining colonial powers. In North America, on the other hand, independence occurs in the context of a conflict between great powers. In both, however, the effects of the international order are relevant, demonstrating the connection between the region and the international system since its formation.

social integration[44]. In Central America, a series of failed wars seeking to recreate the Central American Confederation ended up reaffirming the division and the weakening of the political units in that subregion[45]. In South America, the new phase was marked by major interstate conflicts that challenged the position of states in the hierarchy of power and the regional order. The War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870), the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), and the Chaco War (1932-1935) are the cases that stand out for their great impact on the configuration of the system in terms of power, as a result from the involvement of the leading regional powers in the conflict and the negative effects for Paraguay and Bolivia on the regional hierarchy[46].

Despite different readings on the War of the Triple Alliance or the Paraguayan War (1864-1870)[47], this war fundamentally distinguished from previous conflicts due to its origin in a regional dynamic (DORATIOTO, 2002, p. 20) and because it had as its center a power struggle, moved by a rising state dissatisfied with the configuration of the regional order at that time (SCHWELLER, 2006, p. 116). In search of territorial expansion and control of the River Plate region, Paraguay's reaction in defense of Uruguay before Brazilian intervention in 1864 initiated the rivalry between the countries (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 302). After invading Brazilian territory in the region of Mato Grosso and having transit to access Brazilian territory denied in Argentina, the Paraguayan intervention in Argentina separatist rebellion led to the union of the countries of the River Plate region in the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, in 1865, in opposition to Paraguay. The weight of the alliance surpassed Paraguayan capabilities in demographic, military, and economic terms, which led to a war of intense destruction that lasted five years[48].

The War of the Triple Alliance was "the result of the national state-building process in the River Plate region and, at the same time, a milestone of its consolidation" (DORATIOTO, 2002, p. 23, our translation). Thus, it cannot be dissociated from previous conflicts and the processes of state formation. On the other hand, it marks a new phase in the configuration of the regional order due to the impact of the war on the definition of the distribution of power in

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[44]. On the Mexican Revolution and the influence of internal conflict on Mexico's state capacity, see Francisco Garfias (2018).

[45] Meredith R. Sarkees; Frank W. Wayman (2010), as classified in the Correlates of War (COW), refer to the series of interstate conflicts as "First Central American War" (1876), "Second Central American War" (1885), "Third Central American War" (1906) and "Fourth Central American War" (1907). Among other factors and specific contexts, the conflicts were aimed to recreate the Central American Confederation.

[46] As noted in the previous section, examples of internal state consolidation wars in Brazil, as well as internal disputes between Buenos Aires and the federalist provinces in Argentina, are also important factors in understanding capacity building in the region. In this phase, they reinforced the effect on the definition of the hierarchy of power, determining the structural conditions of the regional system from then on.

[47] For discussion, see Doratioto (2008) and Centeno (2002, p. 55, note 16).

[48] The intense military development project carried out by Solano López in Paraguay would have made the country's army, in 1814, the strongest in South America (WILLIAMSON, 1992, p. 205).

the River Plate region. The destruction of Paraguay in demographic, territorial, and political aspects "confirmed that it would remain a small, landlocked nation" (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 316). This frustrated its aspiration to consolidate its leadership and military preponderance in the region (SCHWELLER, 2006, p. 116). For Uruguay, the war enabled the end of a long cycle of conflicts in the River Plate region involving Brazil and Argentina, consolidating its existence as a buffer state between the two regional powers. In Argentina, the conflict led to a rise in terms of capabilities and consolidation as the second center of power in the region, enabling the guarantee of its national unity. For Brazil, the war was an opportunity to strengthen the national army and regain its preponderant role in the region (DORATIOTO, 2002, p. 484).

In the context of the Chilean dispute over the Bolivian coast territory[49], the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) took place because of the Bolivian decision in 1878 to increase in ten cents the taxes on mineral exploration in the region. This decision opposed to the agreement of the 1874 treaty[50], leading Chile to claim the domain over the territory (BURR, 1965, p. 138). The refusal of Peru, Chile's traditional rival in the region, to remain neutral in the conflict became a central issue in the dispute involving the preponderance of power in the region. Even with the Bolivian truce, Chile ended the war with dominion over the coast. The country gained sovereignty over the region's territory and mineral resources, which left Bolivia a landlocked nation. In relation to Peru, Chile conquered the territory of Tarapaca and occupied the regions of Tacna and Arica[51]. In addition to increasing its capabilities and territory, the result of the war allowed Chile to reduce Peru "to the status of a third-rate power" (BURR, 1965, p. 166), defining a new distribution of power in the region and confirming Chile's role as a dominant power on the South American West coast (SCHEINA, 2003a, p. 365). For Peru and Bolivia, the destruction of infrastructure, loss of territory, and scarcity of economic resources have confined the fate of these countries as secondary powers in the Latin American hierarchy of power.

As a result, the War of the Triple Alliance and the War of the Pacific had significant implications for the distribution of power in the region. Both wars suppressed Bolivia and

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[49] The dynamics involving Chile, Bolivia and Peru have roots in other regional conflicts, such as the War of the Confederation (1836-1839). Chile's victory against the Confederation both dismembered the union and strengthened Chile's position in the hierarchy of power. This version is reinforced in the Peruvian historiography about the war, which tends to attribute the cause of the conflict to Chilean expansionism in the region (BURR, 1965, p. 138).

[50] According to the agreement, Bolivia would ensure that taxes on Chilean exploration in the region would not change over the next 25 years (BURR, 1965, p. 138).

[51] The tension between Chile and Peru over these territories would endure for the next few years and would only be solved in 1929, with the Tacna-Arica Agreement, when the Tacna region were returned to Peru, and Chile remained with the territory of Arica only.

Paraguay states, which became since then weak states in the region's dynamics (MARES, 2001, p. 35). Nonetheless, this condition was reaffirmed in the context of the dispute over the Chaco Boreal region, which led to the Chaco War (1932-1935). As a background, the conflict stemmed from the defeats in the Paraguayan and Pacific wars. Both nations sought to claim part of the territory and to recover their capabilities. As Bolivia had lost access to the sea to Chile in the War of the Pacific, the access to the Paraguay River by the Chaco Boreal region was essential. In Paraguay, the conquest of Chaco was seen as a compensation after the catastrophe of the War of the Triple Alliance (FARCAU, 2011). The collapse of the Bolivian army in 1935 allowed Paraguay to control 90% of the Chaco region, ending with twice as the territory it had at the beginning of the conflict (SCHEINA, 2003b, p. 108; FARCAU, 2011, p. 3).

Thus, when Centeno says that marginal conflicts like the Chaco War "mattered little to even their own neighbors" (CENTENO, 2002, p. 59), the author ignores their significant and reiterative effects on the regional hierarchy of power. Although the Chaco War and other low-intensity conflicts, such as the Conflict of Leticia (1932) and the Zarumilla War (1941), had limited character and involved small states in the region, they considerably influenced the dynamics of the regional order. For example, the Zarumilla War (1941-1942), the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, resulted in the Peruvian occupation in the Zarumilla region. In this war, Ecuador lost about 40% of the claimed territory (MARES, 2001, p. 36). In the same period, the series of wars in Central America prevented again the political unit in a Confederation, which could have configured a stronger state in Latin-American regional dynamics (MARES, 2001, p. 35). By exposing defeated states to conflict, these wars determined the lower position of these units in the hierarchy of power, as smaller states in regional dynamics. The historical variations in the capacities of the main Latin American states over the entire period slightly changed the distribution of power among the units, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 – Latin America: material capabilities, CINC, 1840-2010

Source: author's elaboration, based on data from CORRELATES OF WAR-COW (2015).

The War of Triple Alliance led Brazil and Argentina to rise as regional powers, destroying Paraguay. Similarly, the War of the Pacific allowed Chile to remain predominant, reinforcing its position as one of the region's leading powers and minimizing Peru and Bolivia positions. In the Chaco War, the conflict between the main losers of these wars reinforces its inferior position, deeply damaging its capabilities. However, in addition to interstate wars and civil wars, this second phase was also marked by the possibility that social revolutions could change the hierarchy of power in the region. The most emblematic case was that of Mexico. Despite having bequeathed social, economic, and institutional advances, the Mexican Revolution was insufficient to reverse the unfavorable power distribution vis-à-vis the United States. The US own interventions during the revolution and the extent and intensity of the conflict reinforced the constraints to which the Mexican state was subjected to its projection of power.

Thus, as a result of the wars, the regional hierarchy of power was defined in a pattern that lasted until the end of the 20th century: winners ascended the regional hierarchy of power, and losers saw their aspirations and capabilities collapse. Without disregarding their particularities, war as a political phenomenon significantly impacted the configuration of the

regional order. The resulting distribution of power remained relatively stable until the end of the century, defining the hierarchy of power in the region until nowadays.

2.3.3 War defines the degree of regional autonomy (1940-2000)

The 1940s ushered a new phase in the configuration of the regional order. Interstate conflict in the region decreased significantly during this period (KACOWICZ, 1998; MARES, 2001; CENTENO, 2002)[52]. On the other hand, social revolutions, the emergence of global conflicts, and the region's involvement in hemispheric disputes demonstrate the growing connection of the region with the international sphere, accentuating the consequences of international dynamics for the region. This change occurs in the context of the globalization process of capitalism, indicating the growing expansion and reach of the system, time when the international system becomes global. The mobilization of Latin American countries during World War II and the Cold War also means for the region the consolidation of the United States as a global power and regional hegemony, either through direct involvement or the influence of global conflicts in the internal dynamics of the region. Thus, the effect of global conflicts on the dynamics of the region cannot be dissociated from the analysis of the United States-Latin America relations[53], giving rise to a growing hemispheric position under American influence.

In that period, the region's relationship with the United States was favored by the weakening of the region's commercial and financial ties with Europe after the First World War. In Latin America, the interwar years inaugurate "a new form of external domination" (ALBERT, 1988, p. 4), marked by the oscillation between Pan-Americanism (and the Good Neighbor Policy) and the direct interventions of the Big Stick policies. In the period that preceded World War II, the change in the nature of extra-regional threats, in the face of the growing perception of threat on the actions of Germany and Japan, arouse greater attention about the United States' role in the region. In 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Central American and Caribbean countries signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the Axis countries. Despite not signing the initial declaration, Mexico declared war in May 1942 and Brazil in August of the same year. Most of the other countries assumed a neutral position, maintaining cooperation and alliance with the United States, except for Argentina and

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[52] This period is classified as part of the "long South American peace" (BATTAGLINO, 2012; CENTENO, 2002; KACOWICZ, 1998; MARTÍN, 2006), the "non-war zone" period (HOLSTI, 1996, p. 154) or, according to a more critical view, a "violent peace" period (MARES, 2001).

[53] Hence, the emphasis on US-Latin America relations can be understood as the analysis of "how the United States has chosen to apply and exercise its perennial predominance" (SMITH, 2008, p. 5).

Chile[54]. In that context, economic, military, political, and ideological ties between Latin America and the US were strengthened (BETHELL; ROXBOROUGH, 1992, p. 6).

The engagement in the alliance with the US served as an instrument of internal bargaining for the political forces in many countries[55]; however, it also considerably limited the possibility of external economic bargaining. The closure of markets and the impact of the war on foreign trade produced inflation in local economies (BRATZEL, 2006, p. 20). As a result of direct participation in the war, the American military and economic assistance to Brazil and Mexico allowed a significant increase in their capabilities during this period. In the Brazilian case, a series of treaties, loans, and economic and military benefits were reached in exchange for the strategic position in the Northeast of Brazil (BRATZEL, 2006, p. 19). Countries with ongoing industrialization projects, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, experienced an accelerated industrial and urban growth during and shortly after the war (BETHELL; ROXBOROUGH, 1992, p. 21). The high oil prices also benefited Mexico and Venezuela. Colombia had its army modernized as a result of its participation in the defense of the Panama Canal (BRATZEL, 2006, p. 20-21).

On the other hand, after the end of World War II, the articulation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (ITRA) in 1947, the Bogotá Pact with the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948, and other bilateral military assistance treaties strengthened hemispheric collective defense mechanisms under the hegemony of the United States. In the context of the Cold War, these mechanisms were selectively mobilized against "subversive" threats framed according to the dichotomy in force, which opposed the capitalist United States to the communist Soviet Union (WEIFFEN, 2012, p. 369). Competition among global powers has intensified, especially after the Cuban Revolution in 1959, with the emergence of a third world perspective of non-alignment also in the region (DOMINGUEZ, 1999, p. 34; BRANDS, 2010, p. 3). With the occurrence or threats of social revolutions, the American agenda reinforced the subordination of local, national, and regional dynamics to the US interests as a global power. It was a period marked by external intervention, ideological

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[54] At the time, Argentina and Chile opposed to cut relations with the countries of the Axis. As a result, these countries received significantly less military aid from the US when compared to the others (BRATZEL, 2006, p. 16-22).

[55] For example, "Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela all used their particular assets, geographic and economic, to gain what they wanted out of the war. Colombia wished to remain sovereign in the face of terrific power, Ecuador wanted safety from Peruvian attacks, and Venezuela used its oil to gain royalty concessions" (BRATZEL, 2006, p. 22-23).

polarization, and authoritarian and dictatorial regimes (SMITH, 2008; BRANDS, 2010)[56]. Therefore, the cycle of diplomatic pressures, covert operations, and American interventions in Latin America was restored (SMITH, 2008, p. 208; WRIGHT, 2017, p. 206)[57].

Following that, the growing cycle of economic dependence[58]. and military intervention in the post-Cold War period posed direct challenges to the autonomy of the region. The crises in Central America in the 1980s, the militarization of drug trafficking with the war on drugs in Colombia (1982-2001), and the various interventions in conflicts in the region continued to reaffirm the securitization and militarization of the American actions in the region, with the recurrent opposition and subordination of governments and social groups (DOMINGUEZ, 1999, p. 46; SMITH, 2008, p. 213 -306; CEPIK, 2013, p. 318)[59]. The region's low autonomy was also manifested in episodes such as the Malvinas/Falklands War, in 1982, and the Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador, in 1995. In Malvinas, the Argentine decision to recover the territory and claim sovereignty over the islands ended up frustrated by the defeat against the British forces. This demonstrated the disparity of power and the limits of Argentine capacities vis-à-vis the global powers[60]. The United States declaration of support for the United Kingdom in the conflict, which contradicted ITRA's interpretation as a mutual assistance mechanism in the inter-American system, led to the challenge of Latin American countries, paving the way for the crisis in hemispheric security mechanisms. In the conflict between Peru and Ecuador in the Cenepa valley - the mediation that led to the declaration of peace resorted to the Rio Protocol - reiterated the role of the United States over the region[61].

After the 9/11 attacks, the American presence in the region was strengthened again, aimed at the recovery of hemispheric defense mechanisms in the context of the War on Terror, imposing a security agenda based on the US global interests over the region (CEPIK, 2013, p.

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[56] Examples are the Bolivian Revolution (1952), the Cuban Revolution (1956-1959), the Venezuelan Revolution (1958) and several urban *guerrillas* characteristic of the Cold War period in Latin America (SCHEINA, 2003b; BRANDS, 2010).

[57] The overthrow of the government of Jaco Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the interventions in the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, the support for the coup against Salvador Allende in Chile and the interventions in Nicaragua in the 1980s are examples (DOMINGUEZ, 1999, p. 42). About the previous cycle of North American interventions in the Caribbean, see Dana Munro (1964).

[58] The main proposals of that period occurred in the context of the Washington Consensus, in 1989, and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in 1994.

[59] In the subsequent period, the military invasion of Panama in 1989 and the occupation of Haiti in 1994 are examples.

[60] At the regional level, the Argentine decline was even more evident after Malvinas/Falklands War, which allowed the rise of Brazil as the main pole of power in South America. On the effects of the Malvinas/Falklands War on the distribution of capabilities in the region, see Luis L Schenoni (2018).

[61] Signed in 1942 as a result of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian War of 1941-1942, the Rio Protocol aimed to solve the historical political disputes between the countries, with the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile as guarantors. In the context of World War II, the engagement of the United States reflected the intention to strengthen the American presence in the region.

318). The limits of autonomy and structural constraints were reiterated based on the prolonged regional hegemonic heritage forged by the US in World War II and the Cold War. Even during and after the attempts to organize political action at the sub-regional (UNASUR) and regional (CELAC) institutional realms in the first decade of the 21st century, the limits of regional autonomy are evident. Created to ensure a more institutionalized regional order, these organizations were vital mechanisms to challenge the limits of autonomy. However, regional order features, as the limited systemic alignment conditions under the US hegemony, the states' low mobilization capacities and the limits of regional autonomy restrain the possibilities of a more autonomous political action in the region through these initiatives. Thus, besides other conjectural conditions, the order itself limited the advance of the regionalist processes in Latin America. In this regard, it is worth noticing that the lower position of Latin American countries in the global hierarchy of power and the intrinsic connection between the international and the regional order are inseparable from the outcomes of military conflicts that occurred or were threatened in the region.

2.4 CONCLUSION

Contrarily to previous studies which stated that war would have no relevance for understanding the state formation process in peripheral regions, this paper argues that war should not be underestimated in studies on the formation of the units or other attributes of the regional systems. After all, without considering the region's historical formation and the role played by the war in this process, we could not understand the formation and historical origins of the current configuration of the regional order – because of its structural, long-term character – nor the reason why the region occupies a subordinate position in the international system. By rescuing the contingent character of conflictive interactions and the integration of different levels of analysis based on the framework of Systemic Approaches (Power Transition and Hegemonic Stability Theory) and Historical Sociology, we show that the results of wars are important to the region. They were decisive in the regional order formation in three distinct phases:

a) in the definition of the units (1800-1859);
b) in the definition of the regional hierarchy (1860-1939);
c) in the definition of the degree of regional autonomy (1940-2000).

The contemporary regional order in Latin America is thus characterized by the asymmetric distribution of power between the great powers (mainly the United States of

America), a few regional powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico and lesser military capable countries in this region. For this reason (and not due to some cultural aversion to war), regional polarization, i.e., the consolidation of alliances or rivalries among the units, is low. As discussed, despite the decrease in the level of conflicts more recently, the existence of "enduring rivalries" (GOERTZ; DIEHL, 1993; THIES, 2005) and "violent peace" (MARES, 2001) demonstrate critical regional tensions. Moreover, even the alliances and cooperation initiatives were hindered. In its institutional configuration, the regional order is characterized by a moderate degree of institutionalization, which is centered on regional and sub-regional cooperation organizations. The main regional organizations created after the end of the Cold War, such as the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) are currently undergoing a severe crisis, leaving the future of regional institutions uncertain. Even facing the gradual growth of China's importance to Latin America[62], the preponderance of the United States constitutes an important structural feature of both international politics and the regional order. Thus, the region has a limited degree of autonomy in relation to the system and the international order itself, which restrains the possibilities of agency and international insertion for the countries of the region. As we tried to present in this study, this configuration is also the result of the cumulative effects that wars had on the different phases of regional structuring.

The definition of the region's political units, in number and extent, was primarily determined by the wars of independence and the series of civil conflicts in the first half of the 19th century. The development of the units' capabilities and the definition of the distribution of power in the region are primarily related to the result of interstate conflicts since the winners became regional powers (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Chile), and the losers were restrained as local powers (e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru). This hierarchy remained stable for more than a century, having been tested in the second half of the 20th century by efforts to overcome the legacy of national states and integration processes that sought to expand Latin America's regional autonomy considering the rise of global powers. Regarding the degree of regional autonomy, world conflicts are the critical juncture that consolidated the "magnetism of the USA" (BORBA, 2019, p. 266) over Latin America and restrained its possibilities of agency. The limits of a collective bargain against the international system and the global powers illustrate the structural dependence and the limits of regional autonomy.

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[62] On China's relations and influence in Latin America, see R. Evan Ellis (2014), Shoujun Cui; Manuel Pérez Garcia (2016), Kevin P. Gallagher (2016) and Javier A. Vadell (2018).

These results demonstrate that, despite the lower position in the hierarchy of power and the limited autonomy of the region, Latin America is not isolated from the world. Even with the decrease of interstate conflict in the 20th and 21st centuries, and the changes in the nature of the conflicts, war remains an important variable to understand the configuration of regional structures. As we sought to argue based on historical evidence, wars in the region were crucial to understanding the unit and regional hierarchy definition, but global conflicts and action by global powers also have enduring consequences for regional dynamics. Besides that, the links between the international order and regions are enhanced after Cold War and the regionalism processes. Regional orders are important for the future of the international order as they test the global power capabilities (strength and consensus) and challenges the international order by building regional alternatives of governance.

Furthermore, recognizing the limitation of regional autonomy and the constraints to which the region is subjected does not mean adopting a normative position of resignation in the face of global constraints. Given the challenges and limits encountered, it is possible to rethink strategies and guide the formulation of foreign policies capable of recognizing and responding to the constraints of the international structure. When investigating the historical contexts of the regional order formation, it is possible to understand more deeply these connections, the limits of agency, and the restrictions and possibilities of international insertion of peripheral states and regions through the understanding of the historical legacy of wars.

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3 AGENDA DE PESQUISA

O estudo sobre os efeitos das guerras na formação de ordens regionais insere-se em uma agenda de pesquisa ampla, que tem como foco compreender contextos e consequências da formação de ordens regionais e seu papel nas dinâmicas políticas, econômicas, sociais e securitárias das regiões e no seu relacionamento com o sistema interacional. Com origem em estudos anteriores sobre ordens sistêmicas e ordens regionais, a agenda atual contempla problemas relacionados a natureza, configuração e possibilidade de mudanças de estruturas em sistemas regionais e internacionais. Sobre esses três mecanismos, o papel da guerra e seus efeitos mostra-se relevante e central para a análise, segundo evidências históricas e contribuições da literatura. A agenda deriva da intersecção de contribuições do Realismo Estrutural, das Abordagens Sistêmicas (Teorias da Transição de Poder e Estabilidade Hegemônica), da Sociologia Histórica e do Regionalismo nos debates sobre estrutura e mudança. Assim, três problemas centrais emergem dessa agenda:

a) o entendimento da possibilidade de mudança de estruturas profundas;

b) o entendimento da possibilidade de coexistência de estruturais regionais e internacionais;

c) os efeitos e o papel da guerra sobre mudanças e estruturas tanto no nível regional quanto internacional.

A partir desses problemas centrais, surge a proposição de uma agenda de pesquisa voltada à análise da formação, impactos e mudanças de estruturas, considerando uma perspectiva teórica e macro-histórica. Teórica no sentido de promover um diálogo entre diferentes teorias que abordam essas temáticas, privilegiando uma abordagem prioritariamente guiada pelos problemas de pesquisa e não por paradigmas teóricos, conforme proposições de Larry Laudan (1977). Macro-histórica no sentido de pensar a especificidade de "grandes estruturas e processos amplos e mapear suas formas alternativas" (TILLY, 1984, p. 61, tradução nossa)[1], buscando analisar a natureza e efeitos de estruturas a partir de processos amplos, valorizando as contribuições teóricas e metodológicas oriundas da Sociologia Histórica. Visto que o tratamento da estrutura na disciplina ainda se caracteriza pela rigidez e limitado potencial de compreensão frente mudanças sistêmicas, a abordagem teórica e macro-histórica, ambas focadas em mecanismos, processos e legados históricos, auxilia na identificação e explicação de continuidades e mudanças. Em relação ao tratamento de estruturas regionais, a abordagem

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[1] No original, *"[...] big structures and large processes and to chart their alternate forms".*

das regiões como sistemas internacionais auxilia na construção de um referencial que busca avançar em relação ao problema da ausência de definições sobre a dimensão estrutural de sistemas regionais, na medida em que, em especial, aborda e destaca a importância do elemento da ordem regional para compreender a configuração e características do sistema regional considerando contextos espaço-temporais e constrangimentos estruturais, e como essa configuração determina processos, comportamentos, interações e posições dos atores políticos nas relações internacionais.

Esse interesse e panorama de pesquisa tem com origem experiências de iniciação científica na Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM), onde meus primeiros interesses de pesquisa centravam-se no papel do Brasil na América do Sul e nas iniciativas de integração da região. Na transformação desse interesse inicial em um projeto de pesquisa, me deparei com uma literatura que abordava recorrentemente o conceito de "ordem" e "ordem regional" sem, no entanto, aprofundar sua definição ou aplicá-lo, em específico, aos estudos sobre a região. O interesse em estudar a ordem regional na América do Sul nasceu dessa observação e de uma motivação pessoal em produzir conhecimento a respeito da própria região, visto que durante minha trajetória acadêmica, percebia que problemas teóricos como a questão da ordem e estruturas ocupavam limitado espaço na produção acadêmica brasileira, sendo maior parte da bibliografia oriunda de centros de pesquisas dos países centrais. A produção brasileira sobre a região pouco se dedicava a explorar as possibilidades de construção teórica a partir das evidências empíricas observadas. Neste aspecto, tal qual no clássico retrato da colonização do continente americano, de Jan van der Straet (c1575), incomodava-me o fato de que a região, neste caso a América Latina, ainda se mantinha como uma figura de interesse, receptiva, exótica e atrativa, mais ao exterior do que aos próprios latino-americanos(as).

Nesse sentido, meu trabalho de conclusão de curso consistiu em um estudo de caso sobre o subsistema regional sul-americano, no qual busquei identificar as causas sistêmicas para a configuração e mudanças da ordem regional. A partir de uma análise macro-histórica, com utilização do método histórico-comparado e a ferramenta do *process tracing*, o estudo buscou analisar as continuidades e mudanças nos elementos interacionais e estruturais do sistema regional sul-americano a partir de sua formação, no período pós-independência, com o intuito de identificar as mudanças na ordem regional e investigar as suas causas sistêmicas. Desse trabalho surgiram diversas conclusões e *insights* que guiam minha agenda de pesquisa atual. Enumera-se alguns:

a) a possibilidade de mudanças macro-históricas nas estruturas profundas dos sistemas regionais;

b) a relação entre ordem sistêmica e princípio ordenador sistêmico, na configuração de tipos estruturais sistêmicos, a partir do grau de institucionalização regional;

c) a configuração de hegemonias regionais como condição de maior estabilidade da ordem;

d) o papel de guerras centrais e periféricas nos processos de mudança na ordem regional;

e) o impacto das estruturas profundas nos níveis de cooperação e conflito dos sistemas regionais;

f) importância das relações entre a potência regional e as potências secundárias para a manutenção de hegemonia sistêmica, baseada em altos graus de aquiescência e moderada autoridade.

O quarto ponto enumerado é, precisamente, o qual avanço um pouco mais nesta dissertação.

Como perspectivas futuras, busco continuar pesquisando essas temáticas, que conectam a Teoria das Relações Internacionais, a América Latina e o Regionalismo a partir de uma perspectiva teórico-metodológica alinhada à Sociologia História e aos estudos histórico-comparativos a partir da inserção em programa de Doutorado nacional ou internacional com tradição de pesquisa voltadas a essas temáticas. Assim, na sequência de minha trajetória acadêmica, pretendo, no Doutorado, aprofundar a pesquisa sobre efeitos da guerra em estruturas regionais, explorando mais a fundo as conexões entre estruturas regionais e internacionais e suas implicações diante de mudanças sistêmicas. Com base nas conclusões desse trabalho, a temática se mostra relevante para compreender origens e condições de relacionamento e inserção das regiões em relação ao sistema internacional. Ademais, as regiões, assim como as guerras em regiões periféricas, demonstram ter efeitos importante na configuração de estruturas regionais, podendo ser elementos-chave também para avaliação das transformações na estrutura internacional.

Ademais, como agenda para pesquisas futuras, propõe-se a continuidade do aprofundamento dos tópicos relacionados as problemáticas aqui apresentadas, onde intersecionam-se caminhos na área de Relações Internacionais, Estudos Estratégicos, Ciência Política e Sociologia. Incluem-se nessa agenda a possibilidade de realizar estudos de caso sobre aspectos gerais ou específicos da ordem regional na América Latina (como meu trabalho de conclusão de curso e publicações anteriores), estudos de caso comparados entre distintos sistemas e ordens regionais, estudos sobre a relação entre guerra e mudanças sistêmicas em diferentes sistemas internacionais (temporal e espacialmente), estudos sobre a correlação entre aspectos da ordem interna dos Estados com a ordem da região que integram, dentre outros

derivados desses campos de pesquisa, buscando privilegiar os aspectos teórico e metodológico da Sociologia Histórica e aos referenciais dos métodos histórico-comparativos, enfatizando a importância de avaliar processos históricos de continuidade e mudança para compreender mudanças na natureza e efeitos de estruturas, constrangimentos estruturais e possibilidades de agência para superá-los – podendo assim informar a formulação de política externa dos atores regionais e contribuir para a configuração da arquitetura institucional regional. A aplicação desse referencial, inclusive, abre espaço para que novos temas derivem de tal agenda, tornando possível sua extensão a outros problemas teóricos e empíricos.

Diante de tais complexidades e dos limites e desafios encontrados na execução do presente trabalho, e crendo na relevância e pertinência do tema e da agenda de pesquisa para a área, pretendo seguir atuando em projetos de pesquisa preocupados com a interligação desses aspectos teóricos, metodológicos e empíricos, a fim de contribuir para o resgate de uma tradição de estudos vinculada a Sociologia Histórica e as abordagens sistêmico-estruturais nas Relações Internacionais. A teoria das RI tem muito a dialogar e explorar ainda no seu diálogo com a Sociologia Histórica, sendo a presente agenda de pesquisa apenas uma das vertentes possíveis. O potencial de interligação e utilização do referencial para outros estudos é promissor para diálogos da disciplina no Brasil e no exterior. Esses objetivos e desafios guiam meu intuito de produzir uma análise abrangente sobre ordem e estrutura em sistemas internacionais e regionais, aprofundando os problemas da mudança sistêmica e estruturas na Teoria das Relações Internacionais.

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