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INTERNACIONAIS**

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**NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:  
The case of the US National Security Council (2001-2015)**

**Porto Alegre**

**2016**

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Dissertação submetida ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Marco Cepik

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**The crux of the problem is that national security agencies are too domestic for students of international relations and too foreign for students of American politics. (ZEGART, 1999, p. 3)**



## RESUMO

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar as mudanças institucionais ocorridas no Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos entre 2001 e 2016. Ele se enquadra nas Resoluções nº 114/2014 e 115/2014 da Câmara de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul e, portanto, é dividido em três partes. A PARTE I é composta por uma contextualização do objeto, contendo uma descrição geral do objetivo do trabalho, bem como a delimitação do objeto, marco teórico, e marco temporal. A PARTE II é composta pelo artigo em si, que analisa as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016). O objetivo é demonstrar que mudanças em agências de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de análise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos. Primeiro, uma matriz institucional formada por normas, organizações, regras, capacidades e incentivos foi usada para comparar as mudanças no Conselho de Segurança Nacional para comparar as mudanças nas duas presidências. Em seguida, possíveis causas de mudanças selecionadas foram identificadas – design original da agência, interesses dos atores burocráticos, ou eventos externos –, e finalmente, determinamos as consequências que essas mudanças podem ter para instituições ou políticas. A PARTE III apresenta a descrição da agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida.

**Palavras-chave:** Instituições. Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Estados Unidos.

## ABSTRACT

This paper aims to analyze the institutional changes that took place in the National Security Council of the United States between 2001 and 2016. It is in accordance with Resolutions 114/2014 and 115/2014 of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and therefore is divided into three parts. PART I is composed of a contextualization of the object, containing a general description of the objective of the work, as well as the delimitation of the object, theoretical framework, and time frame. PART II is composed by the article itself, which analyzes the changes in the system of the United States National Security Council through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2008) and Barack Obama (2008-2016). The objective is to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be punctual or incremental, depending on their causes and consequences. In order to do so we used techniques of qualitative analysis and theory of punctuated equilibrium in the examination of official documents and public records. First, an institutional matrix consisting of norms, organizations, rules, capabilities, and incentives was used to compare changes in the National Security Council to compare changes in the two presidencies. Then, possible causes for selected changes have been identified - original agency design, bureaucratic actors' interests, or external events - and finally we determine the consequences that such changes can have for institutions or policies. PART III presents the description of the research agenda to be followed.

**Keywords:** Institutions. National Security Council. United States.

## SUMÁRIO

<b>1</b>	<b>CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: The case of the US National Security Council (2001-2015) .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>2.1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>2.2</b>	<b>The NSC in the national security decision-making process.....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>2.3</b>	<b>Bush and Obama: the institutional changes.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>2.4</b>	<b>The driving forces behind the NSC institutional changes.....</b>	<b>39</b>
2.4.1	Incremental Changes .....	40
2.4.2	Punctuated Changes .....	42
<b>2.5</b>	<b>Conclusions.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>2.6</b>	<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>48</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>AGENDA DE PESQUISA .....</b>	<b>53</b>
	<b>REFERÊNCIAS.....</b>	<b>55</b>

## 1 CONTEXTUALIZAÇÃO

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar as mudanças no sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos através das administrações dos presidentes George W. Bush (2001-2008) e Barack Obama (2008-2016) a fim de determinar as suas causas e consequências. O intento é demonstrar que mudanças em agências de segurança nacional podem ser pontuais ou incrementais, dependendo das suas causas e consequências. Para tal, foram utilizadas técnicas de análise qualitativa e teoria do equilíbrio pontuado no exame de documentos oficiais e registros públicos.

A mudança institucional é um tema controverso em Ciência Política e nas Relações Internacionais. É aceito que as instituições mudam devido a fatores endógenos ou exógenos, mas não há consenso sobre o que é mais importante. Alguns estudiosos defendem que mudanças ocorrem devido a choques exógenos que modificam drasticamente a configuração da instituição e atribuem pouca importância às mudanças incrementais que podem ocorrer devido a fatores endógenos (MAHONEY; THELEN, 2010). Outros argumentam que a mudança institucional é resultante principalmente de fatores endógenos (falhas no design original da instituição, seguidos por interesses mutáveis de atores políticos), com eventos exógenos tendo menor importância (ZEGART, 1999). Uma tentativa de explicar mudanças graduais e mudanças súbitas é feita pelos teóricos do equilíbrio pontuado, que afirmam que os longos períodos de stasis são pontuados por mudanças causadas por alterações na sociedade ou no governo (BAUMGARTNER; JONES; TRUE, 2007).

Para obter os resultados aqui apresentados, foi necessária uma pesquisa abrangente e adaptada de áreas afins. Tendo por base o neoinstitucionalismo modificado que Amy Zegart (1999) criou para analisar a evolução institucional de agências de segurança dos Estados Unidos, buscamos na análise institucional de Stein (2008), originalmente aplicada para organizações econômicas internacionais, a matriz institucional aqui utilizada para mapear as mudanças institucionais durante as presidências de George W. Bush e Barack Obama. Utilizamos também a teoria do equilíbrio pontuado, originalmente desenvolvida para aplicação nas ciências biológicas e adaptada para as Ciências Sociais por Baumgartner, Jones e True (2007), para analisar as origens das mudanças institucionais observadas e as suas consequências. Dada a natureza do tema abordado, é apropriado que o institucionalismo tenha um papel importante na fundamentação teórica do presente trabalho.

O século XX tem testemunhado a ascensão, queda e ressurgimento do institucionalismo. Até a década de 1950, o cientista político utilizava o "velho" institucionalismo para explicar, através de

um método predominantemente normativo, estruturas políticas, jurídicas e administrativas. A "velha" abordagem institucionalista não favoreceu a comparação e era limitada a atributos formais das instituições governamentais. A reação veio na forma da "revolução comportamental", que rejeitou a tendência institucionalista anterior e defendeu que os resultados políticos poderiam ser explicados através da análise de distribuições informais de poder, atitudes, características e comportamentos dos indivíduos. Este ponto de vista, no entanto, logo deixou de responder a importantes questões colocadas pelo campo e deu lugar a novas abordagens institucionalistas nos anos 80 (THELEN; STEINMO, 1992; PERES, 2008; HALL; TAYLOR, 1996).

Essas novas abordagens institucionalistas têm suas raízes nos campos da economia (institucionalismo da escolha racional), da ciência política (institucionalismo histórico) e da sociologia (institucionalismo sociológico) (JACKSON, 2010; HALL; TAYLOR, 2003), e sua novidade era que eles eram capazes de integrar importantes aspectos metodológicos e epistemológicos do behaviorismo às suas características fundamentais, respondendo às críticas recebidas pelo "velho" institucionalismo (PERES, 2008). Assim, a teoria institucionalista tornou-se mais dinâmica e orientada para a teoria, e o foco da análise deixou de ser instituições governamentais ou societárias formais, mas as interações políticas moldadas pela configuração institucional (THELEN; STEINMO, 1992).

De acordo com Hall e Taylor (1996), as três novas escolas de pensamento institucional apresentam diferenças inerentes entre si e possuem pontos fortes e fracos analíticos em relação às duas questões fundamentais da análise institucional tradicional: "como interpretar a relação entre instituições e comportamento e como explicar o processo pelo qual as instituições se originam ou mudam" (HALL; TAYLOR, 2003, p.5). Dos três, o institucionalismo histórico tem sido compreensivelmente mais proeminente nos campos de Ciência Política e Relações Internacionais. As principais razões para isso são que as características fundamentais favorecem a integração com as outras duas abordagens, enriquecendo a análise final, e seus fundamentos teóricos facilitam a análise institucional comparativa transversal, inter-nacional e intertemporal (THELEN; STEINMO, 1992; HALL; TAYLOR, 1996).

O Institucionalismo histórico define instituições como os "procedimentos, rotinas, normas e convenções formais ou informais incorporados na estrutura organizacional da política ou da economia política"<sup>1</sup> (HALL; TAYLOR, 1996, p.6). A abordagem institucional histórica enfatiza as instituições intermediárias que moldam as estratégias políticas, as formas pelas quais as instituições estruturam as relações de poder entre os grupos em conflito na sociedade e, especialmente, o foco no processo de política e de formulação de políticas dentro de determinados parâmetros

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<sup>1</sup> Do original: "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy."

institucionais. Em relação aos atores do sistema político, esta abordagem considera as instituições como o contexto em que definem e buscam seus interesses, metas e estratégias. Esses atores nem sempre agem como maximizadores racionais, suas ações dependem mais da interpretação e comportamentos familiares do que de cálculos puros (THELEN; STEINMO, 1992; HALL; TAYLOR, 1996).

Em “*Flawed by Design*” (1999), Zegart parte do institucionalismo da escolha racional e o modifica de acordo com as necessidades do seu modelo. A autora argumenta que agências de segurança nacional não possuem a mesma lógica de funcionamento que agências domésticas – sobre as quais o institucionalismo é baseado. As principais diferenças entre agências de segurança nacional e agências domésticas são: os grupos de interesse envolvidos na origem e evolução das agências, com agências de segurança nacional virtualmente alheias a ação de tais grupos; o tipo de trabalho realizado, com agências de segurança nacional trabalhando sob forte sigilo; predominância do executivo no domínio da segurança nacional, o que limita os interesses do Congresso na formulação de políticas; e a interconectividade necessária para o funcionamento apropriado das agências de segurança nacional, as deixando mais vulneráveis aos interesses individuais de atores burocráticos (ZEGART, 1999).

A questão abordada nessa dissertação é relativa à causa de tais mudanças institucionais e o impacto que as mesmas tem na formulação e implementação de políticas de segurança nacional. Ao tomar por base a definição de Estudos Estratégicos proposta por Diniz, Raza e Proença Jr. (1999, p. 17) – “[...] os Estudos Estratégicos tem por objeto o estudo do emprego dos meios de força do Estado, desde as forças armadas até as polícias, para propósitos politicamente determinados [...]” – a relevância do desenvolvimento e implementação das políticas de segurança nacional para a disciplina fica evidente (DINIZ, PROENÇA JR.; RAZA, 1999). Se a função fundamental do Estado é proteger seus cidadãos (ZEGART, 2010), e para tanto ele pode – e deve – lançar mão não apenas das suas forças armadas mas também de agências de inteligência e diplomacia, por exemplo, um órgão de coordenação como o Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos é um excelente estudo de caso, pois oferece a oportunidade de avaliar o papel que cada agência de segurança nacional que o compõe tem na formulação de políticas de segurança, e como os interesses e incentivos de cada ator burocrático afetam o seu funcionamento.

O Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos Estados Unidos foi criado em 1947 junto com outras importantes agências de segurança nacional pela lei *National Security Act*. A 2ª Guerra Mundial evidenciou a necessidade de o governo estadunidense abandonar a sua política externa isolacionista e sua postura reativa face aos conflitos internacionais da primeira metade do século XX. Era necessário que os EUA criassem um framework permanente para sua política de segurança nacional,

a fim de “identificar, impedir, e se necessário se defender contra ameaças internacionais ao país”<sup>2</sup> (GEORGE; RISHIKOF, 2011, p.1). A *National Security Act* iniciou esse reposicionamento externo americano. A lei foi redigida por diversas razões, dentre as quais Bolton (2008) destaca quatro, fortemente baseadas no contexto histórico do fim da 2ª Guerra Mundial e início da Guerra Fria: primeiro, a Europa se encontrava fisicamente em ruínas, o que a tornava vulnerável ao expansionismo soviético. Segundo, essa Europa arrasada se encontrava em uma delicada posição geopolítica, dada a sua proximidade geográfica a URSS e sua proximidade ideológica aos EUA, tornando-a o palco provável das disputas bipolares. Terceiro, a Guerra Fria aumentou exponencialmente a complexidade do cenário global, forçando os EUA a reverem seu posicionamento isolacionista adotado até então. Finalmente, a morte de Roosevelt, enquanto o mesmo ainda era presidente, deixou seu vice Harry Truman com um sistema de segurança nacional desorganizado e com informações incompletas ou errôneas, o que deixou evidente a necessidade de institucionalização área de segurança nacional (BOLTON, 2008).

Por meio do *National Security Act* de 1947 foram criadas cinco instituições de segurança nacional. A primeira foi o escritório do Secretário de Defesa (Secretary of Defense)<sup>3</sup>, criado com o intuito de promover a cooperação e a coordenação estratégica entre os braços das forças armadas<sup>4</sup>, que até então atuavam como agências independentes, diminuindo a competição entre as forças e aumentando a eficiência do planejamento militar. A segunda agência a ser criada foi a Aeronáutica (Air Force). Até então, a Marinha e o Exército mantinham operações aéreas disjuntas, situação que se provou ineficiente com a rápida evolução dos veículos aéreos militares. Assim, a Aeronáutica foi estabelecida a partir do setor de operações aéreas do exército, enquanto a marinha manteve o seu próprio comando aéreo, fato que até hoje é contencioso entre as forças armadas americanas. A terceira agência foi o Estado-Maior Conjunto (Joint Chiefs of Staff). O Estado-Maior Conjunto foi criado com o objetivo de reunir os oficiais seniores dos serviços militares a fim de coordenar respostas militares aos problemas enfrentados pelo país. A quarta agência criada foi a Agência Central de Inteligência (CIA). Até então, o governo estadunidense não possuía uma agência civil de coleta e análise de inteligência em tempos de paz, instituição que se mostrou extremamente necessária com o início da Guerra Fria e a hostilidade do bloco soviético. Desde a sua criação, a CIA enfrenta duas questões controversas – os limites legais das suas operações e o seu posicionamento institucional em meio às demais agências de inteligência dos EUA. Por fim, a quinta agência de segurança criada pela *National Security Act* de 1947 foi o Conselho de Segurança Nacional (National Security Council) (SNOW, 2008). A sua importância é descrita por Snow (2008)

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<sup>2</sup> Do original: “identify, deter, and if necessary defend against international threats to the nation”

<sup>3</sup> A *National Security Act* de 1949 alterou a de 1947, criando o Departamento de Defesa (Department of Defense), com completa autoridade sobre as forças armadas (Jordan *et al.*, 2009).

<sup>4</sup> Até 1947, os Estados Unidos possuíam apenas dois braços das forças armadas: a Marinha (Navy) e o Exército (Army).

da seguinte forma:

O Conselho de Segurança Nacional foi de enorme importância simbólica ao descrever o papel americano no mundo do pós-guerra. No seu nível mais básico, reconheceu a nova e crescente importância dos Estados Unidos e a conseqüente necessidade de um mecanismo formal para auxiliar na forma como os Estados Unidos reagiriam no mundo. Também implicou e impulsionou a centralidade das questões de defesa dentro da hierarquia das preocupações de política externa. (SNOW, 2008. p.196)<sup>5</sup>

O papel do Conselho de Segurança Nacional é coordenar o processo interagências, gerenciando a formulação e implementação de políticas de segurança nacional. De acordo com a *National Security Act*:

A função do Conselho será assessorar o Presidente no que diz respeito à integração das políticas nacional, externa e militar relacionadas à segurança nacional, de modo a permitir aos serviços militares e aos outros departamentos e agências do Governo cooperar mais efetivamente em assuntos envolvendo a segurança nacional. (US CONGRESS, 1947)<sup>6</sup>

O Conselho de Segurança Nacional é responsável pela coordenação das ações das forças armadas, das agências de inteligência, e das agências de segurança interna (*homeland security*). Para tanto, o CSN conta com quatro membros estatutários: o presidente, o vice presidente, o secretário de estado (representando a diplomacia), e o secretário de defesa (representando as forças armadas). A eles se unem os conselheiros estatutários, que atualmente são o Diretor de Inteligência Central, o presidente do Estado-Maior Conjunto, e o Conselheiro de Segurança Nacional (National Security Advisor)<sup>7</sup> (BOLTON, 2008). O presidente tem a prerrogativa de convidar novos membros de acordo com as necessidades do Conselho e os temas a serem abordados nas reuniões. A princípio essas adições devem ser aprovadas pelo Senado, mas até hoje nenhum presidente submeteu seus membros convidados a tal aprovação (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009).

Além dos membros e conselheiros estatutários e convidados, o Conselho de Segurança Nacional conta com um corpo de funcionários responsável pela pesquisa e esboço das políticas a serem discutidas pelo Conselho. Esses funcionários em sua maioria são cedidos pelos departamentos que compõem o Conselho, mas também podem vir da academia, de *think tanks*, ou do setor privado. Desde a criação do Conselho, o corpo de funcionários vem aumentando em número e importância (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Do original: “The National Security Council was of enormous symbolic importance in depicting the American role in the post-war world. At its most basic level, it recognized the new and growing importance of the United States and the consequent need for some formal mechanism to assist in how the United States would react in the world. It also implied and boosted the centrality of defense matters within the hierarchy of foreign policy concerns.”


<sup>6</sup> Do original: “The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.”

<sup>7</sup> Formalmente chamado de “assistente especial do presidente para assuntos de segurança nacional”, do original “*special assistant to the president for national security affairs*”.



O sistema do Conselho de Segurança Nacional é organizado em quatro camadas: a primeira é o Conselho em si, com todos os membros e conselheiros estatutários e os membros convidados. É no Conselho que as decisões finais são tomadas pelo presidente, com a ajuda dos demais membros. A segunda camada é o Comitê dos Principais (Principals Committee), composta por todos os membros do Conselho em si com exceção do presidente. Por conflitos de agenda ou para motivar uma discussão mais desinibida, nem sempre o presidente está presente nas reuniões do Conselho de Segurança Nacional. O Comitê dos Principais é presidido pelo conselheiro de segurança nacional do presidente, e nele os membros debatem as propostas de políticas a serem apresentadas para o presidente. A terceira camada é o Comitê dos Vices (Deputies Committee), que como o nome sugere é composto pelos vices dos membros do Conselho. Este Comitê é responsável pela formulação das propostas de políticas a serem discutidas no Comitê dos Principais e no Conselho de Segurança Nacional, bem como a operacionalização da implementação das decisões tomadas pelas camadas acima. Por fim, a quarta camada é formada pelos Comitês de Coordenação de Políticas (Policy Coordinating Committees), que são divididos por assunto ou áreas geográficas, e são responsáveis por manter as camadas superiores atualizadas em relação às principais questões de segurança pertinentes ao seu domínio (SNOW, 2008).

**Figura 1 - Sistema Interagencia do Conselho de Segurança Internacional**



**Fonte:** a autora (2016)

O marco temporal selecionado para o presente trabalho é de 2001 a 2016, correspondendo respectivamente ao início da presidência de George W. Bush e ao fim da presidência de Barack Obama. O período escolhido coincide com uma época de mudanças profundas no ambiente securitário internacional, afetando, em maior ou menor grau, todos os países do mundo. Dada a sua proeminente posição econômica e militar, os Estados Unidos estão no centro dessas transformações.

Durante a campanha presidencial de 2008, Obama declarou que “as ameaças deste século são no mínimo tão perigosas quanto, e em alguns aspectos mais complexas, àquelas que enfrentamos no passado”<sup>8</sup>. De fato, os ataques de 11/9 causaram uma reorientação do sistema de segurança nacional dos Estados Unidos com o objetivo principal de reprimir e prevenir atividades terroristas. Entretanto, ao analisarmos a profundidade dessa reorientação e as mudanças ocorridas na dinâmica do cenário internacional, percebemos que elas foram apenas o começo de uma série de preocupações para os formuladores de políticas de segurança nacional (SNOW, 2008). Os desafios enfrentados pelos Estados Unidos nesse início de século não estão limitados às atividades terroristas que se intensificaram desde os ataques de 11 de setembro de 2001. A estes se somam as armas de destruição em massa, as guerras no Oriente Médio, os genocídios, as mudanças climáticas, as pandemias globais, a crise econômica internacional, a ascensão chinesa e a recuperação russa, compondo uma complexa agenda de segurança nacional a ser formulada e implementada (JENTLESON, 2014).

Esta breve introdução apresentou uma descrição geral do objetivo a ser atingido pelo presente trabalho, e delimitou o tema, o marco teórico, e o marco temporal que serão adotados pelo artigo a seguir.

## **2 NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:**

### **The case of the US National Security Council (2001-2015)**

Laura De Castro Quaglia

This article analyzes institutional changes in the US National Security Council System through the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2013). By applying qualitative reasoning and punctuated equilibrium theory to available evidence provided by documents and public records, we aim to demonstrate that changes in national security agencies can be classified as incremental or punctual, depending of their causes and their consequences. First, an institutional matrix comprising norms, organizations, regulations, capacities, and incentives was used to compare the changes at the National Security Council of both presidencies. Then, then we identified the possible cause of selected changes – agency’s original design, changing interests of bureaucratic actors, or external events –, and finally we determined what consequences these changes might have had for institutions or policies.

**Keywords:** Institutions; National Security Council; United States.

### **2.1 Introduction**

The National Security Council (NSC) system is at the center of the American interagency process responsible for creating and implementing national security and foreign policy. The Council was designed to be the main advisory board aiding the president to fully comprehend the issue at

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<sup>8</sup> Do original: “This Century’s threats are at least as dangerous as and in some ways more complex than those we have confronted in the past”

stake before making a decision. With time, the NSC and its staff gained more power, and the modern NSC system is responsible for formulating and implementing policy. However, since the end of the Cold War, American national security has faced challenges that have showcased the shortcomings of the NSC system.

There have been attempts to reform the NSC system since its creation. Only two years after the NSC came to be by the National Security Act of 1947, the Amendment of 1949 started a long process of evolution for the institution. Still, scholars and practitioners of national security argue that the whole system should go through a thorough reformulation process (BRUNEAU, 2011).

Because of its adaptive characteristic – its appointees and organizational structure being mainly a presidential prerogative –, the NSC system is flexible enough to change according to the demands of the situation and, of course, the will of the president. The objective of this paper is to analyze how the NSC has changed since 2001 – the first year of the Bush administration and the year of the most deadly terrorist attack in American soil: explore the nature of said changes, and their causes, answering the following research questions: in which ways has the NSC system changed? What brings about changes in the NSC system and therefore in the National Security policy-making process?

According to Amy Zegart in *Flawed by Design* (1999), there are four characteristics that differentiate national security agencies from domestic agencies: the low amount and weak reach of interest groups; the secrecy involved in the activities performed by national security agencies; the predominance of the executive branch; and the high level of bureaucratic interdependence. Using a modified new institutionalist theory, Zegart proposes that these national security agencies evolve according to three factors, in order of importance: the agency's original design; changing interests from key political actors; and world events (ZEGART, 1999). We take her model a step further, applying punctuated equilibrium theory to Zegart's modified institutionalism model to explain why original design and the interests of bureaucrats are most often the cause of institutional change, but exogenous events are the ones that originate the most profound changes.

Historical institutionalists have observed that historical events can be divided in periods of stasis punctuated by “critical junctures”. According to Hall and Taylor (1996), these were “moments when substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching point’ from which historical development moves onto a new path” (p. 10). The issue was defining what caused such critical junctures (HALL; TAYLOR, 1996).

Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) first originated in evolutionary biology, and was adapted to the social science field by Baumgartner and Jones in 1993. PET seeks to explain why, in the words of Baumgartner, Jones and True (2007), “[...] political processes are generally

characterized by stability and incrementalism, but occasionally they produce large-scale departures from the past” (p. 155). In short,

American political institutions were conservatively designed to resist many efforts at change and thus to make mobilizations necessary if established interests are to be overcome. The result over time has been institutionally reinforced stability interrupted by bursts of change. (BAUMGARTNER; JONES; TRUE, 2007, p. 157)

These bursts of change are caused either by a significant event or the accumulation of smaller events (BAUMGARTNER; JONES; TRUE, 2007). In this paper we argue that the agency’s original design and the interests of key bureaucrats are factors of incremental change, and so are part of the periods of *stasis*, while exogenous events cause more severe changes. We recognize that due to their nature the incremental changes caused by the two former factors occur more frequently, but it is the changes caused by external events the ones that produce a bigger impact on the institution and therefore on its policies.

In order to answer the research questions, the paper is divided in two parts: first, we build an institutional matrix for the NSC system composition for the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, looking for the shifts regarding norms, organization, capacities and regulations; then, we examine four selected changes and analyze their causes and consequences.

## **2.2 The NSC in the national security decision-making process**

The American national security enterprise is comprised of myriad agencies, departments and organizations, as well as thousands of government employees and private contractors. It cannot be defined as an isolated sector, but as a piece of a larger puzzle involving governmental agencies in the Executive branch, legislative committees, military staff, and so many others, taking into account economic matters, foreign policy objectives and domestic affairs.

The National Security Council system was chosen as the object of this research due to its key position in the national security policy-making process. It has risen from a need for interdepartmental coordination on the matter of national security – made obvious by the troubling *ad hoc* traits of the decision-making process of World War I and II – and it came along with a considerable restructuring of the national security apparatus (BROWN, 2008). The National Security Act of 1947 not only created the National Security Council, but also the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as reorganized the military in three arms, merging them into the National Military Establishment – now Department of Defense – under a Secretary of Defense (U.S. HOUSE, 1947).

The importance of the NSC is made clear by the definition of its functions:

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. (U.S. HOUSE, 1947, p 6)

In addition, Bruneau *et al* (2009) outlined seven functions a national security council must fulfill to be efficient: inform and advise the executive, coordinate policy, liaise with the legislature, fuse and coordinate intelligence, develop documents including the National Security Strategy, oversee policy implementation, and enhance foreign security relations (BRUNEAU; MATEI; SAKODA, 2009).

As the main advisory agency on national security matters, the NSC is institutionally located at the center of the Executive branch's national security enterprise, being responsible for coordinating policy across federal agencies, in which is called the interagency process. In order to do so, the NSC is organized in layered committees: first, there is the Council itself, comprised of statutory members – the president, the vice-president, the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the secretary of energy (as of 2007), the director of national intelligence, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – as well as nonstatutory members – such as the secretary of treasury and the national security advisor -, members who may attend all meetings, and members who may attend when invited (AUERSWALD, 2011). This list, aside from the statutory members, changes according to the president's take on what national security entails. Usually at the beginning of each term, the president will release an official document (a National Security Directive, or a National Security Presidential Directive, or a Presidential Policy Directive) instructing the organization of the National Security Council for his mandate<sup>1</sup>. For instance, Bill Clinton added the assistant to the president for economic policy to the list of nonstatutory members, while George H. W. Bush added the chief of staff to the president (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009).

Second, there is the Principals Committee (PC), composed of the same members as the Council itself, *sans* the president. The PC meets whenever the subject doesn't warrant direct involvement from the president, or when the absence of the president would facilitate the frank discussion of the topic at hand among the members – usually once or twice a week (WHITTAKER *et al.*, 2011). Directly below the Principals Committee is the Deputies Committee (DC), chaired by the National Security Advisor, the president's principal deputy for national security. The other

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<sup>1</sup> The specific organization of the NSC for the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations will be presented in the next part of the paper.

members of the DC are the deputies of the NSC members, and their role is to “[...] [formulate] policy proposals for action by the NSC or Principals Committee and [figure] out how to implement decisions made in those bodies.” (SNOW, 2008, p. 202). The Deputy Committee, as the Principals Committee, meets as the need arises, usually once a day (WHITTAKER *et al.*, 2011).

In the fourth and last layer of the policy-making process for the NSC are the Interagency Policy Committees (IPC) – up until recently known as the Policy Coordinating Committees and earlier yet the Interagency Working Groups. These committees are divided into functional or geographic themes, and are chaired by a government official (usually an assistant secretary or equivalent) from the department more closely related to the issue. In the case of the geographical IPCs, the chair is the assistant secretary of state for the region at hand (SNOW, 2008). According to Whittaker *et al* (2011, p. 34), “IPCs do the ‘heavy lifting’ in analyzing policy issues and developing policy options and recommendations that provide policy-makers with flexibility and a range of options that are politically acceptable and minimize the risk of failure”<sup>2</sup>.

This system is known as the Scowcroft model, since he was the National Security Advisor that devised this arrangement. The four layers mostly interact in a “cyclical” way, with the NSC and the PC forwarding issues to be analyzed to the DC and then to the IPCs, which in turn send policy drafts to be decided upon by the first layers. As it is, the National Security Council System is divided in three parts: the NSC itself – as in the Principals Committee plus the president –; the National Security Advisor (also known as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), appointed by the president without the need for Senate confirmation, and the NSC staff, composed of dislocated members of the various bureaucracies represented in the PC, and populate the DC and IPCs. The NSC staff might vary in number from 50 to 400 according to the president’s policy-making profile.

The National Security Council doesn’t exist in a vacuum. Rather, it is an important cogwheel in the national security and foreign policy machinery. Among the organizations, departments and agencies that form this apparatus are the armed forces, Congress committees, intelligence agencies, economic and financial agencies, and even agriculture and commerce offices (MCCORMICK, 2010).

The NSC is inserted in the Executive Office to the President along with ten other agencies: the Council of Economic Advisers, the Council on Environmental Quality, the Executive Residence staff, the Office of Administration, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Office of the United States Trade

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<sup>2</sup> For a comprehensive take on the complexity of the IPC policy process, see Whittaker *et al* (2011), which can be found at <http://www.virginia.edu/cnsl/pdf/national-security-policy-process-2011.pdf>

Representative, Office of the Vice President of the United States, and the White House Office (LEWIS; SELIN, 2013).

In turn, the White House Office comprises several other offices that interact with the NSC in what can be called an intersection of White House Policy Coordinating Councils, namely the Domestic Policy Council and the National Economic Council. The three have overlapping areas of interest, and must be highly coordinated in order to create efficient policy (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009).

Due to its position in the national security policy-making process and given its statutory members, it goes without saying that the NSC interacts with, and sometimes rivals, Cabinet departments. Naturally, the most prominent interactions are with the departments of State and Defense, more so with the former. In fact, there are those who view the NSC as a second Department of State, the difference being that whereas the Department of State is constricted to pursue foreign policy-making through “regular” channels, the NSC, due to its flexibility, is free to explore and act through “irregular” channels (MCCORMICK, 2010).

As part of the Executive Office to the President, the budget for the NSC is calculated and decided alongside the Office of Management and Budget, which works closely with the president to submit the Fiscal Year Request to the Congress (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009). For the Fiscal Year of 2017, the requested amount for the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council was US\$ 13,069,000, the same required for 2016, of which US\$ 12,800,000 was granted. The amount requested represents 1.83% of the total for the EOP in 2017 (EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016). In comparison, the Department of Defense requested US\$ 582.7 billion, and the Department of State US\$ 50.1 billion for the same fiscal year.

The president has the prerogative as to how, when or if the NSC will be used. Because the NSC is not a rigid system, it can be adapted to each president’s profile (WHITTAKER *et al.*, 2011). Depending on the emphasis the president attributes to foreign affairs and his relationship with the Cabinet, the NSC will be more or less active during his term (SNOW, 2008). Still, in the time since the end of the Cold War, and especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001, presidents have heavily relied upon the NSC to formulate national security policy. In the words of Zegart (1999, p. 78), “Though the president [is] not required to use the council, it [stands] as the only body that brought all of the major national security policy makers together. It [is] the only forum expressly set up to bring wide-ranging debate, analysis, and advice before the president.”.

Granted, the NSC system is not without its flaws, and scholars have been giving input on ways to improve it since its creation. During the Cold War period, the main issue arose during the Reagan administration, in what’s become known as the Iran-Contra affair. On this occasion, part of the staff as well as the National Security Advisor Pointdexter acted without the president’s

knowledge or permission on a illegal scheme to sell arms to Iran in order to fund the anti-Sandinist insurgents in Nicaragua. The Tower Commission report, the first one to evaluate the performance of the NSC, called for a greater control of the NSC staff by the president (TOWER; MUSKIE; SCOWCROFT, 1987).

On February 15, 2001, the U.S. Commission on National Security/21<sup>st</sup> Century completed a two-year assessment of the national security enterprise and its preparedness to face the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. In addition to a series of recommendations to the Departments of State, Defense and Homeland, the report criticized the expanding role the National Security Advisor and the NSC staff had on the policy-making process, as well as the centralization of this process in the NSC (HART; RUDMAN, 2001). More specifically, the Commission issued the following recommendations:

16: The National Security Council (NSC) should be responsible for advising the President and for coordinating the multiplicity of national security activities, broadly defined to include economic and domestic law enforcement activities as well as the traditional national security agenda. The NSC Advisor and staff should resist the temptation to assume a central policymaking and operational role.

17: The President should propose to the Congress that the Secretary of Treasury be made a statutory member of the National Security Council.

18: The President should abolish the National Economic Council, distributing its domestic economic policy responsibilities to the Domestic Policy Council and its international economic responsibilities to the National Security Council (HART; RUDMAN, 2001, p. 51, 52).

More recently, LeCuyer (2012) has called for a reorganization of the national security staff (NSS) in order to make the process more horizontal and dynamic. Advocating an expansion of the NSS role on the national security policy-making process, he argues that in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century the focus of the NSS should be on “[...] high policy, grand strategy, foresight, strategic system management, transparent and predictable processes [...]” instead of “[...] individual issues; policy, crisis management, staff the President.” (LECUYER, 2012, p. 34). According to the author, the National Security Advisor role should also change, from an honest broker to a more proactive role in orchestrating national security solution (LECUYER, 2012).

### **2.3 Bush and Obama: the institutional changes**

The complexity of the national security enterprise is the main obstacle to understand its process. This understanding is made easier if we think of the national security decision-making process as a machine in which we input the national security dilemma (or objectives) we are trying to solve, it passes through our institution of choice (in this case, the National Security Council



System), and it gives us the policy (or results) as an output. The output changes the environment in ways that may result in another dilemma, going back into the machine in a feed backing process. The institution inside the machine will either change – or evolve – depending on endogenous factors such as bureaucracy and politics, or on exogenous factors.

To see how the National Security Council System has evolved since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we'll employ an adapted version of the institutional matrix put forth by Stein (2008), mapping the main changes in the norms, organization, regulations, capacities and incentives in the institution of the NSC. These components interact in such a way that may cause changes in human behavior and therefore in the economic and social order via institutional change (STEIN, 2008). We'll use this matrix to later analyze the effects of incremental and punctuated factors in the observed changes.

Stein (2008, p. 141) defines **norms** as “[...] formal and informal rules that govern what is expected, required, and accepted in a society.”. For the purposes of this paper, we'll emphasize the more informal and unwritten traits of norms. Because of the fact that they are deeply internalized in society (or institutions, in this case) as whole, they are important to determine behavior in groups, and are the part of the institutional matrix least likely to change in the short term (STEIN, 2008). For the National Security Council System, the norms that have stood the test of time are precisely the ones that grant the system an idea of informality, flexibility, and predominance of the Executive branch on decisions regarding organization and policy making<sup>3</sup>, such as infrequency of the meetings, shift of policy planning from the council to the staff, and lack of participation of the Senate on appointing new members (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009). As Cody Brown (2008) concludes:

Each President has made an independent determination of the type of NSC that would best serve the nation. But over time, it is clear that the NSC has evolved from a limited advisory council to a vast network of interagency groups that are deeply involved in integrating national security policy development, oversight of implementation, and crisis management. This evolution has not been the result of congressional action, but rather presidential determination, rooted in the increasingly complex task of managing and optimizing U.S. national security (BROWN, 2008, p. 81)

At large, president George W. Bush's National Security Council followed these norms, at least up until the terrorist attacks of 9/11: the council met infrequently, the president created and discarded *ad hoc* working groups within the NSC system, and for those first few months the Legislative branch was largely ignored. In addition to this, two other trends would become evident as time went on and as the international and national political environment changed: the NSA would

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<sup>3</sup> For further discussion on the roles played by the Executive and Legislative branches on foreign policy making, see Zegart (1999, 2009), Canes-wrone, Howell and Lewis (2008), and Jordan *et al* (2009).

take on a more discreet role, acting more in trying to keep a consensus among vice president Dick Cheney and secretary of defense Rumsfeld on one side and secretary of state Colin Powell on the other rather than formulating policy. Related to that, the NSC ended up losing some of its policymaking preeminence, acquired over the years since its creation, to the Department of Defense (BAKER, 2013). The vice president gained an unseen amount of power in the National Security Council. Not only he participated of every meeting, he also inserted his own personnel in the Principals Committee: his chief of staff and national security adviser to the vice president Lewis Libby, the deputy secretary of state Paul Wolfowitz, and at some capacity the deputy national security advisor for the president himself, Stephen Hadley (BOLTON, 2008). Vice president Cheney went as far as having the daily national security briefings presented to him a couple of hours before the official presentation to president Bush – where he was also present (BAKER, 2013).

President Obama’s National Security Council can be seen as an attempt to counteract the impression left over from president Bush’s foreign policy making. While Bush’s council was overreactive, “clique-y”, and vertical, Obama tried for a more slow-paced, though-through process, employing a staff with different views from his own (starting with vice president Joe Biden), and looking for a horizontalization of the interagency process, aiming to make information more readily available to those formulating policy and making decisions (WOODWARD, 2010). However, that is not necessarily the result: the president ended up empowering like-minded advisors, who prevailed over foreign policy specialists and even the National Security Advisors themselves. Because the previous administration had such a controversial foreign policy, and exited Office leaving behind two unpopular wars, the Obama administration oftentimes opted to approach national security matters almost hesitatingly, which was seen by many as inaction in the face of a threat (ROTHKOPF, 2014).

**Organizations** are defined as “[...] conceptually recognized entities that combine groups of people who follow defined common rules and purposes.” (STEIN, 2008, p. 141). As established, the National Security Council is divided into four organizations: the Council itself, the Principals Committee, and de Interagency Policy Committees. The changes occur not in the hierarchy, but in the composition of these organizations according to the president’s assessment.

The National Security Council under president George W. Bush at first seemed to follow the same model as presidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton before him, reinstalling the former’s Policy Coordination Committees and keeping the latter’s attention to transnational and economic matters (BOLTON, 2008). The main departure from previous administrations in terms of organization of the NSC was the inclusion of the National Security Advisor and Chief of Staff to the Vice President as a regular member of the Principal’s Committee, allowing him to attend every

meeting, as opposed to solely the ones to which he was invited. Another difference was the fact that the National Security Presidential Directive I (NSPD-I), which organized the NSC System, didn't use the term "statutory" or "nonstatutory" for its members. Rather, the document lists "regular attendees" for each organizational layer, thus circumventing the need to have new statutory members confirmed by the Senate (BROWN, 2008).

The NSC System organized by president Bush's NSPD-I was as follows: the Principals Committee would remain the "[...] senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security." (BUSH, 2001, p. 2). Regular attendees were the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Advisor) as the chairman. In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget would attend meetings pertaining to their duties. If international economic issues were included in the agenda, the Secretary of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy and the Secretary of Agriculture were expected to attend meetings coordinated by the National Security Advisor in coordination with the National Economic Advisor. The Deputies Committee would be the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum, prescribing and reviewing the work of the PCCs. Regular members included the Deputy National Security Advisor as chairman, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Director of OMB, the Deputy DCI, the Vice Chairman of the JCS, the Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, the Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. When international economic issues were on the agenda, the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs as co-chairman, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, a Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, and the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture were to attend. Finally, the Policy Coordination Committees were to be "[...] the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy." (BUSH, 2001, p. 4), and were staffed with members from the entities represented in the DC. There were six regional PPCs (Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa) and eleven PCCs on functional topics (democracy, human rights, and international operations; international development and humanitarian assistance; global environment; international finance; transnational economic issues; counter-terrorism and national preparedness; defense strategy, force structure, and planning; arms control; proliferation, counter proliferation, and homeland defense; intelligence and counterintelligence; and records access and information security) (BUSH, 2001).

The creation of the Homeland Security Council following the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought on another layer of coordination. Even though the newly created HSC was a separate organization, there was a lot of overlap pertaining the matters discussed in both Councils, and the National Security Advisor and the Homeland Security Advisor were to work together to coordinate such discussions (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009).

Organizationally, president Obama sought continuity in the National Security Council System – at least initially (BURKE, 2014). He kept a similar system as the one adopted by president Bush before him, but went back to referring the “statute” when addressing the members, and the traditional organization in a Principals Committee, a Deputies Committee and some form of regional and technical group structure to discuss specific policy. A notable difference, however, was the size of the council. In his first Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-1), which organized the National Security Council, the president invited the Counsel to the president to participate in every meeting, and employed the Deputy National Security Advisor to act as a secretary during the Council’s meetings. In addition, besides the usual provisions made in case the Council needed to discuss matters of international economy, the PPD-1 also predicted the participation of specialized personnel when the Council discussed matters related to science and technology, and homeland security (OBAMA, 2009).

President Obama’s PPD-I organized the NSC system as follows: the members of the Council were the president, the vice president, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. In addition, other statutory members that should attend every meeting were the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence. Additional members were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff (Chief of Staff to the President), and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor). The Counsel to the president was invited to attend every meeting. When the Council was to discuss matters of international economy, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers should attend the meeting; if the Council discussed homeland security or counter-terrorism related issues, the Homeland Security Advisor should be present; and if the Council was to discuss matters of science and technology, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy should attend (OBAMA, 2009).

The Principals Committee is formed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Representative of the United

States of America to the United Nations, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, the Deputy Secretary of State, the Counsel to the President, and the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs are also invited to every meeting. When matters of international economy were on the agenda, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy should attend the meeting; when homeland and counter-terrorism issues are raised, the Homeland Security Advisor should be president; and when the PC discusses matters of science and technology, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Office shall attend. The NSA may choose to wield their chairman position to the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy or to the HSA when seen fit. The Deputies Committee “[...] shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process [...] The NSC/DC shall also help ensure that issues being brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision.” (OBAMA, 2009, p. 3). The members are the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Deputy to the United States Representative to the United Nations, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. For international economic issues, the National Security Advisor for International Economics should be present; for matters of homeland and counter-terrorism, the Deputy Homeland Security Advisor; and for matters of science and technology, the Associate Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Finally, the Interagency Policy Committees (IPCs) – president Obama’s equivalent of president Bush’s PCCs – were responsible for the “[...] management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the United States Government.” (OBAMA, 2009, p. 4). Unlike president Bush, president Obama didn’t specify which IPCs were created, choosing to let the Deputies Committee, responsible for interacting with the IPCs, determine which ones should be created (OBAMA, 2009).

President Obama has been criticized because of the size of the NSC System. Such a massive structure is difficult to manage and monitor, which ended up taking the policymaking and decision making away from the official venues and into informal settings with smaller groups (ROTHKOPF, 2009). Not only did the members invited to the Council, PC and DC meetings increased, the size of the staff also bloated due to the president’s decision to merge the staff of the National Security Council and the staff of the Homeland Security Council under the title of National Security Staff –

later changed to National Security Council Staff. This move added at least another 30 people to the staff, and while the administration hasn't been straightforward with the exact size of the NSC System, some specialists estimate the number to be around 350 to 400 people (DEYOUNG, 2015).

**Regulations** are “[...] legal boundaries that set the rules of operation.” (STEIN, 2008, p. 141). For this paper, we interpret this as the legal documents that bind – or should bind – the work of the NSC system. The main documents are the National Security Act of 1947 – which established the National Security Council – and its following amendments – the first one coming about in 1949 and the most recent in 2015. There are also legislative and executive acts that don't target the NSC directly but, due to the interagency process, influence matters of the National Security Council system, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In addition, there are the executive directives (that vary in name: president Bush called them National Security Presidential Directives, while president Obama calls them Presidential Policy Directives), which are the tools presidents use to promote changes on the national security enterprise, and Executive Orders, which can be more varied in nature<sup>4</sup>.

It is important to keep in mind that the regulations for the NSC are in no way perfect or infallible. As pointed out by Zegart (1999, 2009) and Bruneau (2013), the National Security Act of 1947 was deeply flawed, and these flaws reflect on today's NSC System shortcomings.

For president Bush's terms, we'll be focusing on the National Security Presidential Directives, selected Executive Orders, and the IRTPA. During his time in office, president George W. Bush issued 66 National Security Presidential Directives: 41 on his first term and 15 on his second. He also issued 25 Homeland Security Presidential Directives in the course of his presidency, and due to the overlap between the NSC and the HSC, some of them were the same document: for instance, the NSPD-54 on Cybersecurity Policy is the same as HSPD-23, with both names in the heading. Due to the nature of the subject matter, some NSPD remain classified to the general public, and while all NSPD come from the president, not all of them receive the same attention. For example, NSPD-28 on Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and Security and NSPD-51 on National Continuity Policy are regarded as key documents of national security policy and decision-making, but NSPD-60, the second to last NSPD issued by president Bush, determines the creation of a National Security Policy Planning Committee, which, probably due to its obvious overlap with the NSC activities, is largely ignored by the national security community – even though president Obama hasn't dissolved it yet.

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<sup>4</sup> A presidential directive and an executive order have the same legal weight, and remain in effect from one administration to the other unless specified in the document or the new president issues a new one canceling or substituting it.

President Bush also issued 63 Executive Orders pertaining matters of national security, especially intelligence and terrorism<sup>5</sup>. It is interesting to notice that, prior to the 9/11 attacks, there was a period of over 2 years when no Executive Order dealt with national security issues. Before EO 13224 of September 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2001 (prohibiting transactions with people linked to terrorist activities), the last one had been EO 13129 on July 4<sup>th</sup>, 1999 (prohibiting transactions with the Taliban regime) (FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2015).

From the part of the Legislative branch, the main regulation passed on national security was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. While the text of the Act doesn't address the National Security Council itself, it substitutes the Director of Central Intelligence for the Director of National Intelligence as the main intelligence advisor to the President on the NSC (and the HSC) (US CONGRESS, 2004).

President Obama instated three types of executive directives: the Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), which are used to promulgate presidential decisions on national security; Presidential Study Directives (PSD), which initiate policy reviews; and Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), which was unknown until 2013 due to it being classified material. The president (or the NSA) has issued 30 PPDs, way less than his predecessor, of which 11 are available. Of note is the PPD 6 on Global Development, intended to put in motion the National Security Strategy guideline to strengthen regional partners regarding security, economic, and social issues, and thus promoting stability (OBAMA, 2010). He's also issued eleven PSDs, of which two are available. PSD 1 issued February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2009, directs the Homeland Security Advisor to review the interagency process looking for ways to improve the organization for homeland security and counter-terrorism policymaking. This study directive resulted in the integrations of the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council staffs. The PSDs offer support for the creation of PPDs. For instance, PSD 7 of August 31<sup>st</sup>, 2009 on U.S. Global Development Policy supported PPD 6 on Global Development, issued on September 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2009 (FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2015). The PPGs are a series of counter-terrorism policy standards and procedures, made public in 2013.

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<sup>5</sup> As listed by the Federation of American Scientists: 13224, 13228, 13231, 13233, MO 11.12.01, 13239, 13241, 13242, 13243, 13244, 13245, 13246, 13247, 13250, 13251, 13260, 13261, 13262, 13267, 13268, 13269, 13283, 13284, 13286, 13290, 13292, 13295, 13301, 13311, 13323, 13326, 13328, 13353, 13354, 13355, 13356, 13357, 13376, 13381, 13382, 113383, 13388, 13392, 13394, 13407, 13408, 13416, 13419, 13425, 13434, 13436, 13438, 13440, 13441, 13442, 13456, 13458, 13462, 13467, 13470, 13475, 13476, and 13486.

President Obama has also issued 27 Executive Orders<sup>6</sup> regarding national security matters, less than half of the amount his predecessor issued. Early on, some of these orders were reviewing policies put forth by the Bush administration, such as matters with classified documents and presidential records, and the lawfulness of interrogation techniques (FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS, 2015).

The next item listed by Stein is **capacities**. They are “[...] abilities of members to operate effectively to achieve the organization’s goal within its rules and purposes.” (STEIN, 2008, p. 141). In governmental agencies, the capacities can be technical – the knowledge the directors and staff have on the subject at hand – or political – the sway key players such as the National Security Advisor and the main deputies have over the administration. The role of the NSC system and the nature of its process demands a multidisciplinary staff, and indeed they come from multiple backgrounds: academia, private sector, other governmental agencies, and the military. The NSC staff is composed not only by employees of the council itself, but also government officials “borrowed” from the departments that make up the council, such as Defense and State.

An issue that hinders the capacities of the National Security Council System is the fact the principals and most staff changes with each new administration. According to Bolton (2008, p. 149), “[...] the history of presidential transitions has too often been the history of a new NSC team learning lessons the previous NSC team had learned on its watch”. The staff that is kept from one administration to the next oftentimes is met with skepticism and demotion (BOLTON, 2008).

The Bush administration had a technically competent staff, starting with the National Security Advisor herself. Condoleezza Rice is a scholar specialized in soviet studies, and maintained a good relationship with the Bush family since president George H.W. Bush’s administration, having Scowcroft as her mentor. She was politically and academically qualified for the job. However, the increased power granted to the vice president’s office coupled with his alliance with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld ended up shifting the policymaking process to the Department of Defense. The rivalry between the Department of State represented by Secretary Colin Powell and the DoD teamed up with vice president Cheney meant part of Rice’s job was to try and find common ground between these entities and prevent further rupture (BAKER, 2013). As a result, American foreign policy took on a more bellicose stance but at the same time lacked a national security strategy (BRUNEAU, 2011). In Bush’s second term, Rice was appointed Secretary of State, and Robert

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<sup>6</sup> As listed by the Federation of American Scientists: 13489, 13491, 13492, 13493, 13516, 13526, 13527, 13546, 13549, 13551, 13556, 13567, 13584, 13587, 13603, 13606, 13617, 13618, 13636, 13637, 13642, 13650, 13657, 13659, 13691, 13695, 13698, and 13702.



Gates substituted Rumsfeld at the Department of Defense, which meant newly promoted NSA Stephen Hadley had more freedom than Rice did to carry out his job.

According to Hew Strachan, as cited by Bruneau, Matei and Sakona (2009),

The National Security Council exists to make strategy, to align policy with operational capabilities... The clashes and competition between the State Department and the Department of Defense, like those between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CentCom, were not reconciled: strategy fell through the cracks (BRUNEAU; MATEI; SAKODA, 2009, p. 264).

The NSC during the Bush administration, and especially since the Iraq War, has failed to fulfill its specific roles, at the expense of the interagency process and sound national security strategy. It shows that, even if the NSC System had an abundance of technical capacity, the chief executive wasn't able to create a proper work environment and the NSC lost its political capacity and became weak (BRUNEAU; MATEI; SAKODA, 2009).

President Obama arrived in Office with the intent to put together a "team of rivals" across his administration, pledging to take into account a multitude of different views during the decision making process. This is reflected on the National Security Council: the president chose his democratic primaries running rival Hillary Clinton as his Secretary of State, he kept Bush's Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in charge of the DoD, and he appointed James L. Jones, who supported John McCain for president against Obama and whom he had met only twice previously, as his National Security Advisor. However, this model didn't last: James Jones resigned before completing the two years he'd agreed to upon taking the position, a move that was seen as resulting from his poor relationship with the president and other members of the NSC System. In fact, while most times the NSC of a president without previous foreign policy experience – such as Bush and Obama – starts off badly and then improves after a learning curve, Obama's NSC had a rough start with James Jones, improved when Tom Donilon became NSA – in terms of interagency coordination and policy making –, and did poorly again with Susan Rice as NSA, especially after the Lybia intervention (ROTHKPF, 2014).

As mentioned, Obama's NSC System was enlarged right from the beginning, with an increase both in the number of bureaucrats invited to the meetings of the Council, the Principals Committee and the Deputies Committee, as determined by PPD 1, and the number of staff added both in the IPCs and resulted from the merge with the Homeland Security Council staff. While the NSC System has been growing way before Obama became president, his administration is responsible for the biggest institution yet. However, the size of the institution doesn't necessary result in an increase in efficiency. In the words of Rothkopt (2009),

As a consequence, what also has happened over the years, as the group gets bigger and bigger, is that these bigger formal structures have proved unwieldy and the really key work has been done in smaller groups whether they are informal lunchtime conversations with the President or small regular phone groups between the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, which have been a common feature in recent administrations (ROTHKOPF, 2009, p. 3).

Lastly, there are the **incentives**, which are “[...] rewards and penalties that arise from different modes of behavior, [and] [...] can be material or nonmaterial and are often highly contextualized.” (STEIN, 2008, p. 141). They are perhaps the most difficult to identify in the case of the NSC system, since the system is formed from myriad people with different objectives and desires.

According to Zegart (1999), presidents have the national interest at heart, and because of that they should be in charge of foreign policy. On the other hand, Congress members’ incentives are reelection and campaign donations, so they’ll endorse whichever policy is more beneficial for these factors. Finally, bureaucrats aim for the survival of their agencies, oftentimes at the expense of efficiency and progress (ZEGART, 1999). While Zegart’s views on congress members and bureaucrats are reasonable, we disagree with her in regards to president’s interests: yes, national interest may be – and is – an important concern, but in general first-term presidents seek reelection, and second-term presidents seek recognition and to secure their Party’s continuity in power. To achieve either they must interpret the public opinion in regards to the political environment and act accordingly. That is why first-term presidents seldom take unpopular measures that will directly affect voters’ quality of life, for instance. In order to evaluate incentives, we’ll analyze the most prominent actors in the NSC<sup>7</sup>: the president, the vice president, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the national security advisor<sup>8</sup>.

For the first Bush administration, the aforementioned roles were occupied by Dick Cheney as vice president (2001-2009), Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense (2001-2006), Colin Powell as Secretary of State (2001-2005), and Condoleezza Rice as National Security Advisor (2001-2005). President Bush was elected on a platform based on domestic policy issues – tax cuts, public education reform, expansion of Medicare, and an overhaul for Social Security. When it came to foreign policy, governor Bush was the first to admit he had no knowledge on the matter. As such,

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<sup>7</sup> In the way we’re defining incentives – what motivates people to take certain actions –, they oftentimes are kept secret from the public and peers. For the sake of academic honesty, we have analyzed facts and documented behaviors of the people cited in this paper, but naturally have not been able to fully eliminate the risk of speculation.

<sup>8</sup> This selection was made based both on our own observations, as well as on literature regarding the composition of the NSC, such as Crabb and Mulcahy (1986, 1990), Prados (1991), Burke (2009), and Jordan *et al* (2009).

the new president elect attempted to surround himself with experienced foreign policy advisors, starting with Vice-president Dick Cheney.

Dick Cheney had a long history of public service before joining Bush's ticket for the 2000 presidential race. From 1969 to 1978 he served in myriad positions in the executive branch, including White House Chief of Staff to president Ford. It was during this period he first met Donald Rumsfeld and they formed a strong relationship based on similar views. He was then elected to the US House of Representatives until 1989, when he was appointed by George H. W. Bush to be Secretary of Defense, after John Tower didn't get Senate confirmation for the job. In contrast, during this period, George W. Bush was still laying the foundations of his future political career. After G.H.W. Bush's administration, Cheney went to work in the private sector until 2000, when Bush Jr. solicited his help in finding a suitable vice-president (BAKER, 2013). Whether or not the decision to put Cheney on the ticket stemmed from Bush or was a manipulated move calculated by Cheney from the start is still up for debate (GELLMAN, 2008), but the fact is he went on to become one of the most influential vice-presidents in American history, especially regarding national security issues. He met with the president almost every day, he managed to have his national security advisor become a member of the National Security Council, he suggested his old friend Donald Rumsfeld to the position of Secretary of Defense (after briefly considering accumulating the position along with the vice-presidency), and he even received national security daily briefings a couple of hours before the president himself (WOODWARD, 2006). While not much caring for domestic issues, Cheney and Rumsfeld often combined efforts to fill the foreign affairs deficit left by Bush's lack of experience, and furthered "ultra-hawkish" policy (BAKER, 2013). Following Scooter Libby's indictment<sup>9</sup> in 2005, the relationship between Cheney and Bush progressively deteriorated, and from then on Cheney had little say on the strategy for Iraq (WOODWARD, 2006).

Rumsfeld had even more experience than Cheney when he accepted the position of Secretary of Defense in 2001. He had been a Congressman in the 1960s, and in the 1970s he worked in the Nixon and Ford administrations, assuming the role of youngest Secretary of Defense to date in the latter. It was during his first stint as Secretary of Defense that a rivalry arose between him and George H. W. Bush, then Director of Central Intelligence (WOODWARD, 2002). Upon returning to the Pentagon, Rumsfeld started working on military modernization. Like Cheney, Rumsfeld held more belligerent positions that would often clash with those defended by Secretary of State Colin

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<sup>9</sup> Lewis "Scooter" Libby was Cheney's main aide, simultaneously holding the positions of Chief of Staff to the Vice President, National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and Assistant to the President. In 2005 he was indicted and later found guilty of obstruction of justice, perjury, and making false statement during the investigation of the leak of the covert identity of a CIA officer (BOLTON, 2008).

Powell. He was described as a “managerial and bureaucratic lone ranger” (WOODWARD, 2006, p. 364), who hindered the interagency process. His unwillingness to attend lower level meetings, reluctance to lend Pentagon employees to staff the NSC, and his outright refusal to accept what he perceived as orders from the National Security Advisor put him at odds with Condoleezza Rice as well, and eventually this attitude coupled with the declining popularity of the Iraq War ended up isolating him and led to his replacement (BAKER, 2013).

Colin Powell was a decorated general who served as National Security Advisor under president Reagan and as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under president George H. W. Bush. As Secretary of State for the G. W. Bush administration, Powell initially attempted to hold a prominent public image, especially after the China hostage situation, which he played an important part in solving. The president however, didn’t want Powell to become the public face of the administration, and would rein him in whenever he would become too outspoken (WOODWARD, 2002). Powell usually held moderate opinions: he wanted to increase sanctions to Iraq instead of overthrowing the regime, and he sustained the prisoners taken during the war in Afghanistan and Iraq should be protected under the Geneva Conventions and should not be tortured, to name a few. His centrist position directly opposed Cheney and Rumsfeld most of the time, and Powell’s mandate didn’t last through Bush’s reelection (BAKER, 2013).

Condoleezza Rice has had a close relationship to the Bush family since George H. W. Bush’s administration, when she served as staff at the NSC. After advising George W. Bush on foreign affairs during the 2000 presidential campaign, it was a natural step for her to become his National Security Advisor. From the start, Rice attempted to show herself as an honest broker, avoiding giving her opinion in meetings, seeking to coordinate the different ideas presented at NSC meetings to present an agreed upon course of action to the president, and relaying the president’s orders to their recipients. Not even her staff knew her personal positions on most issues. However, due to her close personal relationship with the president, it is speculated that in her daily meetings with him she would reveal her positions and act as a counselor. Her brokerage was also weakened by her constant appearances in the press (BURKE, 2009). Rice was in a delicate position as NSA, since her colleagues expected her to play the role of referee in the internal disputes of the NSC (BOLTON, 2008). Powell complained that she didn’t rein Rumsfeld in when he would disregard previously agreed policy; Rumsfeld complained that she would overstep her boundaries as NSA and try to give him orders; Cheney had attempted to take over the principals committee, a traditional NSA function, and when Rice raised an issue president Bush sided with her (WOODWARD, 2006). She was the natural candidate for the position of Secretary of State after Colin Powell’s resignation at the end of Bush’s first term. Rice was hesitant to accept the position, but caved when Bush said he was

committed to the Palestinian cause. She was confirmed as Secretary of State in the Senate by a vote of 85-13, largely due to the unpopularity of the Iraq war. As Secretary of State, Rice furthered the concept of “Transformational Diplomacy”, based on the expansion of democratic governments, and led a department-wide restructuring (UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, 2006).

Condoleezza Rice was succeeded as NSA by her deputy, Stephen Hadley. Hadley had been Cheney’s aide, and was appointed by him to be deputy National Security Advisor. He had served on the National Security Council staff during the Ford administration, and had been assistant secretary of defense for international security policy under Cheney (WOODWARD, 2006). During the campaign he was a member of the Vulcans, the foreign policy advisory team led by Condoleezza Rice, responsible for briefing then-candidate George W. Bush on matters of national security and foreign affairs (BOLTON, 2008). As a deputy, he worked hard on the plans to invade Iraq and the subsequent occupation of the country, and when Rice decided to accept the position of Secretary of State she spoke highly of Hadley to take her place as NSA. Hadley too was hesitant to continue on the new administration. He believed Bush needed to replace his national security team, especially because of the Iraq War. He finally accepted knowing that his relationship with Rumsfeld would have to change, but that at the same time it would be difficult to make Rumsfeld go from seeing him as Rice’s second to seeing him as a peer. Hadley aimed to be a discreet NSA, without the visibility that Rice attracted, working behind the scenes mainly on the issue of the Iraq War (WOODWARD, 2006).

Robert Gates was first approached by the Bush administration in February 2005 for the newly created position of Director of National Intelligence, which he declined. He opposed the new legislation when it passed, and he was satisfied at his job as President of Texas A&M. Gates had served under five presidents, mainly at the CIA, where he achieved the post of Director of Central Intelligence, but also at the National Security Council, including a period as Deputy National Security Advisor under George H.W. Bush (GATES, 2014). When Bush Jr. invited Gates to become Secretary of Defense in 2006, the Republican Party had suffered a major loss at the mid-term elections, and many republicans at the time blamed the negative outcome on Rumsfeld and the Iraq War (BOLTON, 2008). Upon taking office, Gates maintained most of the Defense Department personnel that worked under Rumsfeld, including his “special assistant” Robert Rangel. Gates got along very well with the rest of the NSC principals – currently Condi Rice, Steve Hadley and him are consulting partners in their own private firm – both at the Bush and later at the Obama administration. His goal was to mend the relationships between the Department of Defense and other institutions connected to national security policymaking, improve civilian-military relations,

and find a solution to the Iraq War. He supported the Surge strategy for Iraq<sup>10</sup> in 2007, which was ultimately successful in reducing the level of violence in the country (BAKER, 2013). He and other members of the military publicly defended a similar strategy for Afghanistan in the beginning of the Obama administration, which put him and the rest of the Pentagon at odds with the president (ALTER, 2014). Gates was the first Secretary of Defense to serve under two presidents of different parties, and he justified his decision to stay with his patriotism, love for the military, and the fact that the US was still in the middle of two wars (GATES, 2014; WOODWARD, 2010). Gates retired from public service in 2011, which he had announced he would do in the previous year, and was succeeded by Leo Panetta.

Obama was elected and re-elected on a platform to end the wars in the Middle East. During his first campaign, he promised to transfer troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, and in the 2012 run he said he wanted to pull the troops from Afghanistan by 2014. Obama recognized the merits of some of the critical elements of his predecessor's policy, and adapted and applied them throughout his presidency. However, after a decade and a half of war in the Middle East, the increasingly negative image of the US around the world, and the unpopularity of Bush's foreign policy among American voters led Obama to adopt an agenda to "[...] downsize American primacy, reducing worldwide expectations for American action and leadership in every problem that others addressed." (RENSHON, 2014, p.85). Much like Bush, Obama didn't have a strong inclination to foreign affairs, and preferred to focus on domestic policy. Regarding the wars he inherited, he reluctantly followed Bush's policies, but in the majority of other foreign policy issues he opted to disengage (RENSHON, 2014).

Obama asked Joe Biden to be his running mate after running against him for the Democratic nomination in 2007. Biden had been a US Senator since 1973, was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee for many years until his inauguration as vice president, which granted him more experience in foreign policy than Obama had. Even though Biden didn't have experience in the Executive branch like Cheney had before becoming vice president, he demonstrated great knowledge when dealing with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (JENTLESON, 2014). Back in 2007 he passed a bill in the Senate defending a decentralized administration in Iraq, favoring strong local governments controlled by Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds, taking into consideration the historical and sociological reality of the country. He was also against a surge strategy in Afghanistan, arguing that a "boots off the ground" approach to deal with al Qaeda would be more effective and less costly (ETZIONI, 2014; ROTHKOPF, 2014). According to Robert Gates, who disagreed with the vice

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<sup>10</sup> The Surge was a strategy to increase the number of troops in Iraq in order to secure the key areas of the country and make sure the political succession in Iraq would happen safely and democratically.

president in nearly every foreign policy issue, Biden got along well with the NSC staff and other cabinet members, being “impossible not to like” (GATES, 2014, p.454). Biden was different from his predecessor mainly in his deference to the President. Unlike Cheney, who was perceived as an independent actor pursuing his own agenda, Biden was seen as being loyal and supportive of Obama, even when their opinions differed (OSNOS, 2014).

After Gates’ retirement, Obama struggled to achieve continuity at the Department of Defense, going through three different Defense Secretaries in five years. Gates was succeeded by Leon Panetta, who had been a Congressman from 1977 to 1993, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 1993 to 1994, Bill Clinton’s Chief of Staff from 1994 to 1997, and Director of the CIA from 2009 to 2011 before accepting the nomination of Secretary of Defense. To accept the job, Panetta had a few conditions, amongst them having the same access to the president as Gates did, be consulted in every decision regarding the military, and being able to go to his home state often to be with his family. Panetta was announced as Secretary of Defense the same week the operation to kill Osama bin Laden – which he planned and oversaw as Director of the CIA – was successful (PANETTA, 2014). The transition from Gates to Panetta was relatively smooth: Gates was leaving by his own volition and they got along well (JENTLESON, 2014). Even though they had different styles – Gates was more serious, while Panetta was more irreverent –, there was continuity in the improvement of civilian-military relations and the interest on the wellbeing of those serving in the military. Panetta didn’t intend to revolutionize the Pentagon, but he did oversee the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and remove barriers to allow women to serve in direct combat positions in the military. He left office in the end of Obama’s first term, along with Hillary Clinton and Tom Donilon (ALEXANDER, 2013).

Panetta was succeeded by Charles “Chuck” Hagel, who had served as a sergeant in the Vietnam War, had been a businessman and Senator for the Republican Party. However, his opposition to the Iraq war and dubious stance on Israel caused many Republicans to oppose his nomination, which was confirmed by the Senate with a close vote (JENTLESON, 2014). As Secretary of Defense, Hagel managed to further manage the budget cuts in defense and armed forces, gave insight on combat experience to the NSC, and made the services fall into line. However, he did not get along very well with his colleagues in the NSC and often held opinions that clashed with Susan Rice and Obama, and with the rising threat of ISIL causing the public to demand changes in the national security apparatus, Hagel was the obvious choice to get cut (COOPER, 2014).

Hagel successor was Ashton Carter, who currently holds the position. Carter was an academic and since 1993 has worked at the Defense Department. Since taking office, Carter has

held tough positions against Russia and China, and has criticized Iraq's military in keeping ISIL under control (CARTER, 2015).

Hillary Clinton was invited to be Secretary of State after a tough race for the Democrat presidential nomination in 2007. Clinton had been first lady of Arkansas, first lady of the United States, and a two term Senator for the state of New York before accepting the position of Secretary of State. Clinton's aspiration to become president has been speculated since her husband occupied the post, and she has worked to hone her political experience ever since. Thus, the job in the Department of State made sense to achieve her ultimate goal. Clinton and Obama had cultivated a good relationship when they were both Democrat senators, but their bond suffered during the presidential nomination race, and it took a while for her and Obama to rebuild trust (WOODWARD, 2010). Following a period of courtship, Obama convinced Clinton to accept the position of Secretary of State, and after a short awkward phase they "proved to be quite collaborative" (WOODWARD, 2010, p. 398). Clinton succeeded in advancing Obama's diplomatic program, and they seldom disagreed on important policies (JENTLESON, 2014). Her term was marked by the Benghazi attack controversy, but she also restored US influence in international arenas, improved relations with Asian countries, and furthered the agenda of women and LGBT+ rights (HURLBURT, 2016). She maintained a good working relationship with the principals in the NSC and with the NSA, with the occasional exception of Leon Panetta and James Jones (GATES, 2014). Clinton left the Department of State on good terms at the end of Obama's first term, and was succeeded by John Kerry.

John Kerry served in the military in the late 1960's, and was Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts in 1982. He was a US Senator from 1985 to 2013 when he accepted the position of Secretary of State. In the Senate, he chaired the Committee on Foreign Relations from 2009 to 2013, granting him some experience with foreign policy. Prior to that, Kerry was the Democratic nominee in the 2004 presidential race against George W. Bush, when he lost by a bit over 2% of the votes. As Secretary of State, Kerry has so far worked hard to bridge the trust gap between the US and Russia, especially regarding the situation in Syria, and on pushing the Paris agreement on climate change (KERRY, 2016).

James L. Jones was asked to be Obama's National Security Advisor after meeting the president – then candidate – only a couple of times. Obama agreed with Jones' assessment of the flaws in Bush's NSC, and believed he would know how to solve them. Jones defended that the NSA should develop a way to measure progress towards the set goals, as well as be able to achieve said goals without micromanaging the department and agencies. He was known for being independent and outspoken, and the fact that he couldn't be seen as an extension to the president was an asset (WOODWARD, 2010). However, as Jones himself mentioned on his first meeting with Obama, he



didn't see himself as a good aide, and would be better suited for the role of Secretary of State. He had had a long career in the military and retired as a four-star general in the Marine Corps, and occupied prestigious posts such as supreme allied commander Europe, so the routine as a senior staff officer such as the National Security Advisor working fifteen-hour days was hard to get accustomed to. Additionally, he never really formed a close relationship to the president, and was unable to follow his operating style, two important factors to be an effective NSA (DESTLER, 2010). Jones had trouble earning the trust of both the president and other members of the administration, who eventually called for his resignation, which happened in October 2010, 21 months after he started he job (ROTHKOPF, 2014).

Tom Donilon, Jones' Deputy National Security Advisor, was chosen to succeed him. As Deputy NSA, Donilon had become one of Obama's closest advisors, and he was already performing some of the NSA duties that Jones refused to get involved (DESTLER, 2010). He worked long hours and was highly efficient in his job, choosing to stay away from the spotlight. Donilon was highly involved in the formulation of Obama's strategy in Afghanistan, and he was the NSA when bin Laden was killed. Donilon advocated for the "pivot to East Asia" strategy, and the quick withdraw of American troops in Afghanistan, which at times put him at odds with other departments. Another trait that angered other agencies was Donilon's constant search for consensus, which slowed down the policymaking process (WILSON, 2013). After helping with the transition between Obama's first and second administration, Donilon resigned and Susan Rice was chosen to replace him (LANDLER, 2013).

Susan Rice was a US diplomat and the US ambassador to the United Nations before accepting the job of National Security Advisor. She has maintained a higher profile than Jones and Donilon, and is also seen as more combative and less conciliator than her predecessors. Rice has been in charge of the NSC during the escalation of the tensions with Russia, the increasing threat of ISIS, and the exposure of the US cyber security weaknesses, but has maintained that the current situation is an improvement if compared to previous years (BEAUCHAMP, 2016).

**Table 1 - National Security Council Members 2001-2016**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
P	George W. Bush								Barack Obama							
VP	D. Cheney								J. Biden							
SD	D. Rumsfeld						R. Gates			L. Panetta		C. Hagel		A. Carter		
SS	C. Powell				C. Rice				H. Clinton				J. Kerry			
NSA	C. Rice				S. Hadley				J. Jones		T. Donilon			S. Rice		

Source: the author (2016)

As seen, the incentives vary between the actors. While the presidents' incentives tend to be more straightforward, the bureaucrats have different ambitions, such as an elected office, a promotion to a more prestigious position, or leaving a legacy upon retiring. In a system that usually relies heavily in a principal-agent model, the actors' incentives must be taken into consideration when regarding policymaking.

In Table 2 there is a concise summary of the institutional matrix for the NSC system during the administrations of president George W. Bush (2001-2009) and Barack Obama (2009-2013).

**Table 2 - NSC Institutional Matrix 2001-2015**

Category	Definition	Bush	Obama
Norms	Informal rules that govern what is expected, required, and accepted in a society. Important to determine behavior in groups	More power to the Sec of Defense and VP; Low profile NSA; Overreactive.	Risk aversion; Attempted horizontalization; White House-centric.
Organizations	Conceptually recognized entities that combine groups of people who follow defined rules and purposes	Inclusion of NSA to the VP in the PC; Creation of the Homeland Security Council; Inclusion of Secretary of Energy in the NSC.	Incorporation of Homeland Security Council staff; Inclusion of Science and Technology office; Inclusion of Counsel to the President.
Regulations	Legal boundaries that set the rules of operation.	66 NSPD; 25 HSPD; 63 Executive Orders	30 PPD; 11 PSD; PPG; 27 Executive Orders
Capacities	Abilities of members to operate effectively to achieve the agency's goal within its rules and purposes	Competition between departments; Loss of political capacity.	Attempted "Team of Rivals"; Enlarged Council and staff.
Incentives	Rewards and penalties that arise from different modes of behavior.	Middle East stabilization	Counterbalance Russia and China; end Middle East wars.

Source: the author (2016)

## 2.4 The driving forces behind the NSC institutional changes

As we have established, the National Security Council has gone through quite a few changes since 2001. Some of them were incremental, and some represented a bigger shift in policymaking. In this section we'll review some of the institutional changes we outlined in the previous section, and apply punctuated equilibrium theory to classify them as either incremental change or a "branching point", based on their causes – original design, bureaucratic interests, or external events – and consequences for the institutions or policy.

### 2.4.1 Incremental Changes

The bibliography on punctuated equilibrium theory applied to the social sciences has failed to come up with a concise and objective definition for “incremental”, especially regarding institutional changes. To complete this analysis, we determined that the incremental changes are those that don’t have a direct or immediate impact on policymaking, or ones that do not require an official change in regulation by an oversight body, such as the Congress or the Senate.

#### *2.4.1.1 Inclusion of the NSA to the Vice President in the Principals Committee*

The central role played by Dick Cheney in the NSC process was one of the main changes the Council went through in Bush’s first term. The vice president managed not only to accumulate a lot of power in his hands, but also to have strong allies in important roles in the national security enterprise, making him the most influential American vice president in the modern era (AUERSWALD, 2011).

The presence of Scooter Libby at the NSC Principals Committee is an indicator of Cheney’s interest in participating actively in the national security apparatus. Libby worked closely with Cheney during the presidential campaign, leading the effort to prepare Cheney for the vice presidential debate. After the election, Cheney invited Libby to be his National Security Advisor, position he would only accept if he got to be Cheney’s Chief of Staff as well, giving him command of every employee of the Office of the Vice President. Cheney not only accepted the condition, but he also arranged for Bush to appoint Libby as assistant to the president, which virtually put him in the same rank as Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and Bush’s political advisor Karl Rove (GELLMAN, 2008).

Aside from Rice’s deputy Steve Hadley, Libby was the only person who was not a principal to attend both the National Security Council meetings chaired by the president, and the Principals Committee meetings chaired by Rice (BOLTON, 2008). Libby supported Cheney and Rumsfeld’s position to take a more bellicose stance against the US enemies, which routinely caused friction with Secretary of State Colin Powell, who tended to defend the diplomatic route. Libby’s presence at the NSC and principals committee meetings meant one more voice to counter Colin Powell’s moderate proposals (ROTHKOPF, 2005). Powell, who had little access to the president and was the only moderate voice in the NSC since Rice refused to voice her opinion, grew increasingly frustrated by the obstacles imposed by Cheney and his allies on his policy suggestions, and it didn’t come as a surprise to him when Bush asked him to resign in favor of Rice (BAKER, 2013).

Libby actively participated in the effort to link the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to Saddam Hussein, joining Cheney on long and frequent meetings with CIA officials where they routinely demonstrated preparedness and knowledge of the facts regarding Iraq and al Qaeda. According to CIA director George Tenet, at their first meeting on the subject at CIA headquarters on September 2002, they “*arrived with such detailed knowledge on people, sources, and timelines that the senior CIA analytic manager doing the briefing that day simply could not compete.*” (TENET, 2007, p. 343) After countless meetings at the CIA headquarters and assurances from Tenet and his aides that there was no intelligence proving such link, Libby and the rest of Cheney’s allies begun sustaining the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that Hussein intended to use against the US and its allies (WOODWARD, 2006).

#### 2.4.1.2 *Enlargement of the NSC Staff*

Since 1990 the National Security Council Staff has been steadily growing, from about 50 people in 1990 to over double that number in 2000 (DAALDER; DESTLER, 2000). By the end of the Bush administration, the NSC Staff was comprised of 200 people, and today, the NSC is speculated to employ around 400 people, an all time high since its creation in 1947 (DEYOUNG, 2015).

Part of its growth is expected with the ever-rising complexity of national security threats faced by the US. According to Jordan *et al* (2009, p. 213), “as policy needs expand, so does government”. However, the current NSC has grown out of control, and it has affected its efficacy and efficiency (ROTHKOPF, 2014).

The increase in the NSC staff in the Obama administration can be explained by a few facts other than the complex nature of security issues. First, it is common for incoming presidents to employ a good part of their campaign aides in the newly formed administration, performing the policy roles they were responsible for during the presidential run. The Obama presidential campaign employed over 300 foreign policy aides, 100 more than the National Security Council staff under Bush at the time. Even if not every one of them went on to become NSC staff, it is safe to assume most of them did (ROTHKOPF, 2014). Second, Obama added the ambassador to the UN as a member of the Council, folded the Homeland Security Council created by Bush, into the NSC – thus adding 35 people to the NSC staff – and created offices for cybersecurity, WMDs, and “resilience” (RENSHON, 2014; DEYOUNG, 2015). Third, he transferred the leadership of the interagency policy committees, which were previously chaired by an agency or department of interest, to NSC staff members (DEYOUNG, 2015). Finally, he reactivated – or at least gave more

prominence to – the Interagency National Security Lawyers Group, “an elite council of the top lawyers from each of the core national security-foreign policy agencies. [...] [The group met] to debate highly fraught national security legal-policy issues [and] provided advice to the policymakers at each stage in the bureaucratic process.” (SAVAGE, 2015, p. 64-65).

Since the system was designed towards consensus, such a sharp increase of personnel would logically hamper any attempt at compromise (JORDAN *et al.*, 2009). The system became redundant, repeating the work of the State Department, for instance, but with less expertise, because while the NSC is overstaffed for its original purposes, it is understaffed and underfunded for the role it had been attempting to fill (ROTHKOPF, 2014). The increasing number of interagency committees also results in more meetings and reports on subjects that unknowingly often overlap with other committees, wasting time and resources (DEYOUNG, 2015). The initiatives taken by president Obama had the clear goal of improving the comprehensive consideration of imminent national security issues, but they have failed to translate into better policy (RENSHON, 2014).

#### 2.4.2 Punctuated Changes

Punctuated changes are the ones that have a deep and direct impact on the institutional policy-making process and on the public policy. For this analysis we have selected the increased power Cheney and his allies had and the policy shift in Asia toward China.

##### 2.4.2.1 *Increased Power to Vice President and Secretary of Defense*

Before the presidential inauguration, Joshua Bolton – Bush’s chief of Staff – asked Scooter Libby – Cheney’s Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor – what kind of job Cheney would perform as vice president. Traditionally, vice presidents would advise the president when the latter requested, chair commissions, or focus on a particular issue, such as the environment for example. Cheney made clear from the beginning he would be an exceptionally engaged vice president, and would get involved in matters regarding not only policy issues, such as the economy, the environment, and mainly national security, but he would also take a more managerial role, overseeing appointments and nominations (GELLMAN, 2008).

From the beginning, Cheney received *carte blanche* from Bush to attend any meeting he wished, and so he did throughout his tenure as vice president. He attended about 80 percent of Bush’s meetings, and was a regular at the NSC principal committee meetings, which was uncommon for a vice president, and he also attended deputy committee meetings from time to time

(DAALDER; LINDSAY, 2003). Cheney also managed to arrange frequent one-on-one time with the president: Bush and him had lunch together alone once a week, and Cheney was present for Bush's daily security briefings at the Oval Office, an hour after Cheney himself had the same briefing at his home. This way, Cheney could have contributions ready for the president when he asked. As Gellman (2008) puts it, "[...] information was power. Cheney sought it widely and creatively, and used it to shape what the president learned and when." (GELLMAN, 2008, p. 278).

Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld met when Rumsfeld worked at the Office of Economic Opportunity under president Nixon and hired Cheney to work as congressional relations. From the on, they forged a strong personal and professional relationship, and worked together in different positions and different administrations. It was Cheney's idea to invite Rumsfeld to be Secretary of Defense, and Bush complied even though Rumsfeld and George H. W. Bush had been rivals over two decades earlier. Throughout their almost six years serving as principals at Bush's NSC, Rumsfeld and Cheney always stood by each other in the fights with Powell and Rice over policy. Both men were "ultra-hawkish" neoconservatives, so whenever they suggested a more assertive military solution, Powell would counter with a moderate diplomatic option. Powell's team would refer to Cheney and Rumsfeld as "'secretive, little-known cabal' intent on subverting the process to advance a radical agenda." (BAKER, 2013, p. 362).

In addition to Rumsfeld, Cheney managed to put other allies in key positions in the administration: Libby as his Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor, Paul Wolfowitz as Deputy Secretary of Defense, Doug Feith as Undersecretary of Defense, and Paul O'Neill as Secretary of Treasury (HAYES, 2007). His own staff at the Office of the Vice President was comprised of fifteen aides. His predecessor had less than half of that. In practice Cheney had three opportunities to give his input during the policymaking process: through his staff on the committees developing policies, in cabinet-level meetings he attended as he wished, or when he met with the president one-on-one (BOLTON, 2008).

Still, all this apparatus wasn't enough to secure Cheney's and Rumsfeld's policy suggestions would prevail. Before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bush had taken Powell's side at both major national security policy issues of the first eight months: Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction, and the Chinese plane debacle.

Ousting Saddam Hussein from power was in the American foreign policy agenda since the Gulf War. Clinton's administration had discussed it but never took action (DAALDER; LINDSAY, 2003). In the first NSC meeting of the Bush administration, Iraq and Saddam's destabilizing role in the region were the subject. George Tenet presented the room with a photo taken recently by a reconnaissance plane of a building that looked like a factory in Iraq. Tenet speculated that it could

be a plant to produce chemical or biological weapons, but admitted there was no confirming intelligence. While Cheney and Rumsfeld discussed logistics of a possible attack against Saddam, Powell made the case of more efficient sanctions, which would hurt the regime but not the Iraqi people (SUSKIND, 2004; ROTHKOPF, 2014). Still, with Cheney's support, Rumsfeld attempted to keep Iraq on the agenda by calling a meeting to discuss it. In July he sent a memo to Cheney, Rice and Powell outlining three possible strategies to deal with Iraq: discontinue the sanctions, since they weren't effective; enlist allies in the region to oust Saddam Hussein; or attempt to negotiate with Hussein. The memo didn't mention a direct military action, but the Secretary of Defense was assertive in his assessment that if Saddam Hussein were to be overthrown, the US would enjoy a more comfortable position in the region. The meeting Rumsfeld wanted never took place (BAKER, 2013).

In April 2001, an US Navy spy plane was captured while flying near China. The Chinese government took the 24 crew members as hostages, demanding an apology from the American government (WOODWARD, 2006). Rumsfeld and Cheney were against issuing an apology, maintaining that the American crew was flying over international waters and did nothing illegal (BAKER, 2013). Not only that, Rumsfeld felt China should be somehow penalized for its behavior. For him, since the hostages were Defense Department personnel, it was the Pentagon that should deal with the crisis, not the State Department. Instead, the US government sent a letter to the Chinese Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs saying that the US "regretted" the incident, which was regarded as an apology and acknowledgement of guilt (RUMSFELD, 2011). The incident was publicized as a victory of the Department of State and Powell received the credit for the successful negotiation.

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, things began to shift in favor of a more aggressive approach to foreign policy. The US military had boots on the ground in Afghanistan less than a month after the attacks. Soon, the Taliban regime was overthrown, and al Qaeda, along with bin Laden, went into hiding. Almost immediately, the issue of what to do with the prisoners taken during the invasion arose, and tensions between Cheney and Rumsfeld and Powell were obvious. With the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and away from the American courts' jurisdiction, the subject of how to classify them was discussed. Powell and Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that they should be held under the Geneva Conventions, even though technically they didn't apply (WOODWARD, 2006). On the other hand, Cheney and Rumsfeld argued that if they considered the detainees prisoners of war under the Convention, they would not be allowed to use "enhanced interrogation techniques" to get information that could possibly avoid new terrorist attacks. In the end, Bush decided that al Qaeda terrorists were not covered by any international war convention, and that the Taliban soldiers, while classified under Geneva, were considered illegal combatants and

thus were not POW. Objectively, Bush adopted diplomatic language to follow Cheney's advice (BAKER, 2013).

After the attack on the WTC, Cheney's allies saw the opportunity to push for a more aggressive policy against Saddam Hussein. However, after Wolfowitz insistence in tackling Saddam right away at the first "War Cabinet" meeting since 9/11, Bush made it clear that the national security apparatus would first deal with the confirmed enemy: al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (BAKER, 2013). Still, Bush's initial focus on Afghanistan didn't stop Cheney, Rumsfeld and their aides from looking for links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. In his memoir, George Tenet highlights how insistent Cheney and Libby were at some point with their inquiries about Iraq's ties with terrorism. (TENET, 2007).

As the war in Afghanistan progressed, the Taliban regime was toppled and Bush's popularity reached 90 percent, an all time high for him. Yet, the press and staff started to get uneasy the longer it took to capture Bin Laden. In October 2001 American troops captured two Pakistani scientists who were helping al Qaeda to build a nuclear device. In this context, Cheney was convinced that a strategy of containment regarding Saddam Hussein wasn't enough anymore. After the Gulf War Saddam's regime had chemical weapons and was attempting to make a nuclear bomb, and the vice president didn't want to risk these types of weapon falling in the hands of terrorists in case there was a connection between Iraq and al Qaeda (BAKER, 2013). Around that time, Bush instructed Rumsfeld to review the US military plans for Iraq in case he decided to engage (WOODWARD, 2006). With Afghanistan seemingly under control, great public support against Saddam Hussein, and increasing accounts of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Bush started planning the invasion that would only take place in 2003 (ROTHKOPF, 2005). Vice president Cheney took the opportunity the terrorist attacks of 9/11 provided to further his foreign policy agenda, with the support of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld as well as his aides.

#### *2.4.2.2 Incentive to Focus on China*

The rise of China is a well-documented fact. The country is ranked number 2 in GDP after the US, and its average annual economic growth rate has been around 10 percent for over a decade, which is astounding for a developed country. For the last two decades, China has improved its economic relations with key regions, such as the Middle East, where it has secured oil and gas to supply its economic growth rate, Africa, and Latin America, where it has replaced the US as Brazil's main trading partner. On the diplomatic front, China has made alliances both in the developing world, with initiatives like the BRICS, and with developed countries in Europe. Russia has become



a greater ally for China in the last five years, with an increase in trade and diplomatic relations. Chinese military spending has also increased, and today China is the third greatest spender in the world behind the US and Russia. Its increasing reach in the region, especially in the South Chinese Sea, has become a security issue for US strategists (JENTLESON, 2014).

Since 2009, China has gradually abandoned its “peaceful rise” and has taken a more aggressive stance that more than once interfered in US interests. The Asian country has been reluctant to compromise at the UN Climate Change Conference, has suspended dialogues and promoted sanctions against the US and US companies with connection to Taiwan, protested US-South Korea military exercises in the Yellow Sea, asserted claims to disputed islands in the region, and has in general demonstrated hostility toward democratic countries (ROSS, 2012; LIND, 2014).

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan winded down, and since China’s adoption of a more assertive stance, the US has shifted its strategic focus to Asia. The region holds economic and military interests for the US. According to then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the region is strategically important because

[...] open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players (CLINTON, 2011).

Thus, to insure its stake at the region, the US put forth the “Pivot to Asia” strategy in 2012. It consisted in “[...] strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening [...] working relationships with emerging powers [...]; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights.” (CLINTON, 2011). Even though the trend of increasing economic and military cooperation with Asia was already established before the Obama administration, the “Pivot to Asia” was a way to emphasize that the Middle East was no longer the center of US foreign policy concerns, and to remind China that the Asia-Pacific region is part of America’s strategic domain.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the rise of China are events of different natures for a variety of reasons, two of which are important to note: one is the actor – Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization with no state power, whose objective is to end US influence in the Muslim world through violent acts, while China is a legitimate state actors whose stated goals are on par with other state actors and in compliance with international laws. The other is the length: the 9/11 attacks were planned in

secret and its occurrence happened in a day, while the rise of China has been in the making for decades, and the shifts caused by it have been in progress ever since. However, since the purpose of this paper is not to analyze these events nor compare them, we believe the inclusion of them does not result in a theoretical or empirical issue.

## 2.5 Conclusions

While Zegart’s model is incredibly insightful, its main flaw might be a lack of concept definition that eschewed her analysis: what does she mean by “importance” when she ranks agency’s original design, bureaucratic interests, and external events in order of importance in agency evolution? If it is related to frequency of change, then her classification makes sense: indeed, original design and actors’ interests cause change in national security agencies more often than external events. However, if by “importance” she means intensity, then her rank is incorrect: external events tend to cause a bigger rupture, or at least a greater shift, in agencies’ changes.

In order to solve this predicament, we employed punctuated equilibrium theory to review the changes occurred in the National Security Council during the Bush (2001-2008) and Obama (2009-2016) administrations. We first classified these changes in one of the five categories devised by Stein (2008) – norms, organization, rules, incentives and capabilities –, then we identified the possible cause of the change – agency’s original design, changing interests of bureaucratic actors, or external events –, and finally we determined what consequences these changes might have had for institutions or policies. We could then regard them as incremental or punctuated changes, and formulated the following table:

**Table 3 - Institutional Changes: causes and consequences**

	<b>Cause</b>	<b>Change</b>	<b>Consequence</b>
<b>Incremental</b>	Cheney’s interests	VP-NSA Principals Committee	Powell weakening; More bellicose foreign policy
	Agency design; Obama’s interests	Enlargement of NSC	Loss in efficacy and efficiency.
<b>Punctuated</b>	9/11 terrorist attacks; Cheney’s interests	Increase power to VP and SD	Afghanistan policy; Iraq war.
	Rise of China;	Focus on China	Pivot to Asia

Source: the author (2016)

We can derive a few conclusions from this model. First, we found that institutional changes can – and often do – have more than one cause: the increased power of the vice president and the secretary of defense was caused both by Cheney’s interests and by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, for

example. One institutional change can also have more than one consequence, as is the case of the presence of the national security advisor to the vice president at the Principals Committee. As for the nature of the changes, we have found that incremental changes tend to be caused by flaws at the agency's design or by the changing interests of bureaucratic actors. These kinds of changes also occur more often than punctuated changes. Punctuated changes are usually caused by external events, at times coupled with other factors as well. They take longer to come into effect, and often come under more scrutiny by the press and specialists than incremental changes.

The use of punctuated equilibrium theory coupled with Zegart's modified institutionalist theory applied to national security agencies was successful to analyze the case of the US National Security Council, and its use can be extended to other national security agencies both in the American system as well as in other countries. Stein's institutional matrix provided an appropriate foundation to build a framework to compare changes within the agency, and it can be modified to compare changes within the agency, and it can be modified to make comparisons between different agencies. We believe this theoretical set can be empirically applied to different situations to further the national security institutions research agenda.

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### 3 AGENDA DE PESQUISA

O estudo das mudanças institucionais é de extrema importância para entender como as instituições em sistemas políticos se desenvolvem e evoluem face a fatores endógenos e exógenos. Em adição a um aprofundamento do presente estudo, a abordagem utilizada nesse trabalho – aplicação da teoria do equilíbrio pontuado ao neoinstitucionalismo modificado de Zegart – pode ser empregada na busca por respostas de diversos outros questionamentos. Assim, a agenda de pesquisa a ser seguida nos próximos anos é extensa e diversificada.

Primeiramente, pode-se optar por manter o presente objeto – o Conselho de Segurança Nacional dos EUA – e aprofundar a atual análise, posto que o presente artigo não foi suficiente para aprofundar as causas e consequências de cada mudança institucional identificada. Em adição, pode-se também ampliar a análise cronologicamente, aplicando essa abordagem tanto a administrações anteriores quanto a administrações futuras, a medida que as informações ficarem disponíveis. Ainda focando no sistema político estadunidense, pode-se realizar uma análise similar à apresentada aqui de outros órgãos de segurança nacional, como a CIA e o Joint Chiefs of Staff, como fez a Zegart, mas também o Departamento de Defesa e o Departamento de Estado por exemplo.

A pesquisa também pode focar nos atores que formam a burocracia de segurança nacional e como o relacionamento entre eles e as posições que eles tomam influenciam a formação da política de segurança nacional. O trabalho de Crabb e Mulcahy (1986 e 1991) é um ponto de partida interessante: os autores analisam no livro *Presidents and Foreign Policy Making: From FDR to Reagan* como o relacionamento entre o presidente, o conselheiro de segurança nacional, e o secretário de defesa influencia nas decisões do Conselho de Segurança Nacional. Em outro livro, *American National Security: a Presidential Perspective*, eles analisam e classificam os conselheiros de segurança nacional entre administradores, coordenadores, conselheiros e agentes, dependendo do nível de responsabilidade na formulação e implementação de política de segurança nacional que cada um exerce. O trabalho deles pode ser atualizado não só com os atores que ocuparam essas posições desde a publicação dos livros, mas também com um referencial teórico mais moderno e uma metodologia de análise mais estruturada.

Alternativamente, uma abordagem interessante é o aumento do papel do setor privado nas questões de segurança nacional. Esse aumento se dá tanto na indústria de armamentos, veículos, e equipamentos, quanto na utilização de *private contractors* – civis treinados por empresas de segurança privadas que são contratadas pelo governo e atuam em posições de policiamento e segurança em zonas de guerra. Podemos utilizar o framework aqui criado para determinar uma



eventual mudança na dinâmica interna do CSN devido a maior utilização de empresas de segurança em detrimento das forças armadas, em especial o exército.

Outra possibilidade é expandir o escopo da pesquisa, realizando uma análise comparativa transnacional, examinando as mudanças institucionais de agências de segurança nacional em diferentes países. Para tanto, a referência metodológica mais adequada seria a análise institucional comparativa. Este método se concentra em explorar como diferentes variáveis estão ligadas, estruturando assim a explicação do processo político em questão. Esta abordagem permite entender a continuidade das políticas dentro dos países e a variação das políticas entre os países, e pretende relacionar essas semelhanças e diferenças de instituições com um resultado de interesse, neste caso a política de segurança nacional. Para começar, é preciso ponderar *o que, como e quando* comparar. Os estudos de caso são selecionados com base em uma mistura de Design de Sistemas Mais Diferentes (DSMD) e Design de Sistemas Mais Similar (DSMS). A abordagem DSMS se baseia em diferenças contextuais e unidades invariáveis de variação, e pode sofrer com problemas de validade externa. Por sua vez, a abordagem DSMS controla o contexto, mas variáveis diferentes, e pode sofrer com questões de validade interna<sup>1</sup>. Os casos selecionados apresentam entre si contextos semelhantes e diferenciados, bem como unidades de variação fixas e variáveis, o que resulta em um interessante exercício comparativo.

O institucionalismo e a teoria do equilíbrio pontuado tem sido aplicados de forma bem sucedida em diversos campos. O subcampo da segurança nacional nos Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais tem muito a ganhar com uma maior interação com essas teorias, e a extensa agenda de pesquisa aqui apresentada é apenas uma fração do tipo de pesquisa que pode ser feita utilizando tais referenciais.

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<sup>1</sup> Embora idealmente os pesquisadores conseguiram eliminar completamente problemas de validade interna ou externa, na realidade isso é praticamente impossível (PENNINGS; KEMAN; KLEINNIJENHUIS, 2003).

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